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READERS' NOTES 
This study was requested by the President and senior management of the International 
Development Research Centre, based on a recommendation in the study, Secretariats Housed at 
IDRC. It was managed by the Evaluation Unit of IDRC in collaboration with Internal Audit. The 
process was guided by an internal Review Committee drawn from across the Centre. Members of 
the Review Committee were Louise Brouzes, Brian Davy, Chantall Fortin, Sharon 
Messerschmidt, Terry Smutylo and Fred Carden (Convenor) assisted by Edith Ofwona. A senior 
Advisory Committee oversaw the Review, composed of the President, Maureen O'Neil; Vice 
Presidents Ray Audet, Pierre Beemans, and Caroline Pestieau; and Antoine Hawara, Director of 
Internal Audit. 
The study was undertaken and the report has been prepared by independent consultants, Dr. Jim 
Armstrong and Dr. Anne Whyte with contributions from Henry McCandless. The financial data 
and statistics used have been provided and verified by Internal Audit. A draft report and 
recommendations were reviewed by the Review Committee, the Senior Management Committee 
and Secretariat Executive Directors and staff, together with a number of IDRC staff who 
participated in a series of workshops held as part of the research and reporting back process. The 
workshops benefited from the assistance of Sarah Earl. In addition, input was received from 
Secretariats and IDRC staff based in the Regional Offices. 
The case studies in Part 2 have been researched and written from a strategic perspective with an 
eye to abstracting managerial lessons that would be helpful for reviewing Secretariats as a 
program implementation modality within IDRC. Therefore the case studies are not an assessment 
of the Secretariat scientific or technical programs, which was not part of the mandate of this 
Review. Each Executive Director or responsible official was given an opportunity to discuss the 
case studies and to correct inaccuracies. However, the views expressed and the conclusions drawn 
in both the case studies and the final report are those of the authors. 
We would like to thank the many people in the Secretariats and IDRC and those on the 
Secretariat Steering Committees representing IDRC's external partners, who so generously 
provided their time and energy in sharing information and insights with us. Without the 
considerable effort on the part of the Evaluation Unit, the Review Committee, the managers and 
staff of the Secretariats and IDRC, this study would not have been possible. 
Dr. Jim Armstrong 
Dr. Anne Whyte 
November 19, 1998 
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A REVIEW OF IDRC SECRETARIATS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Secretariat modality provides an innovative and flexible organizational mechanism to address 
many complex development needs. IDRC has experimented widely with the Secretariat modality, 
developing considerable, valuable, and unique organizational expertise. The Secretariat modality 
has been used for about 20 select IDRC activities during the past six years. While a small number 
of Secretariats have been disappointments, most have achieved some success and others have 
been very successful. In spite of widespread application of the modality and the overall success of 
Secretariats at IDRC, several questions remained unanswered about the utility of Secretariats. 
This Review addresses these questions. It came to three major conclusions. First, Secretariats 
work. They help IDRC achieve its mission and meet its objectives, and have resulted in numerous 
tangible benefits. Second, they are a cost-effective means of leveraging scarce funds and provide 
good value-for-money. Third, to maximize Secretariat performance, the environment in which 
they operate needs to be improved starting with a corporate strategic framework for Secretariats. 
PERFORMANCE OF SECRETARIATS AS A MODALITY 
Prior to this Review, donors had never been systematically surveyed to determine the degree to 
which their needs were being met. Of 18 donor representatives interviewed, only two rated the 
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performance of the Secretariat that they sponsor negatively. Five were completely satisfied, eight 
quite satisfied and three satisfied with performance. When asked to compare the Secretariat's 
performance with other donor-funded activities with which they are familiar, 75% rated it above 
or far above average. All respondents had positive comments on network-building, one of the 
principal functions of Secretariats. Donors' views of IDRC as an organization have 
unquestionably improved through their experiences with Secretariats. 
IDRC staff were also positive. Three out of four felt that Secretariats had a positive impact on 
international development. Senior management and governors indicated that their expectation of 
Secretariats had been largely met, with only one in 20 providing a negative answer. This group 
was very clear about the benefits of Secretariats for IDRC, including better visibility, presence, 
prestige, profile, international status, recognition, ability to tap new opportunities, and possibilities 
of working collaboratively with donors. The main area of concern identified by this group was the 
quality and appropriateness of the performance information that they receive. 
The review of collective performance concluded that Secretariats contribute positively to IDRC as 
an organization and to its corporate mission, and constitute an effective means of collaborating 
with other agencies. The ten Secretariats reviewed attracted over $88 million in external funding 
between 1992 and 1998. During this same period, IDRC invested $20 million in these 
Secretariats. The proportion of total external funds being received by IDRC for its Secretariats 
has increased from 43% in 1992 to an average of 80% in the last two years. 
The ten Secretariats examined account for $3.3 million in direct annual expenditure by IDRC. 
Against the backdrop of the long lists of activities and accomplishments of Secretariats provided 
in the report, it is concluded that Secretariats do provide good value-for-money. 
RECOMMENDATION I -BUSINESS PLANNING 
In other jurisdictions, the first step in moving toward an alternative service delivery mechanism is 
the development of a business plan. For the first five years of creating Secretariats in IDRC, this 
step was missed. The answers to the questions emerging from an examination of lessons learned 
go a long way toward the development of a business plan. 
A business plan outline for Secretariats that reflects lessons learned and IDRC's unique 
mandate should be developed and applied. 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
While overall performance of Secretariats has been satisfactory, some issues about performance 
management remain. First, as indicated by the need for a strategic framework, performance 
standards and expectations for Secretariats as a whole are not clearly defined and need to be 
developed as part of the corporate strategy. Second, it was observed that performance indicators 
for individual Secretariats are, in many cases, underdeveloped. Finally, serious concern was 
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expressed about the quality and reliability of performance reporting to senior management and the 
Board. While almost all interviewees were comfortable with performance levels, many expressed 
unease with the fact that their comfort was based largely on anecdotal evidence. The lack of 
concrete performance measures and accurate, careful reporting were frequently mentioned as 
problems in this area. Sixteen of 19 Senior Management or Board members who answered the 
question expressed serious concerns about the quality and appropriateness of the performance 
information they receive. 
RECOMMENDATION 2 - PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
Board members have indicated the need for clear and concise information that is less narrative and 
more focused on assessing performance against approved targets and milestones, so that the 
Board can make judgements on the basis of information provided to them. IDRC and key 
Secretariat staff should assist the Board in determining the type, quality and timing of the 
information needed. 
a) Performance targets and measurement criteria should be developed to provide 
feedback to the Secretariats, donor partners, IDRC staff, management, and the 
Board. 
b) IDRC should assist the Board in determining the information they need on 
Secretariat performance so that due diligence can be exercised 
c) Mechanisms should be established to share information with partners. 
The Review concluded that more information sharing is needed between the IDRC Board and 
management and the donor partners contributing to the Secretariats. A number of Board members 
indicated that they need more direct information from donors about how their needs are being 
met. Currently, the main information channel is the Executive Director of the Secretariat. While 
this will remain the most important channel, it needs to be complemented with mechanisms for 
direct consultations between IDRC senior management and the Board, and donor partners. These 
mechanisms could include a series of short reports, a survey, or meetings arranged around the 
time of the IDRC Board meeting to which key donors are invited. 
RECOMMENDATION 3 -ACCOUNTABILITY 
As in other public sector jurisdictions using alternative service delivery models, establishing clear 
and rigorous accountability frameworks is perhaps the single most important task. Who is 
responsible for what? and Who should answer to whom, for what? are critical questions that have 
not yet been answered. When collaborative partnerships are involved, the issue of accountability 
becomes even more complex and critical. 
The focus in achieving the goal of financial accountability (ensuring that expenditures are made in 
accordance with authorities conferred by Parliament) should not be a complex set of rules that 
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limits flexibility in service delivery or achieves important organizational objectives. Rather, the 
focus should be on transparency and on readily accessible, clear and concise information about 
finances and collaborative partnership arrangements. Following are accountability self-assessment 
questions that the Board of Governors should ask itself- 
Is the Board of Governors satisfied that the arrangements in place will achieve the 
goals of the legislation under which it operates? 
Is the Board satisfied that the persons who will carry out the tasks under the 
accountability arrangement are properly qualified and trained to do so? 
Is there a need for, and in the affirmative, does the arrangement contain, proper 
provision for the monitoring, control, etc. of IDRC's work? 
Are proper means in place to receive reports on the carrying out of the tasks and to 
deal with problems as they arise? 
Does the accountability system clearly spell out the responsibilities of each party to the 
arrangement, the objectives pursued, and the information that will be collected and 
provided to monitor the carrying out of the arrangement? 
Does the arrangement achieve the goals of other federal legislation and policies that 
are relevant? 
Will information on the arrangement, financial, and other, be readily available? 
While this framework is no guarantee against any or all accusations, it should assist governors in 
taking the necessary steps to ensure that, when arrangements are put in place, the Board can 
account properly for the decisions they have taken and defend them effectively. 
Government has focused on expanding the role of audit toward a more comprehensive approach 
as part of its efforts to achieve accountability in government. By combining the results of these 
audits, one is provided with a holistic view of the organization. This is the basis of the 
comprehensive audit. 
a) IDRC Senior Management Committee should work with the Board of Governors to 
develop an accountability framework for Secretariats. 
b) Within this Board approved accountability framework, each Secretariat Steering 
Committee should adopt its own accountabilityframework, which is approved by 
SMC. 
c) IDRC should continue moving toward a more comprehensive approach in its 
audits of Secretariats including financial audit, operational audits, management 
audits, value-for-money audits and performance audits in addition to the 
traditional compliance audit approach. 
Following the approach developed in this Review, it is suggested that IDRC avoid using someone 
from outside the organization to develop an accountability framework. This needs to be 
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developed by SMC and key Secretariat staff in collaboration with the Board, and receive Board 
approval. This framework would cover: 
The respective powers, responsibilities and accountabilities of the Steering Committee 
and Executive Director 
The Secretariat's intended achievement and performance standards 
The types of learning to be gained and shared 
Reporting of performance results and learning 
Reporting on compliance with administrative policy and donor agreements. 
RECOMMENDATION 4 - STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR SECRETARIATS 
Interviews indicated a broad consensus about the lack of a strategic framework for Secretariats. 
Everyone, including Senior Management and Governors, was unanimous that a strategic 
framework for Secretariats was essential and missing. The need for a framework establishing a 
conducive environment in which Secretariats can flourish was seen as urgent. Interestingly, while 
almost all respondents saw value in Secretariats, few, if any, could identify where IDRC intended 
to go with the modality, or what criteria were used in making decisions about Secretariats. 
A strategic framework for Secretariats should be developed under the leadership of the 
President. The five interrelated elements of this framework are: strategic direction, 
business planning, performance management, accountability, and operations and 
structure. The strategic framework should: 
Ensure the full utilization of the capabilities inherent in the total organization 
Integrate all components for the organization to ensure unity in action and purpose 
for the entire organization, and 
Identify future related activities that define the direction of Secretariats within the 
organization. 
LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE 
The lessons drawn from the detailed case histories of Secretariats examined for this Review fall 
into three main categories: capacity, focus, and relationships. When contemplating starting a 
Secretariat, one of the first and most important questions that must be explored is whether or not 
the financial and personnel capacity are in place to carry out the new activity effectively. Of the 
problems emerging from the use of Secretariats at IDRC, the capacity issue emerged with the 
most frequency and posed the most serious problems. Examples of critical questions to be asked 
about financial capacity include: Have the proposed activities been properly costed and 
realistically assessed? What secured funds have been committed from outside partners now and in 
the future? What are the financial contingency plans? 
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Critical questions to be asked about personnel capacity include: Have required staff resource 
levels been assessed in terms of the work plan proposed? Have the core competencies been 
identified for the staff who will be required to carry out the work described in the work plan? 
What characteristics, competencies and expertise would the leader of the new Secretariat require 
to ensure international credibility and partner support? 
Lessons about the need to have a precise focus include the need for realistic objectives and time 
frames. By design, Secretariats are small organizational units focused very precisely on a specific 
development issue. Questions that need to be posed about focus include: Are the mission and 
objectives focused sharply enough to reflect a degree of realism? Is the mission achievable? Do 
the mission and objectives appeal to existing and potential partners including IDRC? Are they 
easily understood and conceptualized? 
Many lessons about relationships emerged, including organizational and human relationships. At 
the highest level of relationships, it appears that Secretariats with missions in harmony with 
broader Canadian public policy objectives have the most chances of receiving sustained support. 
At another level of relationships, success seems to require strong interpersonal relations with 
IDRC staff, Steering Committee members, and network constituents. Critical questions to be 
addressed about relationships include: Are IDRC's knowledge and expertise adequate to support, 
guide and oversee the activity under consideration? Does the activity fit within IDRC's broader 
strategic framework? 
RECOMMENDATION 5 - OPERATIONS AND STRUCTURE 
Operational and structural changes alone are not expected to significantly improve Secretariat 
operation and governance. More important is the overall corporate strategic framework which 
encompasses business planning practices, performance management, and accountability 
mechanisms as well as operational and structural matters. Structural changes without a strategic 
framework would be of minimal benefit. Further, the reviewers maintain that, until a corporate 
strategic framework is developed and approved, it would be premature to initiate costly 
organizational changes, or attempt to resolve a number of outstanding administrative issues in 
isolation from a strategic framework. 
Reflecting the capacity issue discussed earlier, one of the main conclusions of this and other 
reviews is the fact that the skills, abilities, and competencies of the Executive Director are critical 
to the success of any Secretariat. However, the Review found that little attention was given to the 
competencies required by new Secretariats prior to staffing decisions. While in many cases there 
was a happy coincidence in that required skills were available and suitably assigned, this was not 
always the case. 
a) Core individual and team competencies should be determined for each Secretariat 
before staffing actions are taken. 
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b) An external senior person reporting to the President should be engaged to work 
with a dedicated task force to develop the strategic framework required for 
Secretariats. 
The terms of reference for the Secretariat Task Force would be to help IDRC develop a strategic 
management and accountability framework for the Secretariats with the aim of sorting out most, if 
not all, of the many issues raised in this Review. This exercise should be tightly managed and 
involve all SMC members together with input from the Secretariats. It should have a definitive six 
month maximum time line from initiation to Board approval. The terms of reference for this 
Review do not allow for the development of the strategic management framework that is the 
necessary first step before contemplating either major structural changes in IDRC or the 
establishment of new Secretariats. More important however is the need to involve key IDRC staff, 
SMC and the Board in the process of developing a corporate strategy. Detailed recommendations 
by external consultants and corporate strategies developed outside an organization are likely to sit 
on the shelf unimplemented because they are not internalized by the very people who must make 
them work. 
REVIEW MANDATE 
The mandate for this first comprehensive Review of the IDRC Secretariat modality was to identify 
ways in which IDRC and the Secretariats could better help each other fulfil their respective 
objectives. An assessment of the performance of Secretariats as a modality was carried out in 
order to determine how best to operate and govern them. The mandate was not to review 
individual Secretariats. 
The following questions are central to the Review: 
How well do Secretariats fulfill their intended roles? 
What are the outcomes of the work of Secretariats? 
What factors within the Secretariats themselves and within IDRC as the host 
organization determine the performance of Secretariats? 
What impact do Secretariats have on the achievement of IDRC's mission and 
objectives? 
Are appropriate accountability and management mechanisms in place to allow IDRC 
to effectively discharge responsibility and fulfill the Centre's obligations to other 
donors and to the IDRC Board? 
Can these mechanisms be improved, by what means, and who is responsible? 
WHAT ARE SECRETARIATS? 
IDRC, like public sector organizations the world over, has been experimenting with various forms 
of alternative service delivery. These experiments have led to the creation of semi-autonomous, 
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mission-focused organizations and various forms of partnerships with external bodies. The belief 
is that flexibility in the design and delivery of programs and autonomy from restrictive 
bureaucratic policies and practices are required to maximize performance. Further, the complex 
policy and development issues facing the public sector can only be dealt with effectively through 
collaborative efforts as they typically cut across national, institutional, and disciplinary boundaries. 
Secretariats constitute a unique approach to collaboration and partnerships on specific 
development issues. They facilitate donor co-ordination and reduce fragmentation by channeling 
funds and pooling effort into a specific priority activity. They foster innovation, as they enable 
IDRC and its partners to limit the risk associated with new, untried ventures by focusing efforts, 
limiting scope and long term commitment, sharing costs, and allowing rapid start-up, mid-course 
adjustments, and exit. By housing the Secretariats in IDRC physically and organizationally, the 
need to build new institutions and infrastructure is minimized. All donors benefit from a more 
cost-effective arrangement. 
A Secretariat has many of the following characteristics: 
It is an operation supported by IDRC but, because it requires a special identifiable 
focus, it is kept separate from the rest of the Centre 
It is active in a field relevant to IDRC's competence and programming 
It is funded by one or more donors, in addition to IDRC 
Its programming is governed by a Steering Committee that often comprises 
representatives of the sponsoring organizations and experts in the field 
It carries out the program of work approved by the Steering Committee 
Its work is likely to be conducted over a fixed period of time (Guidelines for 
Secretariats Housed at IDRC). 
ABOUT THIS REVIEW 
Much important information for this Review came from case studies on ten Secretariats selected 
because they cover the full range of Secretariats in terms of research emphasis and donor 
involvement (Part 2). 
IDRC SECRETARIATS CASE STUDIES 
SECRETARIAT CREATED 
MI (Micronutrient Initiative) 1992 
SIFR (Secretariat for International Fisheries Research) 1992 
WETV (The Global Access Television Network) 1993 
EEPSEA (Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia) 1993 
ITI (International Tobacco Initiative) 1993 
Bellanet (Global Electronic Forum) 1994 
IMFN (International Model Forest Network) 1995 
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ATPS (African Technology Policy Secretariat) 1997 
SISERA (Sec. for Institutional Support for Economic Research in Africa) 1997 
FoodLinks (Linking Food Chains) 1997 
Data for the Review came primarily from detailed interviews carried out with 93 key informants 
including IDRC staff, Secretariat staff, donors, IDRC Senior Management Committee members, 
and Governors (Volume 3). It also came from a series of workshops held with IDRC and 
Secretariat staff and with senior management (Volume 3). In addition, a detailed Literature 
Review was carried out (Volume 2) - The extensive Literature Review carried out with the 
assistance of the IDRC Library staff revealed that hardly any research has been published that 
directly relates to the Secretariat modality or to collaborative partnerships. However, there was a 
considerable amount of literature on creating more autonomous agencies and building 
organizations to foster innovation and creativity. Other sources of information included a review 
of existing documents, studies, evaluations, audits, and management reports and extensive 
comments on the draft report that was widely circulated. 
The approach to the Review was designed to: 
Involve and engage as many staff and other key informants as possible 
Take a strategic rather than technical, prescriptive approach 
Identify a few key recommendations that would result in significant improvement 
Ensure that IDRC officials were involved in the refinement and implementation of the 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
SECRETARIATS AND IDRC 
INTRODUCTION 
Empowerment through knowledge. Such is IDRC's mission. In pursuing this mission over many 
years in development research, IDRC has refined its own approach: 
Knowledge is the key: Sustainable improvements in human well-being depend on 
knowledge - its production, distribution, ownership, and wise application 
Research is the means: Research done in and by a country is vitally important for the 
production of knowledge needed for its development 
People are the vehicle: Development takes place when men, women, and their 
communities develop the ability to identify and solve their own problems 
Sustainable and equitable development is the goal: IDRC is pledged to the generation 
and use of knowledge in ways that alleviate poverty and improve people's lives. 
IDRC's mission and approach have led it to define its programs around specific development 
issues. This holistic, focused way of dealing with increasingly complex and serious problems 
related to global poverty has resulted in the implementation of new and evolving organizational 
forms. 
IDRC has taken a leadership role on the cutting edge of many new areas of research and in the 
application of innovative organizational mechanisms. International Secretariats are one of these 
program delivery mechanisms. They are intended to achieve greater impact on program priorities 
through careful and specific targeting of resources and formal collaboration with partners external 
to IDRC. Secretariats are created and administered in accordance with special guidelines 
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approved by IDRC's Board of Governors. While each of them is unique, Secretariats share a 
number of fundamental characteristics. They generally have a focused mandate and a distinctive 
governance and organizational structure. They are usually funded by a consortium of donors 
including IDRC. Although they enjoy a higher level of autonomy and often visibility, legally, they 
are still part of IDRC. 
In experimenting with forms of alternative service delivery, IDRC has been part of a broad 
movement within the public sector. Perhaps the two most important defining tendencies of this 
movement are semi-autonomous agencies and collaborative partnerships. 
Recent experiments with semi-autonomous agencies, both in Canada and abroad, have been 
driven, to a large extent, by a desire for more flexibility in the design and delivery of programs. 
This is achieved by changing the relationship between service providers within a line department 
and the central agencies that manage them. Agencies are seen as a way of improving service and 
performance by separating policy from operations and then locating the latter in new structures 
outside of the existing bureaucracy. This independence allows the agency to establish new rules 
and procedures that make its operations more flexible, cost effective, responsible, and responsive. 
At the same time, it must continue to operate within the policy framework set by government. 
Examples abound: Canada's Food Inspection Agency, Special Operating Agencies, Executive 
Agencies in the UK, State-owned Enterprises in New Zealand, and Business Enterprises in 
Australia. 
Many of the major issues facing governments, including health, security, environment, 
employment and competitiveness, involve multiple jurisdictions and sectors. Effective strategies 
for dealing with them therefore require collaboration and partnering, often at a number of levels. 
This holds just as true for issues in international development. Recent examples highlighting this 
trend toward partnerships include: Community Health Services in New Brunswick, Prince 
Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia; Partners in Innovation to develop new 
technologies in road construction between Nova Scotia and its universities; Knowledge Economy 
Partnership between Prince Edward Island, Industry Canada, educational institutions, and the 
private sector; Human Resource Development Canada's Labour Market Development 
Agreements, which re-establish an entire policy field as a collaborative enterprise; and IDRC 
Secretariats that collaborate with other international development organizations to focus on 
specific development issues. 
In at least one important way, IDRC's Secretariats go beyond this public management trend in 
that, for the most part, they attempt to establish an international leadership role in a specifically 
defined area. Typically, the other applications aim at improved service and reduced costs and do 
not have ambitions as lofty as IDRC's Secretariats. 
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WHY SECRETARIATS? 
As this Review will show, not only were the Secretariats in IDRC part of a broader movement 
within the Canadian public sector to experiment with alternative forms of program delivery, but 
there was a specific organizational and historical context within IDRC which led to some of the 
early initiatives to establish Secretariats. Some of the reasons expounded at that time related to 
IDRC's own survival and to the preservation of its programs, staff and budget. This historic 
context should not detract from the benefits that Secretariats have since demonstrated as a 
program delivery mechanism and which are more relevant to answering the question now: why 
Secretariats? 
The benefits of the Secretariat mechanism include: 
Facilitating donor co-ordination and collaboration, thereby avoiding duplication, 
competition and fragmentation of effort 
Channelling funds and efforts into a specific priority program 
Extending the capacity of existing IDRC infrastructures through the creation of arms- 
length organizations that can be started 
Enabling IDRC and its partners to limit risk in new, untried ventures 
Facilitating selective use of special program delivery approaches that might be 
problematic if pursued through normal institutional means - advocacy work, joint 
ventures, technical assistance, and the provision of research grants are examples 
Providing revenue diversification for IDRC 
Providing more effective identity and profile to help mobilize new resources 
Providing an attractive and effective mechanism for involvement and engagement of 
collaborators. 
This Review will show that the Secretariat mechanism can provide, and has provided, all of these 
benefits to IDRC, even if individual Secretariats have not scored highly in all areas. The Review 
will also show that there are common threads to the ways in which the Secretariat mechanism can 
be further strengthened as IDRC looks towards the future. Secretariats do successfully carry out 
their program mandates. They attract more partners and more external funding than other 
program mechanisms in IDRC. However, they have not always achieved their own goals for 
funding and partnership within the time anticipated, nor have they always been as successful as 
they might have been. Some of the reasons for this lie within IDRC's own corporate culture and 
policies, both of which can be adjusted to be even more supportive to Secretariats and thus 
underwrite IDRC's successful innovation in program implementation and inter-agency 
collaboration. 
There has been a pattern in the past of establishing small Secretariats trying to carry out large 
mandates with minimal resources (both financial and human resources), of banking on optimistic 
scenarios and shying away from hard decisions, of IDRC becoming the donor of last resort and 
other donors not living up to earlier expectations. All these lessons can be incorporated into an 
improved framework for Secretariats, by clarifying the conditions necessary for them to be 
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established, the agreements negotiated with partners, the resources provided to carry out the 
mandate, and a clear exit strategy. 
The general reply to the question why Secretariats? has to be a clear endorsement that they are a 
successful modality for IDRC to deliver certain programs, that they complement IDRC's other 
modalities, bring increased credibility and stature to IDRC, and can be made even more effective. 
While a small number of Secretariats have been disappointments, most have achieved some 
success and others have been very successful. In spite of wide spread application of the modality, 
the use of several similar alternative service delivery mechanisms in public services the world 
over, and the overall success of Secretariats at IDRC, there is still an undercurrent of doubt about 
IDRC's commitment to the Secretariat modality. It provides an innovative and flexible 
organizational mechanism to address many complex development needs. IDRC has experimented 
widely with the Secretariat modality, developing considerable, valuable, and unique organizational 
expertise. The Centre may wish to consider further the criteria for establishing a Secretariat, both 
in differentiating Secretariats from other program modalities, and in defining IDRC's expectations 
for its performance. The current criteria, identified in the Guidelines for Secretariats Housed at 
IDRC, do not adequately distinguish between Secretariats and other program activities and do not 
fit IDRC's existing Secretariats. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES ON IDRC NETWORKS AND SECRETARIATS 
While IDRC has not been alone in experimenting with new organizational mechanisms, it has been 
at it longer than most. To date, IDRC has used this approach in about 20 different applications. 
Secretariats have been employed and refined since 1992. There have also been a number of 
studies and examinations of the use of networks and of Secretariats housed at IDRC, including: 
R. Schwass, Partner Satisfaction with IDRC's Management and Administration of 
Co funded Projects, 1996 
Phillip English, The Governance of Networks: The Experience of IDRC's Social 
Sciences Division in sub-Saharan Africa, 1995 
IDRC, Some Experiences with "Secretariats ", 1994 
Working Group, Secretariats Housed at IDRC-Guidelines for Secretariats Housed at 
IDRC, 1996 (revised 1998), approved in 1996 by IDRC's Board of Governors. 
The most noteworthy observation about these and other related studies is the fact that much good 
work has been done with scant impact. There has been little uptake on the learning contained in 
these studies. For example, the Working Group Report, Secretariats Housed at IDRC, contains 
26 administrative recommendations as well as the Guidelines for Secretariats Housed at IDRC. 
Further, the interviews carried out for this Review revealed that, while many people involved with 
Secretariats may know about the existence of these Guidelines, surprisingly few are aware of their 
contents. 
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While findings of earlier reports were not based on a generic examination of the Secretariat 
mechanism but on studies of subsets of Secretariats, many are reaffirmed and will appear once 
again in this Review. Examples of the earlier findings include: 
The internationality of Secretariats is an issue since most of the funding is Canadian, 
and practically all of it comes from CIDA. (Schwass) 
The goal of Secretariats should be to encourage local and regional organizations to 
take full responsibility for the networks as soon as their capacities will permit the 
transfer and IDRC should not expect a long-term role as convenor of such networks. 
In this and other respects, IDRC tends to hang on for too long. (Schwass) 
Several Secretariats have faltered because roles/objectives have been set too widely 
or have not been defined precisely. Secretariats must be crystal clear on what they 
can do that individual agencies cannot do... [When they attempt] to address all 
problems simultaneously... they end up accomplishing very few things well or 
completely. (Some Experiences with "Secretariats ") 
The more successful Secretariats target specific countries or regions as an initial entry 
point (Some Experiences with "Secretariats ") 
Secretariats should set clear and realistic boundaries on what can be realistically 
achieved within the time frame of available guaranteed and committed funding. (Some 
Experiences with "Secretariats ") 
A common problem with many Secretariats has been that they adopt a broad mandate 
but neglect to provide adequate staffing and recruit staff that are not well suited to 
the job at hand... there is often a mismatch between the work that must be done and 
the skills that staff possess. (Some Experiences with "Secretariats ") 
Several networks suffered most from the decision not to have a full-time Executive 
Director. (English) 
One should hire the strongest [Executive Director] possible and be prepared to pay 
the competitive price. The position is a very demanding one and the success of the 
network depends more than anything else on this individual. (English) 
The host organization needs to spend a lot of time nurturing without obstructing. A 
significant degree of autonomy is needed to foster the collaborator involvement and 
local ownership that underpin most capacity-building enterprises (English). 
Some of these findings seem to have been lost on IDRC and the lessons not adequately 
internalized. Problems may include: too many recommendations, the fact that many of them deal 
with relatively low level administrative matters, no entry point or responsibility centre for 
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Secretariats, the lack of identification of someone responsible for taking action on the 
recommendations, and the absence of a consultative process. 
HISTORY OF SECRETARIATS AT IDRC 
FORERUNNERS TO THE SECRETARIATS 
Prior to 1992, IDRC had worked with other donors on collaborative program delivery 
mechanisms similar in broad outline and objectives to Secretariats and had been a key player, in 
1987, in developing AERC (African Economic Research Consortium), which was initially hosted 
by the Rockefeller Foundation with IDRC chairing the Steering Committee. This initiative, 
regarded as a model for several of the later Secretariats, had in fact a very different history from 
that which was to unfold for the IDRC International Secretariats. 
Although AERC emerged from previous IDRC supported research networks, it was established at 
the outset as an independent legal entity by the donors. Its first Executive Director and inspiration 
was a former IDRC Program Officer. It was first located in the Rockefeller Foundation head 
office in New York, and then in IDRC's Regional Office in Nairobi. Despite its close links with 
IDRC, AERC was therefore very different from the IDRC Secretariats of the 1990's. It was 
clearly accountable to its Steering Committee of donors for overall policy and finance, and to its 
Regional Advisory Committee for its programs. Other than paying for specific services such as 
accounting and office space, it had no special accountability relationship with its host institutions. 
1992: THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS IN IDRC 
The present concept of an international Secretariat to be housed in IDRC was first introduced in 
January 1992 with the approval of the establishment of the Micronutrients Initiative (MI) 
Secretariat by the IDRC Board of Governors. The idea of such a Secretariat had been proposed 
by the World Bank in December 1990, and had the support of a number of key agencies in the 
nutrition field as well as some bilateral donors. In 1991, during discussions about where such an 
initiative should be located, IDRC offered to host the Secretariat. The negotiations were led by 
the then incoming President of IDRC and concluded successfully with the donors by the end of 
1991. 
From the other agencies' point of view, IDRC was a neutral venue outside the UN system (which 
itself was subject to restrictions on professional positions). The Centre had a good track record in 
supporting interdisciplinary activities and in donor collaboration. CIDA was also seen as a leading 
bilateral donor and a Canadian location for the Secretariat seemed appropriate. From IDRC's 
point of view, MI represented an opportunity for corporate visibility, for high development impact 
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and for attracting external donor funds, through an initiative which already had a defined mission 
and clear multi-donor support. 
Thus, the first IDRC International Secretariat was a multi-agency initiative looking for a home. 
The second International Secretariat, SIFR, had also been under development by a multi-agency 
collaborative process including IDRC, and was looking for a suitable host institution. SIFR was 
originally destined to be located within FAO in Rome and then within the World Bank in 
Washington, DC, but for various reasons the donors could not agree on these as host institutions. 
Late in 1991, negotiations began with IDRC as the host institution and agreement was reached in 
time for the proposal to be approved by the IDRC Board in March 1992. 
1993-94: INTERNAL MOVES TO CREATE SECRETARIATS 
After the establishment in 1992 of the first two Secretariats (MI and SIFR), which were 
international in conception and development, there followed a series of initiatives driven from 
within IDRC. These included WETV (March 1993), EEPSEA (March 1993), ATPS (March 
1993), and ITI (August 1994). These initiatives, not all of which were formally approved by the 
IDRC Board as Secretariats but were special projects treated as Secretariats, arose from specific 
Program Initiatives championed from within the organization. 
EEPSEA, located in Singapore, and ATPS, located in Nairobi, were closely linked to IDRC's 
mandate in research and research capacity building. WETV was seen as a corporate initiative 
which was not linked to any specific IDRC research program. ITI was an inter-divisional initiative 
within IDRC, led by the Health Sciences Division, and was also seen as an opportunity for 
external funding from Canadian government funds to be allocated for international tobacco 
control. 
1994-95: BELLANET AND IMFN 
The next two Secretariats to be established, Bellanet (October 1994) and IMFN (November 
1995), were developed outside IDRC. Conceived by a number of external donors, Bellanet was 
established by consensus at IDRC after two years of meetings and consultations. The IMFN was a 
Canadian initiative involving three government departments and agencies (Natural Resources 
Canada, DFAIT, and CIDA). Although the negotiations were not as lengthy as for Bellanet, there 
was a formal process of examining suitable host organizations on the part of the IMFN donors 
before IDRC was approached and an agreement was reached to place the initiative within IDRC. 
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1997: THE LATEST SECRETARIATS 
The most recent Secretariat to be established (other than FoodLinks which was started in October 
1997 and terminated in March 1998) is SISERA (March 1997). This was an internal initiative, 
designed to bring together two major projects already being managed out of IDRC's Regional 
Office in Dakar, and to build on IDRC's previous institutional strengthening grants in West 
Africa. SISERA was conceived as a complementary activity to AERC and it was hoped that it 
would attract donor funds targeted at economic research support in Africa. FoodLinks operated 
as a special project for about two years before it was eventually established as a Secretariat, led by 
the same IDRC staff member who had already undertaken some important and visible activities. 
EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
When presented with the proposal to host the first international Secretariat, the IDRC Board 
specified a number of conditions for the relationship of the Secretariat to the Centre: 
The Secretariat's operations would be generally subject to the Centre's administrative 
policies and practices 
All administrative costs would be reimbursed by donor contributions to IDRC 
Objectives were to be closely linked to IDRC's existing programs. 
There was no explicit strategic framework developed at the outset for international Secretariats at 
IDRC, nor was there, initially, any policy beyond IDRC's openness to such opportunities, each of 
which would be looked at on its merits, and would receive funding from external donor whilst 
remaining within IDRC administrative policies. In May 1993, a year after the first Secretariats 
were established, a liaison function was established in the office of the Director General for 
Resources to deal with Secretariat policy development and troubleshooting. The pressing issue 
was that of the authority of the Executive Directors, who were consultants to IDRC and therefore 
fell outside the structure for delegated authority from the IDRC Board. 
The then new President promoted the housing of Secretariats within IDRC programming units as 
they would be more administratively flexible, responsive to changing priorities, and directly 
supported by other donors. These units were meant to generate revenue or at least achieve cost- 
recovery for their operations. They were seen as a cost-effective means of pooling ever-scarcer 
donor resources, including those of IDRC itself. The general approach of senior management was 
to accept the most optimistic scenario as each Secretariat was considered. There was little or no 
discussion of an exit strategy if outside funding did not materialize and IDRC found itself in the 
situation of being the donor of last resort, whose own credibility became inextricably linked to 
that of the Secretariat. 
At the outset, the IDRC Board was concerned that the Secretariats would be linked to IDRC's 
existing programs. However, 1992 was a time of dramatic restructuring at IDRC and both the 
nutrition and fisheries programs were eliminated at the same time the MI and SIFR were 
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established. The feasibility study which led to the establishment of WETV was underway at the 
same time as the Communications Division was significantly reduced. Inevitably, the Secretariats 
became associated with the restructuring and downsizing of IDRC. The new Secretariats did 
provide an opportunity to preserve some important IDRC program activities. However, from the 
start, they were associated with internal transfers of staff and were seen inside and outside IDRC 
as a means of solving some of IDRC's human resource management issues. 
The establishment of the ten IDRC Secretariats examined in this Review spans the period of office 
of the former IDRC President. Although they are very different from each other in program focus, 
in genesis, and in how international they really are, the Secretariats shared their origin in his 
concept of an innovative knowledge organization (IDRC) and a flexible programming mechanism 
(the Secretariats). They each owe their establishment to this vision and to his personal support. 
They also owe their emphasis on the best case scenario and their accountability framework to his 
leadership style, and to the context of budget reduction, downsizing, and restructuring that 
prevailed in 1992-97, all of this against a background of concerns about the organizational 
survival of IDRC. While it is true that some Secretariats were seen as sources of revenue for 
IDRC, the Secretariat mechanism was proposed as an instrument for transforming IDRC itself 
into a flexible, creative, and visible organization. They were to show the way. 
TYPES OF IDRC SECRETARIATS 
In practice, although this Review focuses on ten Secretariats, some twenty Program Initiatives 
were established or promoted under the rubric of IDRC International Secretariat in the period 
1992-1997. They were generally administered under the Board-approved policy guidelines which 
were developed for Secretariats between 1993 and 1996, and last updated in May 1998. These 
twenty Secretariats are shown in Table 1. As the table shows, some of these Secretariats had a 
global mandate and some a regional, or even a country one. Nine of them were located in Ottawa 
and eight in IDRC Regional Offices. Three were located in separate project offices in Bangkok, 
Cape Town, and Dar es Salaam. Two were formally approved by the IDRC Board as quasi- 
Secretariats based in Ottawa: the OCEEI (Office for Central and Eastern European Initiative) and 
IWOKRAMA (Iwokrama International Rainforest Programme). 
Only eight Secretariats were formally approved by the Board as International Secretariats: MI, 
WETV, ATPS, Bellanet, IMFN, INBAR, SISERA, and FoodLinks. This Review includes all of 
them except INBAR which is now established (since November 1997) as an independent 
organization in China. The other Secretariats were approved as special projects by the IDRC 
Board. This brings into question how Secretariats are different from other IDRC program 
activities and what the defining characteristics of an IDRC Secretariat are. 
Following the Guidelines for International Secretariats at IDRC, Internal Audit uses six 
characteristics to define a Secretariat: 
Their operations are supported by IDRC, but are a distinct entity within the Centre 
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They are active in a field relevant to IDRC's competence and programming 
They are funded by one or more donors, in addition to IDRC funds 
They are governed, as to programming, by a Steering Committee that is often 
comprised of representatives of the sponsoring organizations and experts in the field 
They carry out the program of work approved by the Committee 
They conduct their work over a fixed period of time. 
TABLE 1- ALL IDRC INITIATIVES REFERRED TO AS SECRETARIATS - 1992-97 
(Bold types denotes Secretariats included in the Review) 
YEAR FULL NAME LOCATION 
1992 MI Micronutrient Initiative Ottawa/Delhi 
SIFR Strategy for International Fisheries Research Ottawa 
1993 WETV Global Access Television Network Ottawa 
EEPSEA Economy and Environment Program for South-East Asia Singapore 
ATPS African Technology Policy Secretariat Nairobi 
OCEEI Office for Central and Eastern Europe Initiative Ottawa 
VISED Vietnam-Indochina Sustainable Development Program Bangkok 
NEPED Environmental Protection and Economic Develop. (Nagaland) Delhi 
1994 BELLANET Bellanet Initiative (Global electronic forum) Ottawa 
ITI International Tobacco Initiative Ottawa 
IWOKRAMA Iwokrama International Rainforest Programme Ottawa 
EHIP Essential Health Interventions Project Dar es Salaam 
1995 IMFN International Model Forest Network Ottawa 
CONNEPP National Environment Policy Transition Project Johannesburg 
INBAR International Network for Bamboo and Rattan Delhi 
EMS Environmental Management Secretariat Montevideo 
1996 TIPS Trade and Industry Secretariat Cape Town 
ADRF Asia Development Research Forum Singapore 
1997 SISERA Sec. for Institutional Support for Economic Research in Africa Dakar 
FOODLINKS FoodLinks Ottawa 
Each of the 20 Secretariats shown in Table 1 was reviewed according to selected administrative, 
program, and financial characteristics in order to identify what patterns of attributes might be 
useful for developing a typology and for selecting a sample for more detailed review. 
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Administrative characteristics include: 
Board-approved status 
Establishment and termination dates 
Location of Secretariat headquarters 
Number of approved staffing positions. 
The program characteristics include: 
Geographic scope of the program mandate 
Program sector 
Main program activities. 
The financial characteristics include: 
Number of different donors 
Size of the total budget since establishment 
Percentage of the total budget coming from IDRC, CIDA, other Canadian public 
funds, and international and private sector sources. 
The results have led to the identification of six dimensions which seem to best describe 
Secretariats in terms of their origin, outputs, characteristics, and fit with IDRC's own mandate 
and criteria for Secretariats. These dimensions are: 
Degree of focus on development research (a qualitative assessment) 
Genesis of Secretariat (within IDRC; within Canada; from international initiatives) 
Number and type of external donors (Canadian or international) 
Geographic mandate (national, regional, global) 
Main outputs (project results, trained personnel, policy formulation, information 
sharing and networking, institutional strengthening and creation) 
Conformity with IDRC criteria for Secretariats. 
Even within the limited population of Secretariat initiatives (only 20), several possible typologies 
can be developed , based on the Secretariats' administrative, financial and program characteristics. 
Simple approaches would include dividing the Secretariats by program sector or by geographic 
location. The preferred approach for this Review was to focus on a typology which reflected the 
degree of international collaboration in the Secretariat, and the emphasis on development research 
in the Secretariat's mission and program activities, as these seemed particularly relevant to the 
Secretariat mechanism as a program modality for IDRC and as a mechanism for collaboration 
with other development agencies and partners. 
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Table 2 presents an initial typology of the Secretariats reviewed, which is based on two indicators: 
A qualitative assessment of the degree of emphasis on research in the Secretariat's 
mandate and outputs 
The type and level of external donor involvement in the start-up phase and in current 
funding of the Secretariat. 
This typology also has the advantage of an even distribution of the Secretariats across the matrix. 
It also reveals that none of the Secretariats appears to be characterized by a high research focus 
and high international donor involvement in both its genesis and funding. Among the reasons for 
this could be that: 
Relatively few international donors fund research so the potential pool of collaborating 
partners is small 
International collaboration on research activities is not seen by donors as requiring a 
Secretariat mechanism but can be achieved at the level of project funding 
It is simply the result of the law of small numbers. 
AERC (African Economic Research Consortium) is not an IDRC Secretariat but an independent 
international Secretariat serving a program which developed from IDRC research networks. 
IDRC helped to establish AERC and still plays a key role in the organization. It is an example of a 
pre-1992 IDRC program mechanism which falls into the high research-high international donor 
involvement category and which merits some comparative review, particularly as several of the 
Secretariats used AERC as a model. 
TABLE 2 - TYPES OF SECRETARIATS IN TERMS OF RESEARCH EMPHASIS AND DONOR 
INVOLVEMENT 
Emphasis on Research External Donor Involvement in Start-up and Fun 
Mostly internal to Mostly Canadian High involvement of 
IDRC partners international agencies 
outside Canada 
High research ATPS EEPSEA (AERC. not an IDRC 
emphasis Secretariat) 
Medium research FoodLinks IMFN SIFR 
emphasis ITI 
Less emphasis on SISERA MI Bellanet 
research WETV 
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SECRETARIATS COMPARED TO OTHER PROGRAM MODALITIES 
In practice, not all the Secretariats comply with all these criteria, and a good number of other 
program modalities such as Program Initiatives and Special Projects, could also fit within the six 
characteristics that define Secretariats. Some Special Projects, such as Acacia, have larger 
budgets than some of the Secretariats and have also hired an Executive Director from outside the 
Centre. PIs and Special Projects can also have external advisory committees, technical advisory 
groups and co-funding from external donors. 
At the beginning, Secretariats were seen as having greater flexibility in budget management by 
being able to allocate program funds for program delivery (that is, for salaries, travel and 
equipment etc.). In a time of cutbacks in staff positions and program budgets, this was seen, 
particularly by IDRC staff, as a major advantage of the Secretariat mechanism over other program 
modalities. However, allocations are made to operational expenses from program funds in Special 
Projects. Thus, the dividing line between PIs, Special Projects, and Secretariats is not a clear one, 
neither in terms of program objectives nor of finances. 
Indeed, within IDRC, it was considered a desirable evolutionary path that PIs or groups of 
projects could transform themselves at some point into a Secretariat. This occurred with some of 
the internally led Secretariats such as ATPS, INBAR, and FoodLinks. Once Secretariat status had 
been achieved, it was felt that the program activity would have greater visibility, focus, flexibility, 
and be more results oriented. Certainly, image is one way in which the Secretariat mechanism is 
different from other program modalities in IDRC. As one member of IDRC staff put it: 
Secretariats are seen as quasi-institutions which have acquired an international 
character. They can do a brokerage function and act as a repository of ideas. People 
come to a Secretariat for this more than to a PI. Secretariats have a sharper focus. 
Another important difference between Secretariats and PIs is their management style. PIs have 
adopted a team management approach whereas Secretariats, although most are small highly 
participatory organizational units, have a more traditional management structure. Secretariats 
have a defined boss: the Executive Director, and a defined policy body: the Steering Committee 
whereas PIs are led by Team Leaders who are selected by the Team Members. Team Members 
and even Team Leaders are usually members of more than one Team. 
PIs must prepare three year plans or prospects which define the future work plan and general 
budget allocations. Once a prospectus is approved by the Board, Team Leaders are able to 
authorize project activities, and have signing authority up to $500,000. The main constraints on 
them are that the annual budget for the PI is uncertain from year to year, and that the Team 
Leader is exercising authority on behalf of the team, so that he/she must work to develop 
consensus within the Team. In practice, the information sharing and consensus building process is 
reported to be very time consuming and may even weed out the most innovative, high risk ideas 
which are unlikely to receive wide support within the Team. 
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Another difference that IDRC staff sees between the implementation of the Secretariat modality 
and PIs is that the roles of team members and leaders for each of the PIs are shared among 
relatively few person years so that people feel pulled in too many directions. Some envy the 
dedicated person years enjoyed by the Secretariats, where the work may be no less demanding but 
is more focused on a particular mission. PIs have less control over the selection of their human 
resources than do Secretariats and are reported by both IDRC and Secretariat staff to be slower 
and less flexible in making decisions than Secretariats. These challenges are not uncommon in 
organizational attempts to increase interdisciplinarity and develop the team management style that 
characterize the Program Initiatives. 
ABOUT THIS REVIEW 
This Review results from a desire to consolidate the learning about the application of the 
Secretariat mechanism. The Review has one principal purpose: to assess the performance of 
Secretariats in order to identify ways in which IDRC and the Secretariats could better help each 
other fulfill their respective mandates and objectives. The Review is of this unique mechanism as a 
delivery modality for IDRC and is intended to help determine how best to operate and govern the 
Secretariats. It is not an evaluation of individual Secretariats. The complete Terms of Reference 
are found in Volume 3, Appendices, available from the IDRC Evaluation Unit. 
Having too many tedious recommendations at the administrative level, not identifying 
responsibility centers, and lacking a consultative process are problems this Review sought to 
avoid. First, the number of recommendations is limited to critical areas that will make the most 
difference. Second, the approach taken is from the managerial and accountability framework point 
of view rather than a technical, administrative one. Third, the concluding section of this report 
identifies what each part of IDRC will have to do if the recommendations made in this report are 
approved and implemented. 
Fourth, the process followed in the preparation of this Review (summarized below) has been as 
consultative as possible. Ninety-three interviews were conducted. The survey questionnaires, a list 
of interviewees, and a summary of survey findings appear in Volume 3. Staff were invited to 
participate in workshops to help interpret data synthesized from these interviews. The survey 
questionnaires, a list of interviewees, and a summary of survey findings appear in Appendix 2 
(Volume 3). At the first series of staff workshops, participants were invited to comment on the 
review process and methodology. At the second series, they helped interpret the raw survey data 
and identify critical issues. During the third series, and after having reviewed the literature review 
and case studies, as well as the survey findings, participants were involved in critiquing the 
recommendations and Review findings.. The material presented and discussed at each of these 
workshops was simultaneously circulated to Regional Offices for comments. An additional 
working session was held with IDRC Senior Management Committee, including all Regional 
Directors. Summaries of these Staff Workshops are also found in Volume 3. In addition, 
Executive Directors of the respective Secretariats were given the opportunity to verify facts and 
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comment on the case studies prior to their dissemination. Finally, the review process was overseen 
by a Secretariat Review Committee with active participation from all IDRC branches. 
OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT 
The issues arising from the use of alternative service delivery mechanisms in the broader public 
sector and those arising from IDRC's experience with Secretariats are identical. They include: 
learning from experience, emphasis on results, accountability, strategy and policy tools, human 
resource management issues, and organizational culture and structure. 
SECRETARIAT REVIEW PROCESSES 
Evaluation design June 30 
Data collection July/August 
Interview synthesis and analysis August 21 
Staff workshops September 16 
Case studies September 31 
Management audit September 31 
Literature review September 31 
Preliminary draft report October 16 
SMC Work Session October 28 
IDRC staff workshops OctlNovember 
Final report November 23 
Senior Management Committee Decision December 2 
Board of Governors Presentation January 21/22 
As a result of these innovations, organizational learning has become more important than ever. 
For most experiments with alternative service delivery, including Secretariats, there are no 
precedents. Rapid learning from our own experience and the experience of others has become 
critical to ensuring effective stewardship of public programs and funds. Of the twenty Secretariats 
established by IDRC between 1992-98, ten were selected for more detailed case studies. Some 
lessons are presented in Chapter 2. The complete cases are found in Part 2. 
Performance over process has become the hallmark of virtually all contemporary public sector 
improvements just as results-based management has become the mantra for renewed public 
services around the world. Secretariats are designed specifically to focus on results and 
performance rather than internal processes. A review of how Secretariats have performed and 
actions necessary to improve performance management are found in Chapter 3. 
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The use of various forms of organization, like Secretariats, at arms-length from traditional public 
service institutions, and the utilization of various forms of partnership and horizontal collaboration 
are specifically intended to enable a better focus on outputs and results. However, this can only 
come about through an increased level of organizational autonomy and freedom to make 
operational decisions. These arrangements tend to blur traditional lines of accountability. Clear 
lines of accountability must be identified and preserved, or new accountability frameworks put in place. 
More than ever before, public institutions are accountable to citizens for the legitimate use of public 
funds. This accountability includes the important element of ensuring that decision makers and 
governors have adequate information upon which to base their decisions. Chapter 4 deals with the 
critical accountability and governance issues arising from the use of Secretariats. It also examines the 
findings through the audit objectives established for this Review. Finally it suggests a more 
comprehensive approach to audit to improve accountability for results. 
Global changes, including information and communication technology processes, have rendered many 
of our old approaches to public management obsolete. For example, the public service is no longer 
shrouded in secrecy and policy is no longer the domain of a small number of policy elite providing 
advice to decision makers. Further, citizens and constituents demand more involvement and 
engagement in policy decisions and program implementation. With the democratization of information 
has come a new demand for transparency and the need to demonstrate the rationale for service 
decisions affecting public policy and programs. This has placed new demands on institutions to 
demonstrate coherent and comprehensive strategies. To some extent, the public service has had to 
reinvent strategic planning processes and techniques to engage stakeholders and those affected by 
government policy and programs. Chapter 5 deals with the strategic framework required for the 
optimal functioning of Secretariats in IDRC. 
As with other such alternative mechanisms, there are a number of operational and structural issues 
arising from the use of Secretariats. Key among them are human resource management and leadership 
issues. New approaches and organizational forms force public sector managers to re-examine and, in 
many cases, alter traditional approaches to human resource management. For example, recruitment and 
promotion systems built around the notion of generic skills may not be relevant when it comes to 
staffing a highly specialized Secretariat. Also, many public sector jurisdictions find themselves looking 
for more entrepreneurial and task-specific skills. In addition, housing and nurturing arms-length 
organizations such as Secretariats often requires host organizations to undergo profound cultural 
change as more traditional, hierarchical, risk-adverse, command-and-control approaches become less 
appropriate for innovative, knowledge-based, results-focused organizations. Traditional bureaucratic 
cultures inhibit and often kill these new forms of organizations. Just as new cultures need to be forged, 
to accommodate these types of changes, new structures and improved approaches to central control 
functions need to be developed. Chapter 6 examines these important issues. 
Finally, if the recommendations made in this report are accepted, there are implications at all levels of 
IDRC. Chapter 7 discusses the responsibilities which should be taken on by the Board of Governors, 
Senior Management, IDRC staff and Secretariat staff in the implementation of the recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE 
Detailed case histories of 10 IDRC Secretariats are presented in Part 2. Each case ends with lessons 
drawn from that particular experience. While each Secretariat is unique, collectively these lessons fall 
into three main categories: capacity, focus, and relationships. Two distinct sub-groups were identified 
under capacity: financial and human resources including leadership. Lessons about the need to have a 
precise focus stress the importance of having realistic objectives and time frames. Many lessons about 
relationships emerged, including organizational and human relationships. Other less universally 
observable, but perhaps more significant, lessons about accountability, roles and responsibilities, and a 
strategic framework also emerged. These will be outlined throughout the subsequent three chapters on 
Accountability, Strategic Framework, and Operations and Structure. 
CAPACITY 
When contemplating a new venture such as starting a Secretariat, one of the first and most important 
questions that must be explored is whether or not the host organization has the financial and personnel 
capacity to carry out the new activity effectively. Second, if the capacity is unavailable, how could it be 
obtained and at what price. Of the problems emerging from the use of Secretariats at IDRC, the 
capacity issue arose with the most frequency and posed the most serious problems. For example, 
securing appropriate funding is, and in some cases was, a critical issue for SISERA, SIFR, III, IMFN, 
FoodLinks, and WETV. Personnel and leadership capacity loomed large as issues for ITI, SIFR, 
ATPS, and SISERA. 
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FUNDING CAPACITY 
Financial resource problems were evident in many of the cases examined for this Review. SIFR, for 
example, expended too much energy on securing adequate funding (including the considerable effort 
involved in attempting to get some of the donors to live up to their commitments) and not enough on 
results. Further, IDRC invested more funding than originally intended. Even if the money earmarked 
for the Sustainable Oceans Development ($320,500) is subtracted, it was never intended that IDRC 
would fund more than 501/o--certainly not the 80% that it did contribute. This put IDRC in the 
position of being the donor of last resort, not something bargained for at the outset. As one donor 
observed: 
If you 're offered $100, 000, it's hard to say no but that is exactly what you should 
do if there is not the funding assured to support an activity for the long term at an 
adequate level. That's what happened with SIFR; it was built on promises offunds 
that never came. SIFR has been on a shoestring for a long time. 
ATPS is another example. The funds provided did not match the amplitude of the task at hand. The 
Secretariat's large geographic mandate (15 countries) and the number of different activities involved in 
achieving its mission - to create an active network, to effectively influence policy, and to create the 
necessary presence - required resource levels beyond those identified. As it was, ATPS was established 
with only two thirds of the meagre resources originally identified in hand. Bridge funding was needed 
from IDRC, the donor of last resort. 
ITI is a third example of a would-be Secretariat that has had extremely soft funding from the beginning. 
It was approved based on a commitment of $2 million from CIDA. Almost five years later, it appears 
to still be waiting and continues to face serious financial viability issues. SISERA, established just over 
a year ago, is yet another example. Its budget for the first two years is $3.27 million, including $1 
million from IDRC and $2 million rolled over from two earlier projects. The hope is that external funds 
will be attracted to this venture but there are already signs that it will be difficult to obtain the new 
funds necessary to ensure SISERA's longer term financial viability. 
The list of examples goes on and includes IMFN which, while having relatively solid funding through 
to April 2000, has set a do or die internationalization goal of attracting funds from outside Canada; 
FoodLinks, which, it was concluded, has little chance of attracting the funds it needed; and WETV 
which has been plagued by the same problems from the start. 
Funding capacity includes several factors and requires rigorous financial analysis. The following 
questions should be considered and answered: 
What amount of money is required for the proposed Secretariat to have the desired 
impact? 
Have the proposed activities been properly costed and realistically assessed? 
What is the amount of IDRC's financial contribution required now and over what time 
frame into the future? 
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What trade-offs come with making this commitment? That is, are the funds coming from 
another program area, efficiencies, or what? 
What secured funds have been committed by outside partners, now and in the future? 
What would it take to secure more external funding? 
What evidence is there that this external funding will be forthcoming? 
What financial risk is IDRC undertaking? What are the worst case, likely case, and best 
case scenarios? 
What are the financial performance measures? Warning signs? Indicators that it is time to 
bail out? 
What are the fmancial contingency plans? 
Based on a thorough examination of background documents and interviews, it seems as though not 
enough consideration was given to these sorts of questions. 
PERSONNEL AND LEADERSHIP CAPACITY 
STAFFING CAPACITY Some of the most vivid lessons from experience arise from the very weak link 
between the volume and level of work described and the amount of effort required to carry out that 
work in the work plan included in the original proposal for a Secretariat. SIFR is a prime example. The 
human resources supplied were not adequate for the job. Although ample attention was given to work 
planning and activity listing, little effort was invested into the assessment of the time it would take to 
carry out the complex tasks so carefully identified. As a result, the staff supplied was not appropriate 
for the work to be undertaken. 
KNOWLEDGE CAPACITY More important than the level of human resources is the quality and 
appropriateness of resources required. The knowledge, expertise, and experience required to achieve 
the mission are often overlooked. In many Secretariat experiences, through a happy coincidence, the 
capacity was available. Unfortunately, in others, that was not the case. Reports abound of staff being 
assigned to newly created Secretariats who lacked the necessary expertise. 
Although it was not ill considered, ITI faltered in these areas. The project was embarked upon with 
considerable naivete and a lack of knowledge, expertise and experience in the area. IDRC misjudged 
the extent of the power of the tobacco lobby-on both sides of the issue. After a rocky and slow start, 
some key informants believe that ITI has gone through the necessary learning curve and is now poised 
to implement its strategy. 
LEADERSHIP CAPACITY Similarly, leadership looms as a large capacity issue. If the mission of a 
new Secretariat is to establish an international network of experts and become the focal point for a 
specific activity attracting and maintaining the interest of international organizations with similar 
interests, a very strong leadership capacity is essential. Often this requires going beyond the resources 
at hand. If one thing has been demonstrated and re-demonstrated it is that a part-time leader or 
Executive Director does not maximize success and almost always forewarns failure. As Peter Drucker 
so often observes: If a job is worth doing, it is worth dedicating resources to. 
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ITI is a vivid illustration of a Secretariat's need for the full time effort and dedication of an effective 
collaborative leader. To think that much more than marginal progress could be achieved with part-time 
leadership spending 70% of their time on other demanding tasks, as is the case with ITI, is fanciful. For 
some key informants, this situation reflects badly on IDRC. They report that, while the initiative is 
conceptually very attractive, IDRC has until recently shown little interest in fully supporting ITI. 
Existing and potential donors are being asked to make a continuing leap of faith and believe that, 
someday, IDRC will back the project. This of course is the catch-22 in which ITI and IDRC find 
themselves. Naturally, more donor funding would enable more aggressive staffing levels. 
It is one thing to recognize a leadership vacuum, as IDRC did with the tobacco issue. It is quite another 
thing to be able to fill the vacuum. This requires building a constituency of committed collaborators, 
which, as we have seen from other cases such as SIFR, is not always easy particularly in areas that 
impinge on the influence of other institutions and interest groups. 
The strength of Secretariats is seen by many as deriving from their relative autonomy from IDRC-the 
arm's length distance. This has two advantages. First, it helps them focus all efforts on the single issue 
they are dealing with. Second, it enables donors to become more actively involved in the collaborative 
effort. As we have seen throughout the course of this Review, donors are happy with IDRC's 
stewardship, but also insist on exercising fully their partnership role. Once again, this signals the need 
for a full-time Executive Director who is perceived as loyal and dedicated to the Secretariat's mission. 
Such was not the case with ITI and SIFR where the Executive Director was most often carrying 
responsibility for other IDRC initiatives. The lack of a full time Executive Director may also limit what 
SISERA can achieve in the two year mandate it has been given. 
While stature and expertise, energy, and subject area expertise are also important, the ability to work 
effectively with other people both in the host organization and with donors, is paramount. The cases of 
very successful Secretariats-EEPSEA, IMFN, and Bellanet- clearly demonstrate the necessity of 
strong human interaction skills and relentless attention to relationship building and maintenance. 
The main success factor in the case of EEPSEA is its ability to work well with others. It illustrates the 
point made by Warren Bennis in Organizing Genius: The Secrets of Creative Collaboration (1997): 
Great Groups require a highly flexible kind of leadership that has more to do with facilitating than with 
asserting control. People in effective collaborative groups, Bemis continues, feel liberated from the 
trivial and the arbitrary... People are in them, not for money, not even for glory, but because they love 
the work they love the project. He further points out that they are staffed with talented people who can 
work together. Certain tasks can only be performed collaboratively, and it is madness to recruit people, 
however gifted, who are incapable of working side by side toward a common goal. 
Like funding capacity, personnel and leadership capacity have many dimensions. Following are some 
personnel and leadership capacity questions that need to be asked about Secretariats: 
Have required staff resource levels been assessed in terms of the work plan proposed? 
Have the core competencies been identified for the staff who will be required to carry out 
the work described in the work plan? 
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Beyond the individuals required to do the work, what are the characteristics of the team 
that would optimize success? 
What characteristics, competencies and expertise would the leader of the new Secretariat 
require to ensure international credibility and partner support? 
What are the minimal relationship and collaborative skills required to function well with 
IDRC, Secretariat staff, and partners? 
Are these resources (staff and leader) available in IDRC? If not, where can they be 
obtained? 
What is the cost of staffing the Secretariat adequately? 
Can IDRC ensure an ongoing environment in which this team can function? What technical 
and administrative support will they need? What ongoing leadership and management 
oversight is required? Who will be responsible for seeing that these host organization's 
responsibilities are carried out effectively? 
Focus 
By design, Secretariats housed at IDRC are small organizational units focused very precisely on a 
specific development issue. Many interviewees pointed out the importance of having a concise mission, 
goals, and objectives. They, and previous evaluators, have identified this factor as being an essential 
foundation for Secretariat success. Sometimes this precision is attained by delimiting a subject area. 
IMFN is an example of a Secretariat addressing a very broad range of economic, agricultural, forestry, 
water, conservation, indigenous peoples, environmental, and sustainable development issues that span 
the globe, but focusing them on a single manifestation - model forests. Other Secretariats like 
EEPSEA focus their attention on a limited geographical region. More precise than this geographic 
limitation is its intense focus on the method and approach. Sometimes criticized for this narrow focus, 
EEPSEA understands that its success would be threatened by attempting to be more things to more 
people. 
MI is another example of a clearly defined focus. Its mission is clear and compelling: the amelioration 
of the problem of micronutrient disorders arising from iodine, iron, and vitamin A deficiency. This 
mission will be achieved through focus on advocacy and alliance building, development and application 
of technologies, building national and regional capacities, and resolution of key logistical issues. 
FoodLinks exemplifies the difficulties associated with too broad a focus. The mission of this Secretariat 
was to create partnerships among food producers, processors, and marketers in developing countries 
and Canada through the provision of commercial liaison and project management services, in order to 
increase capacity, employment, and incomes for developing country communities in a sustainable and 
equitable manner. The task was colossal in scope and difficulty, echoing the sort of mission statements 
you would expect to find in business development and agriculture departments in countries the world 
over. 
ITI provides another example of an insufficiently focused mission and approach. While the central idea 
of ITI is appealing, it seldom seems to be expressed in concise and simple terms. Certainly this is not to 
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say that the problem at hand is a simple one. However, when we look at the plethora of strategies, 
objectives, activities, and desired outcomes originally presented, we are awestruck at the level of 
resources required to achieve them. Happily, ITI is in the process of defining very sharply focused and 
delimited goals and objectives, which will greatly enhance its chances of success. 
A UN sponsored evaluation of SIFR identified a similar lack of focus. No matter where and how SIFR 
is constituted in the future it should, under no circumstances, be designed to pursue more than a three 
objectives at a time, contrary to its original mandate to pursue several complex objectives at various 
levels of policy, research and donor interest, and to do so nationally, regionally, and internationally. It 
could be maintained that the institutional interests of IDRC inhibited SIFR's chances of success as 
pursuing IDRC's goals, such as the Sustainable Oceans Development initiatives, may have detracted 
from the required single-minded focus. It certainly did dilute the already very scarce amount of time 
and energy of the one-man operation. As the SIFR Steering Committee members interviewed for this 
Review observed, it was not always possible to see where SIFR's agenda started and IDRC's agenda 
ended... and this made people very nervous. 
Questions that need to be posed about focus include: 
If we had the best leadership and an adequate level of staff support within the limited 
resources offered by the Secretariat modality, would the mission be achievable? The belief 
that the impossible can be done has been identified by Warren Bennis (see Literature 
Review) as a characteristics of all Great Groups and collaborative partnerships. However, 
it must be ensured that the mission and objectives are focused sharply enough to reflect a 
degree of realism. 
Are the objectives and corresponding activities focused enough to ensure acceptable results 
in specifically identified areas? 
Will achieving results and having an impact in the specifically defined area make a 
substantial difference? 
What are the other ways available to achieve the same ends? 
Do the mission and objectives have appeal to existing and potential partners including 
IDRC? Are they easily understood and conceptualized? 
RELATIONSHIPS 
The importance of two types of relationship issues, each multilayered, became evident during the 
Review process. The first type, organizational relationships, deals with the fit with IDRC culture, 
mandate and mission. It also covers the fit with broader public policy objectives on the national level. 
The second, interpersonal relationships, deals with relationships between Secretariats and IDRC, 
partners, and staff. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
At the highest level, it seems as though Secretariats with missions in harmony with broader Canadian 
public policy objectives have the most chances of receiving sustained strong support. IMFN is a prime 
illustration. It is clear that the IMFN idea would not have got off the ground, nor proceeded very far, 
without national backing. As it is advancing the government's public policy objectives, it has the active 
support of most of the relevant government departments. 
This linkage to a public policy purpose reflects a general trend in public administration-highlighted in 
Canada by the recent budget review methodology-toward abandoning activities that have no direct 
public policy purpose. It also demonstrates, to IDRC's credit, the development of a mechanism that 
can quickly respond to emerging international issues and circumstances that other institutions cannot 
respond to because of jurisdictional and national boundaries. Rather than being problematic, this may 
be a key advantage of Secretariats that has yet to be explored. Indeed, one of IDRC's strengths is its 
innovativeness and responsiveness of which Secretariats are a manifestation. 
However, this issue raises another difficult question. Internationally, the perception that IDRC is 
independent from the politics of the day is a source of strength and creates a positive image for the 
Centre. It could for example be argued that IMFN's difficulty in attracting international sponsors is, in 
large part, attributable to this link with Canada's advancement of its own public policy agenda. 
MI can also demonstrate direct links to national and international initiatives by way of resolutions 
passed at the 1990 World Summit for Children which endorsed the goals for the elimination or 
significant reduction of micronutrient deficiencies by the year 2000. These goals were further endorsed 
in 1992 by the International Conference on Nutrition. Similarly, EEPSEA was one of the first projects 
launched after the 1992 Earth Summit. 
By contrast, Secretariats not enjoying this level of support appear to have more difficulty achieving the 
same degree of success. SIFR, for example, offers an idea as compelling as IMFN, but lacked the 
official backing of Canada's Department of Fisheries. 
At another level of organizational relationships, the issue of IDRC's suitability as a host for a particular 
collaborative partnership, needs to be addressed. A lesson learned is that there must be an 
organizational, ideological, and methodological fit between IDRC and the Secretariat it is going to 
host. 
In general, IMFN demonstrates that IDRC is an excellent host capable of providing a highly conducive 
environment for collaborative partnerships. The Centre was able to receive existing functions from 
other Canadian departments, and quickly establish a credible international model forest network. The 
transition was extremely smooth and the arrangement proved to be productive. Contributing 
departments and donors are very satisfied with the transition and oversight provided by IDRC. These 
contributors each noted that their view of IDRC improved significantly after IMFN was transferred. 
This positive perception is echoed by the Executive Director who has experience in several other 
Canadian government departments: Having worked in lots of different organizations and 
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organizational cultures, IDRC is a treat-it is very conducive to accomplishing some real 
achievements. It is a very positive environment with a high level of professionalism. 
It was clear in all the documents prepared for the approval of FoodLinks that the Secretariat was 
designed specifically to attract the participation of private sector companies [and] result in the 
establishment of business ventures with developing country partners. Although it would receive 
funding from donors and IDRC, it was always envisioned that the Secretariat would become a business 
enterprise generating revenue from fees for service and royalties. This initiative would clearly move 
IDRC from its research, knowledge, and information brokerage role to a business brokerage role, as 
indicated in the Secretariat's mission statement: FoodLinks will create partnerships among food 
producers, processors and marketers... through the provision of commercial brokering and project 
management services... This, it is to be observed, seems a long way from IDRC's mission: 
empowerment through knowledge. 
FoodLinks brochures clearly indicated that the initiative went "steps beyond the Centre's traditional 
research partners to include private enterprise ". In a "mangoes for sale ... new juice... and better 
bananas " approach, FoodLinks marketed the idea with slogans such as: Building profitable 
partnerships, Let's do Business, and Canada's IDRC is Open for Business!, echoes of the political 
rhetoric of several newly elected governments in-the 1980s and 1990s. The approach needed to make 
FoodLinks work seemed too divergent from IDRC's approach to make for a successful partnership. 
Yet another relationship issue is the technical and subject area support that IDRC can provide a 
Secretariat. This fit with current program and personnel expertise is seen as critical by many of the 
people interviewed in the course of this Review. Where there is no relationship with IDRC's current 
programs and expertise, Secretariats seem to be at a disadvantage. One of the central problems with 
SIFR is perceived to have arisen from the fact that IDRC abandoned that program area. Similar 
arguments have been advanced with respect to FoodLinks and MI. However, it must be observed that 
many Secretariats, including ITI, WETV, and IMFN, have no strong program links. 
The experience of MI raises the issue of Secretariats' need for close links and synergy with IDRC 
Programs. One of the characteristics specified for Secretariats in IDRC, which is used by Internal Audit 
to assess them, is that they are active in a field relevant to IDRC's competence and programming. In 
interviews with IDRC and MI staff, the issue of poor links to IDRC programs was often mentioned. It 
was also raised by external donors who felt that one of the reasons why IDRC was seen as a suitable 
host institution for the new Secretariat was that it had an ongoing nutrition program. When the MI was 
established, the IDRC nutrition program closed and the program link with IDRC effectively withered 
from that time. 
One of the disadvantages that MI has suffered in not having close program links, beside missing the 
intellectual interaction and stimulus that an active group of nutrition specialists in IDRC could have 
brought, is that it has lacked a champion within the Programs Branch of IDRC. Similarly, MI has 
worked essentially separately from IDRC Programs, and its professional expertise has not been 
effectively linked to the Programs Branch. The MI team has demonstrated success in forging 
partnerships with national governments and the food industry, and in supporting innovations in 
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technology and health interventions. There would appear to be more potential for synergy than is 
perhaps recognised by either side. 
However, the lesson may be that a Secretariat does not need to have close program links with IDRC to 
be successful and to bring visibility and credit to the Centre, and to Canada. For MI, it is not IDRC's 
programs that makes it an attractive host institution today. Rather it is IDRC's overall reputation as a 
good, flexible, relatively neutral development agency with a strong presence in developing regions 
through its regional offices. The issue of how MI is linked to Programs Branch would appear to be 
more a matter of concern for IDRC Programs than for the MI Secretariat or its donors. In other cases, 
such as Bellanet, EEPSEA, and IMFN, the Secretariats have become the resource and knowledge pool 
from which IDRC draws, rather than the other way round. 
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
By and large, Secretariats are about building knowledge networks and leading communities of like 
interest in defined domains. As such, they are about relationships. While they can act with some 
autonomy, they are ever dependent upon the partners that support them and upon the supportive 
environment found within the host organization. It is therefore not surprising that the Executive 
Directors of the most successful Secretariats see building, nurturing, and maintaining relationships as 
their main job. Technical expertise clearly seems to be secondary. 
Warren Bennis observes that every successful collaborative group is an island-but an island with a 
bridge to the mainland. While they may tend to be physically removed, they are able to tap a wide 
range of resources. This notion describes what is perhaps the strongest characteristic of EEPSEA and 
its leadership: its ability to stay so focused, and yet, to build and maintain such strong links to IDRC, 
the host organisation, as well as to sponsors and Steering Committee members, is remarkable. 
EEPSEA, noted one partner, excels in networking and forging links. 
IMFN's Executive Director pointed out that time spent building strong and mutually supportive 
relationships is a high-return investment in terms of the smoothness of operations, and the ability to 
focus on outputs and the mission at hand. His approach is to solve relationship issues before they 
become problems. This is particularly important because there is no single point of entry between 
Secretariats and the rest of IDRC-that is, no single responsibility centre to steward, or speak for 
Secretariats. For this very reason, to be successful, Secretariats must carefully nurture a variety of 
relationships within IDRC. Further, this relationship cannot be treated as static, IDRC itself is 
constantly adapting and evolving. 
These strong relationships have been established on four levels: between IMFN and IDRC, between 
the Executive Director and IMFN staff, between IMFN and Steering Committee members, and 
between IMFN and its network members. About 30% of the Executive Director's time is spent on 
nurturing relationships between IDRC and IMFN. The result is that IDRC staff view IMFN very 
positively and are happy to assist them in any way they can. About another 30% is spent with his staff, 
who, according to interviews, are highly motivated and positively engaged in their work. They are also 
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extremely supportive of the host organization. Relationships with the Steering Committee are very 
strong: frequent informal communications occur between meetings and communication with the Chair 
of the Steering Committee occurs on a monthly basis. Based on published Workshop reports, members 
of the international network view the work of IMFN as valuable and very professional. 
Critical questions to be asked about relationships include: 
Is the public policy purpose in harmony with that of the broader arena in which IDRC 
works? 
Is IDRC an appropriate host for the particular Secretariat activity being considered? 
Is the IDRC knowledge and expertise adequate to support, guide and oversee the activity 
under consideration? 
Is this knowledge and expertise at a level that ensures informed decision making? 
Is there a fit between the values, approach, methodology and desired outcomes of IDRC 
and the proposed Secretariat? 
Does the activity fit within IDRC's broader strategic framework? 
Are conditions such that strong relations can be forged between the Secretariat and IDRC, 
staff, partners and network? 
RECOMMENDATION 1- BUSINESS PLANNING 
In all jurisdictions, the first step in moving toward an alternative service delivery mechanism is the 
development of a business plan. Perhaps because IDRC was off the blocks early, this step was missed. 
The answers to the questions emerging from an examination of lessons learned and outlined above go a 
long way toward the development of a business plan. 
A business plan outline for Secretariats that reflects lessons learned and IDRC's unique 
mandate should be developed and applied 
It is important that the business plan outline be developed within IDRC and in consultation with 
individuals having considerable experience with Secretariats, including Executive Directors. Care 
should be taken to limit the business planning process to areas that are of specific concern to IDRC and 
will be reflective of the uniqueness of both individual Secretariats and the development and research 
networking role of IDRC. 
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The proposed business plan outline and the business planning process itself should incorporate other 
recommendations to be found later in the report. At the risk of being overly prescriptive, it is suggested 
that, at minimum, the business plan outline include the following elements: 
Answers to the financial and personnel capacity questions arising in this chapter 
Clarification of focus 
Costing of action plans and planned activity 
Matching of human resources to the plan, including identification of core competencies, 
staffing levels, and level of effort required 
Description of relationships in terms of roles and responsibilities 
One year and longer term performance goals and measurement criteria 
Marketing strategy for meeting external funding targets 
Contingency plans for funding short falls. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS 
One of the main purposes of this Review is to answer the question: How have Secretariats performed? 
A number of factors make this question complex. First, in some cases, Secretariats are real-time 
organization and development experiments. As such, there is seldom clarity about where the 
experiment might lead. If that were known, the experiment may not have been necessary. Examples of 
Secretariats that fall into this category include: IMFN, that is a bold experiment whose performance is 
yet to be proved; Bellanet, which is still evolving; FoodLinks, which was quickly seen to be impractical; 
and WETV, which soon achieved independent status as a business. 
The second factor that adds to the complexity of examining Secretariats' performance is that capacity 
building is difficult to measure. However, we can have relatively dependable indicators and can use 
normative comparisons. For example, EEPSEA has monitored its performance through careful 
documentation of impacts, formal recognition it gets through the media, effect of its work on policy 
making in the targeted countries, and careful evaluation of its programs. Comparisons can also be made 
with other Secretariats and/or program areas and various initiatives might be ranked in terms of the 
degree of success achieved in meeting objectives. 
A third factor emerges from the temerity of attempting any meaningful cost-benefit analysis directed at 
the utility of the Secretariat modality as a whole. To do so would require starting with clear objectives 
of what the modality was intended to do - its strategic mission within IDRC. This is one area where 
all interviewees agreed: there was and is no strategic framework for Secretariats. The closest we could 
come to determining the original overarching purpose for Secretariats was to collect various ideas from 
people who were in positions to drive the concept at the beginning. The more prominent of these ideas 
include: 
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Providing a mechanism to house employees displaced by downsizing 
Offering a way to broaden IDRC's revenue base 
Helping to move away from research processes to more measurable and demonstrable 
contributions to development 
Providing a mechanism for collaboration and partnering. 
Just as some Secretariats have evolved over time, so has IDRC. Having left the downsizing and 
restructuring process far behind it, the Centre's first prominent objective seems to have little more 
merit than an interesting historical bit of information. Little value would be achieved in exploring it 
now, except to say that Secretariats need to be put on a more businesslike strategic footing than they 
have been to date. 
The objective of broadening IDRC's revenue base can be checked easily enough. For example, since 
inception, Secretariats have attracted 55% of IDRC's external funding over a six year period or $88.3 
million. As attractive as this appears, it should be noted that 75% of this amount is from Canadian 
government departments - with CIDA contributing 10 times more than other departments combined. 
Furthermore, 75% of this external funding goes to one Secretariat, MI. When MI is taken out of the 
equation, the picture looks quite different, but not altogether unfavorable. 
If expanding the revenue base of IDRC were a legitimate objective, we would have to conclude that it 
is somewhat met. However, revenue expansion is not defensible as a serious objective in light of 
IDRC's mission: empowerment through knowledge. The more appropriate question is whether or not 
Secretariats are contributing to this mission which has little to do directly with revenue expansion. 
Turning to the notion that Secretariats have the objective of moving IDRC away from its pure research 
process role can be seen as a response to a number of external pressures and evolutions in public 
policy. It is clear that Canada is not the only nation to have expressed serious concerns about how 
science and research is managed and about the need for more demanding performance measures. Of 
course this is no place to continue the debate that surrounds this issue. The point to be made is that 
pressure for change in this area has been considerable. 
Added to this is the penchant of governments to eliminate programs that do not have a public policy 
objective. This was one of the Program Review Tests adopted recently by the Canadian government. 
Further, adding to the pressure to move in a programmatic direction is the fact that the line between 
pure research and application is becoming blurred, as reflected by the practices and research funding 
mechanisms of higher learning institutions. 
At IDRC, the view is that traditional programs are on the research side of the continuum and 
Secretariats on the application side. While there may by a modicum of truth to this perception, it is not 
defensible under close examination. Indeed, the line between research and application is blurred in 
many activities undertaken by IDRC. It could be maintained that IDRC is subject to the same pressures 
as other research institutions and, like them, is evolving. However, we are left here with a higher order 
strategic policy issue that rests outside the scope of this Review. In terms of the Review, it can be 
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concluded that, if moving toward the application side of research were an objective of Secretariats, it 
has been successful, as demonstrated most clearly by MI and IMFN. 
The objective of developing a mechanism for collaboration and partnering with other donors is an 
intriguing one. It is also consistent with a new thrust in public sector management toward more 
horizontal, integrated approaches to service delivery and policy development. The Literature Review 
(Volume 2: available from the IDRC Evaluation Unit) found considerable support for this emerging 
trend. Indeed, if establishing Secretariats as a modality for collaborative partnerships at IDRC were an 
objective, we can conclude that it has been largely met. For example, EEPSEA, UV FN, Bellanet, and 
MI have active and vibrant collaborative partnerships. 
However, what is problematic about this as a performance indicator is that collaborative partnerships 
are not unique or specific to Secretariats. Other program areas can and do get involved in active 
networking and collaboration in several areas. The Acacia Initiative, Cities Feeding People, and PAN 
Networking are examples of Program Initiatives involved in partnerships and formal networking. The 
differentiating feature is the degree of formalization involved with the governance structure of a 
Secretariat. Indeed, other program areas receive external funds from partners and collaborators, and 
may exert influence on program expenditure but they do so in an informal rather than a formal way. 
To come back to the point of conducting a cost benefit analysis of Secretariats as a modality, we have 
seen that there are some surmountable problems, but we are left with some doubt about the utility of 
this sort of exercise. For example, part of the data collection for this Review included asking IDRC 
staff and management how much time they spend on Secretariats. In general, staff dealing with 
Secretariats perceived that they spend an average of 25% of their time on Secretariat activities. The 
average for management was perceived to be 10%. A word of caution is required since it has been long 
established that the amount of time people think they spend on work tasks and the amount they 
actually spend can differ widely. At first sight, however, this seems to indicate a sizable input into the 
costs of housing Secretariats at IDRC - or does it? One has to assume that if Secretariats did not 
exist, at least IDRC's portion of the funding would be applied to other program areas requiring a 
proportional amount of administrative, program, and managerial support. The question then becomes 
one of whether or not the external funding provided to IDRC through Secretariats is worth the effort. 
Excluding MI as a somewhat special case (as it dramatically distorts the figures), the amount of this 
external contribution for the Secretariats included in this study totals $22 million over the past six 
years. In addition to this, IDRC has contributed $17 million. On an annual basis, external contributions 
average $3.7 million, which, when added to IDRC's $3 million, results in a total operating budget of 
$6.6 million. This budget covers the operations of the nine Secretariats in the Review, excluding MI. 
The significant question is whether or not the Secretariat modality enhances or hinders the 
performance level and if it in fact offers any kind of leverage in terms of increased benefit over other 
organizational approaches. To do this, we must acknowledge the fact that, by and large, Secretariats 
are individual and unique entities and therefore need to be examined individually in terms of the 
investment made and results obtained. Once we have done this, we can return to have a look at how 
they have performed collectively. 
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PERCEIVED PERFORMANCE OF SECRETARIATS AS A MODALITY 
Assessing performance of individual Secretariats is not part of the mandate of this Review. Since there 
are no clearly identifiable collective performance measures for Secretariats, the task of assessing 
performance must be somewhat indirect. We will look at perceived performance from the points of 
view of those accountable for Secretariat operations (Secretariat staff, donors, IDRC staff, Senior 
Management Committee, and Board Members). The perceived level of performance of Secretariats is 
high. Next, we will highlight the operations and activities carried out by the 10 Secretariats in the 
Review to demonstrate that the level of output is very high relative to the small amount of money 
invested in Secretariats. In this section, we will also look at Secretariats from the point of view of four 
performance criteria: objectives, program accomplishments, control and accountability, and help to 
IDRC. Finally, we will examine aspects of collective performance which lead again to the conclusion 
that Secretariats show a beneficial return on investment. 
The detailed interview process revealed a lot of information about perceived performance. Of 18 
donors who responded to the question, 13 rated their satisfaction with performance level as quite well 
(8) or completely satisfied (5). Only two donors rated the performance of a Secretariat negatively: one 
not at all satisfied and one little. When asked to compare the Secretariat's performance with other 
donor funded activities, 75% rated it either above, or far above average. With regard to network- 
building, the principal work of Secretariats, all respondents were positive. 
Overall, the use of Secretariats has unquestionably improved donors' views of IDRC. One donor 
commented: I have been dealing with development research for 12 years and am very impressed with 
IDRC. Even with hard times and reduced budgets, it has managed to take on new initiatives. Without 
IDRC, the World Bank would dominate and that would not be good Another donor stated: IDRC has 
been good - light on its feet - [giving Secretariats] autonomy and support. 
IDRC staff were also positive. Three out of four believe that Secretariats had a positive impact on 
international development. Several interviewees were not sure, and only one said that they did not have 
a positive impact on international development. Seventy per cent of those interviewed believe that 
Secretariats contribute to achieving IDRC's corporate and program objectives. More than 80% of 
Secretariat staff believe that Secretariats contribute positively to IDRC's corporate and program 
objectives. In both groups, there were a significant number of people who did not know what IDRC's 
corporate and program objectives are. Most interviewees in both groups were able to provide 
numerous examples of how Secretariat activities had a high level of visibility and enhanced IDRC's 
image. 
Senior management and Governors indicated that their expectations of Secretariats had been largely 
met. Only one respondent provided a negative answer. This group was very clear about the benefits 
brought to IDRC by Secretariats, including better visibility, presence, prestige, profile, international 
status, recognition, ability to tap new opportunities, as well as opportunities to work collaboratively 
with donors. Again, a significant minority of respondents were unclear about the contributions 
Secretariats make to IDRC's corporate and program objectives. Governors were the most unclear on 
this point. 
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While this group of people with the highest level of accountability for Secretariats generally estimated 
that performance was satisfactory or above, they were uncomfortable with the fact that most of their 
perceptions were based on anecdotal evidence. The lack of performance measures and accurate/careful 
reporting were frequently mentioned as problems in this area. One Governor stated: 
Generally, Board Members rely on management for information and timeliness... but 
it is difficult to judge...we are left with the impression that they are all outstanding 
performers but we don't get much hard data... only subjective reports from those 
involved.. We do not have objective indicators. This problem is not specific to 
Secretariats but to all program activities. 
Another Governor said: My concern is that no one knows what is going on with Secretariats. It was 
striking that, with the exception of three interviewees, this group of 19 expressed serious or very 
serious concerns about the quality and appropriateness of the information they receive. 
INDIVIDUAL SECRETARIAT PERFORMANCE 
Each one of the 10 case studies in Part 2 outlines the accomplishments and highlights the activities of 
the Secretariats included in this Review. Collectively, these accomplishments and highlights are 
impressive, a point to which we will return later. In this section, we will provide a general assessment 
of the performance of each Secretariat using four criteria. Since individual evaluations of Secretariats 
were not undertaken as part of this Review, these criteria are applied as general indicators only. They 
are: 
OBJECTIVES 
Does the Secretariat have clear program achievement objectives and critical success 
factors? 
PROGRAMACCOMPLISHMENT 
Does the Secretariat build global awareness of importance of issue(s)? 
Does it strengthen networking/collaboration, research/learning/application of learning? 
Are publications and technology/learning aids produced? 
Is there evidence of Southern capacity being raised? 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Does the Secretariat have good management control? 
Does it comply with IDRC/donors administrative policies? 
Does it adequately account for performance to stakeholders? 
HELP To IDRC 
Does the Secretariat build IDRC stature/credibility? 
Does it achieve a satisfactory level of funding level from outside IDRC? 
LEARNING PARTNERSHIPS: A REVIEW OF IDRC SECRETARIATS 43 CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
ATPS - AFRICA TECHNOLOGY POLICY SECRETARIAT 
OBJECTIVES ATPS has developed multiple objectives and has a plan for better connections 
with country policy-makers. One of its key aims is policy dialogue with users in government and in the 
private sector. ATPS has been less successful in bringing policy makers and policy implementation 
institutions into its orbit than it has been in reaching IDRC's traditional partners in academic and 
research institutions. Some activities were launched in 1996 to begin policy dialogue at the national 
level. 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY ATPS has improved the quality of research undertaken. Its 
projects have a high probability of being completed on time. Based on a recent evaluation, the 
cost-effectiveness is deemed reasonable. There are no significant observations on performance 
reporting 
PROGRAMACCOMPLISHMENT ATPS has developed, monitored and administered three dozen 
research proposals from 300 submitted and facilitates comparative theme-based research across Africa. 
There is evidence of good researcher networking for learning dissemination and quality publications. 
ATPS still lacks success in county government/private sector policy network, national visibility, in part 
from funding limitations and from reliance on traditional academic processes. 
Research activities are ATPS' strength. By 1997, 300 research proposals had been received and 
reviewed, 35 small individual projects had been funded, of which 13 had been completed and six had 
been a subject of dissemination workshops. ATPS research is higher quality and likely to be completed 
on time - two of the goals of combining the two regional networks and creating ATPS with a full 
time Executive Director. ATPS also facilitates comparative research and networking across African 
countries. Dissemination activities by ATPS have been organized through annual workshops and 
national dissemination seminars. By 1997, ten research reports were published in the ATPS Working 
Paper series, as well as a newsletter. 
National workshops will help give ATPS visibility at the national level, another perceived weakness in 
the first few years. The question of visibility relates to critical mass: only in a few countries such as 
Nigeria did ATPS support enough researchers to create a critical mass to share ideas and make an 
impact at the national level. This is a function of the overall resources available to ATPS to fund 
researchers and workshops and its dispersion over 15 countries. 
HELP To IDRC Work is reasonably well respected. While there is a satisfactory external 
funding ratio, ATPS seems underfunded for the task at hand. IDRC has contributed 29% of the total 
funding of $3.6 million. 
BELLANET - GLOBAL ELECTRONIC FORUM 
OBJECTIVES Bellanet's objective is to be a lead change agent for greater collaboration in the 
development community, in pursuit of increased efficiency and effectiveness. It is a source of expertise 
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for incorporating information and communication technologies (ICTs) in this process. In the pursuit of 
those objectives and based on lessons learned, Bellanet uses a strategy of partnering with collaborative 
initiatives, directly assisting development agencies, partners and recipients who are already working 
together on a specific focus or common goal, and who are interested in using ICTs more effectively in 
support of their common mission. This gives Bellanet more scope for transforming the ways in which 
donor and executing agencies work. Bellanet provides guidance and support for the use of ICTs in 
collaborative planning and implementation, as requested by funding partners, other development 
agencies, or project leaders. Bellanet also initiates in-house projects and collaborations linking ICTs to 
opportunities and challenges facing the development community. It has played an important catalytic 
role in many of IDRC's own initiatives by providing ICT policy advice and technical support. 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY Interviewees consider Bellanet a well managed Secretariat with 
good leadership and staff. There are no significant observations on performance reporting. 
PROGRAMACCOMPLISHMENT Bellanet has achieved capacity in conceptual and technical matters as 
they relate to using ICTs for collaborative work, and its international development knowledge makes it 
a natural leader in applying ICTs in support of development community partnerships. This will become 
increasingly relevant as ICTs become integral to organizational and program structures. Bellanet 
provides ongoing technical and process support for the exchange of information concerning programs, 
projects and plans among a variety of partnerships (for example, the Global Knowledge Activity 
Information Management System [GKAIMS] on behalf of the Global Knowledge Partnership). The 
Secretariat has supported collaboration among web-to-email gateway providers, and promoted 
Southern organizations' use of email access to websites. It is now championing (through GK-AIMS 
and similar efforts) the use of ICTs to share planning information and lessons learned in the application 
of ICTs to capacity-building in developing countries. 
In helping to create PICTA (Partnership for ICTs in Africa), which is an informal group of agencies, 
and providing it with the ICT tools for sharing information and collaborative planning, Bellanet has 
demonstrated that it can fulfill its initial objective of helping donor agencies to better work together for 
development. Bellanet also created the infoDev Forum which is a record of the proposals, activities, 
results and lessons learned from infoDev activities. Donors can use the infoDev Forum to monitor 
activities, collaborate on policy, and seek out interesting proposals and partners. 
Interviewees attest to the excellent reputation that Bellanet now enjoys for its research and technical 
capability and its ability to deliver best practice and policy advice. Bellanet is seen as able to deliver in 
an increasingly competitive ICT world. However, it has had less success in having any concrete 
influence with some of its funding members and has had marginal impact in increasing collaboration 
among them. Bellanet discovered early on that it was going to be difficult to directly influence donors 
or the way they incorporate ICTs into the pursuit of their missions. Working through Collaborative 
Initiatives was the strategy response to lessons learned here. This approach directly empowers 
consortia which indirectly, and in some cases directly, help the participating donors and others 
understand and incorporate approaches to greater collaboration, with the appropriate uses of ICTs. 
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HELP To IDRC Bellanet's main constituencies include funded development consortia and 
funding agencies. Some obtain its services through Collaborative Initiatives and others through 
contracts for services. The partnerships which Bellanet assists appear to be satisfied. Bellanet attempts 
to work with partnerships that include two or more of its seven first phase fenders (some of whom 
questioned the achievability of the original objective of creating more collaborative behaviour among 
funding agencies). Outside funding has thus far been satisfactory. Forty-six per cent of its funding of 
$2.2 million in the first phase has come from IDRC. Bellanet appears to be an asset to IDRC (and its 
donors) in the conceptual and technical application of ICTs for development. 
EEPSEA - THE ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS PROGRAM FOR SouTHEAST Asia 
OBJECTIVES EEPSEA's sharply focused objectives aim at enhancing local capacity to 
undertake research on the economics of environmental management. EEPSEA supports research and 
training activities in environmental economics. It supports research in the areas of: forests and wetlands 
management, policy instruments for control of urban pollution, resource pricing, as well as economy- 
wide issues, with the latter receiving the most emphasis. From its inception to the end of 1997, 
EEPSEA has approved 58 research projects. In addition, EEPSEA offers a number of high-quality 
training programs and workshops. Its biannual workshops bring together all active researchers, along 
with resource persons, eminent speakers, the Advisory Committee, and, once a year, the Sponsors 
Groups. This event includes consultations between researchers and their advisors. 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY EEPSEA conducts evaluations of its work and is regarded as 
having good administrative efficiency (see below) and high commitment to performance, an area which 
is systematically and carefully reported on. 
PROGRAMACCOMPLISHMENT For research, EEPSEA has created a system of providing resource 
people as methodology advisers to researchers, and northern academics as teachers and academic 
advisers. It has also supported the creation of associations of environmental economists in member 
countries. EEPSEA's publications track record is noteworthy, and it has achieved a good reputation as 
an international clearinghouse in environmental economics and as an authoritative resource. The 1994 
evaluation survey commissioned by the Sponsors Group found high satisfaction among researchers, 
resource persons, and others with respect to EEPSEA's contributions to improved research and 
interdisciplinary skills, with the usefulness of workshops, and EEPSEA's administrative efficiency. 
In 1996, the Sponsors Group commissioned a comprehensive evaluation of EEPSEA's first three years 
of operations. The report included results of a survey of researchers, resource persons, and others. The 
evaluation was highly favorable, finding that the program met or exceeded most of the evaluation 
criteria; the participation of women is high, and the Secretariat's performance was perceived as good in 
improving research skills, interdisciplinary skills, providing useful workshops, and in terms of its 
administrative efficiency. 
EEPSEA enjoys strong support from IDRC and its staff. Its goals, mission, and objectives are widely 
understood, and its performance well known. The extremely thorough evaluation carried out in 1996 
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helped to build both internal and external support for and confidence in the work carried out by 
EEPSEA. Donors and partners included in the survey indicated that their expectations of the 
Secretariat have been completely met. 
HELP To IDRC EEPSEA is viewed as a credit to IDRC because of its usefulness to 
researchers, media, and governments and is seen as cost-effective and well run. EEPSEA's cumulative 
$8.6 million total funding has been 68% external. 
FOODLINKS - LINKING FOOD CHAINS 
OBJECTIVES The objectives of FoodLinks were to improve the access of small agricultural 
producers in developing countries to markets and value-added activities through private sector 
partnerships and the support of donors. FoodLinks built upon the work of IDRC in supporting 
agricultural research, particularly in post-harvest technologies, over nearly three decades. Through its 
support, IDRC had developed wide contacts with small agricultural producers around the world, and 
had linked them to some of the innovations in genetic improvement, farming systems, and post-harvest 
production. It seemed a logical next step to try to increase the direct benefit to these small producers by 
providing them with access to consumers in the North. This has been tried by a few other organizations 
with some success but it required an operating style IDRC was not used to. 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY In October 1997, a report went to the Board outlining plans for 
FoodLinks as a Program Initiative. At that meeting, the Board suggested and then established 
FoodLinks as a Secretariat. At the next SMC meeting, responsibility for the Secretariat was transferred 
to a President's Designate outside the Programs Branch which, up until that point, had responsibility for 
FoodLinks. Under the new arrangement, plans and forecasts were reviewed and a determination made 
that there was little chance of FoodLinks achieving its program or funding objectives within the time 
frame agreed to by the Board. Therefore, the decision to move forward with FoodLinks as a 
Secretariat was, in consultation with the Chair of the Board, reversed by SMC in March 1998. 
PROGRAmACCOMPLISHMENT This Secretariat existed for such a brief period that a performance 
assessment cannot be completed. 
HELP To IDRC Not possible to assess program achievement and effect on IDRC stature, as 
partners have not been surveyed. 
IMFN - THE INTERNATIONAL MODEL FOREST NETWORK 
OBJECTIVES IMFN is perceived to have met its short-term objectives. The Secretariat enjoys a 
very positive reputation, both inside IDRC and externally. Its major accomplishments include having 
showcased Canada as a leader in forest management, being largely responsible for any current 
credibility Canada has in forestry management, and being solely responsible for keeping the idea of 
models forests alive internationally. There is little doubt that IMFN is respected, but there has been 
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little progress in efforts to internationalize the Secretariat and in attracting sponsors from other 
countries. 
Its key donors are DFAIT and CIDA who have commented that IMFN has led to positive perceptions 
about IDRC. One sponsor commented that: JDRC can be congratulated for its dedication and 
commitment. [They] were very attentive in giving IMFN the profile that it needs. IDRC is doing the 
necessary and then some. Another said: I have a better sense now than before of how IDRC operates. 
They have been light on their feet. [The Executive Director] seems to have the autonomy and the 
support that he needs and I can't think of anywhere else in Ottawa where that particular balance 
could be achieved as well. 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY IMFN is perceived to be well-managed, with high autonomy and 
support from IDRC. The only significant observation on performance reporting is that stakeholders 
generally perceive performance levels as high. 
PROGRAMACCOMPLISHMENT IMFN has achieved a high profile, is often cited, and is credited 
with keeping up Canada's image in the field of forest management and keeping the idea of model 
forests alive internationally. It is a focal point for multi-disciplinary interest and is seen to have 
influenced the creation of Japan's first model forests. 
At this point in time, the model forest idea has been found to be attractive in theory, but unproven in 
practice. It is simply too early to determine if they make a difference in real terms regarding the way 
forests are managed. Model forests are a national program in Canada that started as an experiment six 
years ago. Following the first five years of operation, an extension was granted for another five because 
the time was considered too short to carry out a meaningful evaluation. Therefore, it has not yet been 
determined whether it has been successful or resulted in any concrete positive impact. Towards the end 
of the second five year period, a comprehensive evaluation will be made. Similarly, international 
networking about model forests is a theoretically sound idea and has shown some value added effects. 
However, the idea has not had time to be assessed in practice and the impacts have not yet been 
determined. The networking experiment will be evaluated in parallel with the evaluation of the national 
program. 
HELP TO IDRC IMFN's international reputation is good, leading to positive perceptions of IDRC. 
It has good Secretariat-IDRC relations. Attention to model forests helps IDRC get credit for the 
positive side of Canada's image in forest practices. 
ITI - INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO INITIATIVE (NOW RITC--RESEARCH FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO CONTROL) 
OBJECTIVES Strategies, objectives, and activity aims in IDRC 1994 launch memo appear too 
extensive for realistic funding expectations. However, these original objectives are gradually being 
refined. Program activities include research projects and a series of regional planning meetings for 
developing tobacco control strategies, and some capacity building initiatives. 
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CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY Performance standards were set for the four main goals, and a 
commitment was made to improve ITI's efficiency and effectiveness and to have ongoing evaluation of 
its progress and impact. These commitments do not appear to have been met. No corrective measures 
seem to have been applied following each of the three years of low-levels of performance and missed 
program delivery. 
PROGRAMACCOMPLISHMENT Achievement is hard to assess since annual activity funding has been 
low for research, capacity-building, country activities, and information dissemination. The first three 
and a half years of ITI's existence were marked by weak and sporadic leadership and a commitment by 
IDRC that appeared questionable to existing and potential partners. However, as mentioned elsewhere 
in the report, since February 1998 when a qualified Executive Director was appointed to dedicate part 
of his time to ITI, and qualified staff was hired, improvements have been noteworthy. 
HELP To IDRC ITI has had few tangible benefits for IDRC's stature. Funding of $3 million 
over four years included 30% from an external source, namely Health Canada. However, ITI has 
recently attracted additional funding in the amount of $465,000 from Sida, Sweden. Once again, 
improvements can be observed since February 1998. For example, ITURITC is recognized as a 
contributor to tobacco control policy and legislation in several countries including Turkey and South 
Africa, and two ITURITC projects will be featured in an upcoming World Bank publication. 
MI - MICRONUTRIENT INITIATIVE 
OBJECTIVES Mission and objectives are clear. MI is recognized internationally as a key player in the 
war against micronutrient deficiencies and has helped to raise awareness of the importance of the 
problem and the availability of cost-effective solutions. 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY No significant observations. 
PROGRAMACCOMPLISHMENT MI has achieved a high visibility and a very good reputation among 
international agencies and countries involved in micronutrient deficiencies. Indeed, several external 
sources attested that, after UNICEF, MI is one of the best known and best regarded initiatives in the 
field. It appears to have positioned itself well and has a clear focus, mission, and achievements. 
It has been active on the policy front with intergovernmental processes and within the UN system, and 
has helped to promote inter-agency partnerships, including bringing together government and food 
industry representatives. It is also a highly regarded source of information with its technical reports and 
the MN-NET website on micronutrients. 
MI has successfully supported research such as the development of a salt fortified with both iron and 
iodine, and investigations on iodine stability in salt from developing countries to evaluate different 
packaging and environmental conditions. MI has demonstrated success in field testing a technology to 
fortify rice with vitamin A in Indonesia and shown that the product is acceptable to consumers. MI is 
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providing support for national Vitamin A programs in more than 30 countries through UNICEF field 
offices and is supporting 15 NGOs in 12 countries to implement programs aimed at increasing 
coverage and improving monitoring interventions. 
HELP To IDRC MI adds greatly to IDRC stature. It has achieved a high level of funding - 
past 6 years funding: $69.5 million - 4% from IDRC and 96% external. 
SIFR - STRATEGIES FOR INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES RESEARCH 
OBJECTIVES The program intention of developing a mechanism for improving the fit of donor 
fisheries aid and research priorities on one hand, and with the priorities of developing countries on the 
other hand has been hard to honour. SIFR's objectives were too numerous and too complex for the 
available human and financial resources. 
The role of SIFR (to develop mechanisms for matching the research priorities of developing countries 
with the interests of donors) was more difficult in practice than in theory. SIFR's role of promoter, 
endorser, screener, collaborator, and co-ordinator was fine in theory, but it seems that it could not be 
carried out without impinging on the autonomy of the various players involved. SIFR was transferred 
from IDRC to FAO in Rome on September 1, 1998. 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY No significant observations apart from perceived 
communications difficulties with donors. 
PROGRAMACCOMPLISIIMENT SIFR has had a problem getting donors to go along with its aims for 
influence in a context of varying and conflicting interests operating within the Steering Committee and 
the FAO asserting that the needs of the developing countries were its mandate. A UNDP managed 
evaluation, after two years of operation, showed a perceived lack of progress in improving the 
effectiveness of donor assistance to fisheries research for the benefit of developing countries. 
In 1995, following the initial two-year operation of SIFR, an evaluation of its achievements in meeting 
its objectives was carried out, which was seen as an opportunity to break what was viewed by the 
Steering Committee as a logjam caused by divisiveness within the Committee and a perceived lack of 
progress on the part of SIFR. Results of the evaluation were less than encouraging. Inter alia: 
SIFR had not contributed in any significant way to the overall objective of improving the 
effectiveness of donor assistance to fisheries research for the benefit of developing 
countries 
The objectives to increase awareness of needs and priorities among donors and recipients 
and to increase effective co-ordination among implementing agencies had not been met. 
People interviewed for this Review and case study observed that there were no real impacts and few 
outcomes flowing from SIFR. Reasons offered included the lack of staff and funds, Steering 
Committee divisiveness, and the lack of collaboration, focus, and communication with donors. 
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HELP To IDRC No significant impacts and few outcomes from the needs-matching objective 
were cited by IDRC or Secretariat interviewees in this 1998 Review. Cumulative external funding did 
not rise above 20% of the total funding of $1.7 million. 
SISERA - SECRETARIAT FOR INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH IN AFRICA 
OBJECTIVES SISERA's primary objective is to reinforce the institutional framework for the pursuit 
of economic research in Africa. Objectives appear to be too wide-reaching for the resources assigned 
or available. One hundred per cent of SISERA's $ 1 million funding comes from IDRC, although there 
are some $2.27 million folded into SISERA from two earlier projects funded by USAID which 
SISERA is now managing. The current focus of the Secretariat is start-up activity. 
Since SISERA is very new, having been approved by IDRC Governors in March 1997, it has been 
primarily focused on start-up. Therefore, little can be concluded about performance at this early date. 
Planned Secretariat activities are organized around six modalities to achieve its objectives: 
Core institutional grants 
Collaborative thematic research 
Managerial capacity building 
Support for sabbaticals and internships 
Electronic connectivity 
Dissemination, publication and outreach. 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY No significant observations. 
PROGRAMACCOMPLISHMENT Too soon to assess program achievement. 
HELP To IDRC Too soon to assess impact on IDRC stature. 
WETV - THE GLOBAL ACCESS TELEVISION NETWORK 
OBJECTIVES WETV's objectives were not based on realistic funding estimates and realistic 
assessment of its fmancial management competence. Its September 1995 launch in Beijing was 
successful and it managed to get enough funding partners involved. The broadcaster still has funding 
difficulties that substantially limit its services. WETV is a venture in both innovative programming and 
in public-private sector partnership in broadcasting. In terms of program goals and having a successful 
launch of the service in Beijing, it achieved its targets. It broadcasted from the UN Conference on 
Women via satellite to 34 broadcasting networks or stations covering 50 countries. WETV also 
achieved its goals with respect to incorporation and private-public sector partnership. The WETV 
network is made up of for-profit and not-for-profit entities working in partnership. WETV was 
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selected to be the official carrier of the UN Habitat Conference in Istanbul in June 1996 and launched 
regular programming of a few hours daily in October 1996. 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY WETV was not operating under an effective financial 
management and control system. There were not effective financial controls nor adequate and timely 
reporting to the Board. However, the Board took steps to avert a repetition. There are no significant 
observations on performance reporting. 
PROGRAMACCOMPLISHMENT WETV achieved prominence through its carrier activity and its new 
partnership sponsoring its WETV network broadcasts now extend to 30 countries. It has demonstrated 
the ability to help developing countries by, for example, facilitating, through a webcast, interactive 
access to the Habitat II Conference for people who would otherwise have been unable to participate - 
in this case by establishing experimental interaction sites in Montevideo and Mexico City 
Today, the WETV broadcast signal is transmitted to 38 affiliates in 30 countries. WETV is using 
independent producers from around the world, including many developing countries, as initially 
envisaged. The continuing difficulty with funding means that programming is still limited to a few hours 
a week. Broadcasters also need time to develop confidence in WETV and to open a WETV time slot 
in their program schedule. Each affiliate has a tailor-made contract which ensures that an inability to 
pay fees for programming does not stand in the way of participating in the network. Affiliates can 
participate by purchasing programming, providing in-kind programming, sharing programming fees, or 
by providing a small fee for the service. 
HELP To IDRC WETV has been a mixed blessing: its innovativeness has been saluted and 
IDRC's loss of financial control has been a useful lesson, but the learning could have been gained at a 
lesser financial cost to IDRC. 
COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE 
Although this Review was supposed to focus on the Secretariat mechanism as a whole, and not on the 
performance of individual Secretariats, this proved to be difficult because there are no strategic 
framework or performance targets set for the Secretariat mechanism. For much the same reason, we 
found that there were little data available on Secretariats as a whole prior to this Review. Our 
interviews with IDRC senior management and staff and review of IDRC documents showed that, 
during the 1992-97 period, Secretariats were seen and promoted as a mechanism for enabling IDRC to 
follow its corporate mission while also helping to keep IDRC intact. The main goals described for 
Secretariats are: 
Contribution to corporate mission 
To increase collaboration with other partners, particularly international development 
agencies, and with new partners in the private sector, which had not traditionally 
worked with IDRC in the past 
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To establish donor consortia which could pool dwindling aid resources to provide 
critical masses of resources, and would work more collaboratively 
To provide more funds for programs of particular importance to IDRC. 
Contribution to IDRC as an organization 
To save jobs of IDRC staff during a period of budget restriction and downsizing 
To bring additional revenue to help cover administrative costs, including office space 
rental, and thus keep the ratio of administrative to program costs within acceptable 
limits 
To provide additional flexibility to the use of IDRC funds allocated to program 
activities, so that a portion of these could be applied to operational costs like staff 
salaries and travel. 
Collaboration with other agencies - A number of questions need to be asked about 
Secretariat performance with respect to the goal of increasing partnerships with 
other agencies: 
Did IDRC gain new partners through the establishment of the Secretariats? 
Did IDRC develop donor consortia around the Secretariats? 
Were partnerships made with the private sector? 
Would any of the partnerships have happened without the Secretariat mechanism in 
place? 
The data show that only three Secretariats attracted more than four key external donors: Bellanet, 
EEPSEA and WETV. Only WETV proved attractive to the private sector, and even for WETV, 
private sector funding has proven the most difficult. These three Secretariats were also the most 
successful in attracting new donors to join the initiative after it was established by its founding 
members. Most Secretariats have been established by IDRC with two or three partners and have not 
had a mechanism for others to join despite the valiant efforts of many of their Executive Directors. 
Therefore, Secretariats have only been somewhat effective in developing donor consortia and 
ineffective in bringing in private sector partners. Indeed, the partners that they have gathered around 
their tables are generally the partners with which IDRC has been working since the 1970's. It cannot be 
known if these partners would have joined IDRC in funding the activities if the Secretariat mechanism 
had not been in place. Certainly, many of these same agencies have collaborated with IDRC in funding 
projects and long-running research networks before the Secretariats were established. They are, for the 
most part, IDRC's traditional like-minded international development partners among the Foundations, 
the UN agencies, and bilateral aid agencies from Canada, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. 
IDRC's most frequent partner in the Secretariats is CIDA, which has also funded program activities 
through IDRC outside the Secretariat mechanism and has a general agreement in place with the Centre 
for handling its contributions. In at least one case, CIDA had hoped that the establishment of an 
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international Secretariat at IDRC would attract other bilateral aid agencies to contribute, but this has 
not happened. 
Thus, while the Secretariats have collectively attracted the contributions of some twenty organizations 
over the period 1992-98, these have tended to be IDRC's old partners, and once Secretariats are 
established, new partners are generally hard to attract. 
PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR PROGRAM ACTIVITIES 
The Secretariats have been more successful in attracting funds to IDRC than in promoting 
collaboration between partners. They have brought in a total of over $88 million in external funding 
between 1992 and 1998. This represents 55% of all external funding received for a total investment by 
IDRC in the Secretariats of $20 million (or 18% of total funding). In comparison, IDRC's budget for 
its PIs in 1992-98 was $ 356 million, with about $35 million in external co-funding, representing some 
22% of the total external funds received (or 9% of total funding). 
Furthermore, the proportion of the total external funds received by IDRC for its Secretariats has 
increased from 1992 to 1998, rising from about 43% in 1992-93 to between 75-86% in the last two 
years (1996-98). The other significant source of external program funding is projects managed for 
other agencies by IDRC under contract for a fee (Research Management). These amounted to nearly 
$38 million in 1992-98, or 23% of the total external revenue. 
Thus, if attracting additional money for programs in IDRC from external sources is a criterion of 
performance, the Secretariats have been successful, assuming that if they had operated as PIs, their 
performance might have been broadly similar to that of other PIs, or considerably less than what they 
did achieve. 
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO IDRC AS AN ORGANIZATION 
It can be argued that, whether one takes the 20 Secretariats or the 10 reviewed here, a number of 
IDRC staff owe the extension of their employment with IDRC to the Secretariat mechanism. In that 
sense, IDRC retained expertise that it would otherwise have lost, or lost earlier. 
The Secretariats also helped bring additional revenue to IDRC to cover both its fixed costs such as 
office space rental and operational costs. For example, some administrative positions were retained 
within the Centre because they were supporting both downsized IDRC programs and the Secretariats. 
Exactly how these arrangements translated into cost and benefits for both sides is difficult to determine. 
Certainly, no one argues that IDRC made money on the 10% overhead that it charged on external 
contributions to Secretariats. In practice, it was just over 6% for the ten Secretariats reviewed (not 
including the flow-through money from CIDA to MI on which little or no overhead was charged and 
which brings the total overhead to just under 4%). The total additional money generated by the ten 
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Secretariats through overhead charges was $2.8 million for 1992-98. However, Secretariats are also 
charged a number of direct costs which are not included in the overhead, most notably office rent, 
furniture, and equipment. IDRC specified what the salary levels and benefits of Secretariat employees 
must be. This situation reduced the budget flexibility of the Secretariats: staff were transferred from 
IDRC positions, their starting salaries were not at the bottom of the scale; and office rental space in 
IDRC is high quality. Taken in combination, these charges meant that a considerable portion of the 
Secretariats' budgets was consumed in costs paid back to IDRC. 
Another reason for the internal popularity of the Secretariat mechanism between 1992-97 was that it 
enabled some of IDRC program funds to be used for operational costs. These operational resources 
were seen as critical to implementing programs at a time when the operational budgets proper did not 
provide adequate resources for personnel, especially for research assistance and travel. At the macro- 
level, the ratios of operational to program budgets were preserved, but at the micro-level, there was 
increased room to manoeuver, and, in practice, the Secretariats did increase the operational costs of 
delivering programs compared to the other IDRC program modalities. 
Is IDRC GETTING VALUE FOR MONEY FROM THE SECRETARIATS? 
This is an important, although difficult, question to answer. As shown above, 1DRC has received 
considerable financial benefit through the Secretariat mechanism, both for its programs and for its own 
operations. It has also enhanced its reputation internationally through the work done by the Secretariats 
and has gained more influence than it would otherwise likely have. Members of other donor 
organizations who sit on the Secretariat Steering Committees have generally improved their opinion of 
IDRC through the experience. IDRC has long prided itself on sitting around many more tables and 
having more influence than its actual financial contributions would suggest, and this has happened also 
through the Secretariats. The negative publicity attached to the Secretariat mechanism in the early 
years among donors who felt that IDRC was simply trying to generate revenues for itself, has now 
largely disappeared and the mechanism is viewed positively. 
IDRC is now expected to have a more Canadian federal agency image than it has had in the past. The 
Secretariats can certainly contribute to this promotion of Canadian public policy, especially those 
whose mandates arise from Canadian public policy initiatives, such as model forests, tobacco control, 
combating malnutrition, and Canadian leadership in information and communication technologies and 
networking. 
When looking at the long lists of activities and accomplishments of Secretariats, and given the fact that 
the ten reviewed here account for $2.8 million in annual expenditure of IDRC funds, the conclusion is 
relatively compelling. Secretariats do provide good value for money. 
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WHAT ARE SOME OF THE RISKS? 
IDRC also faces some risks in its current deployment of the Secretariat mechanism. The first is that 
many of the Secretariats have faced severe budget limitations. Most have not met their anticipated 
contributions from other donors and, when the cash crunch comes, IDRC has often had to play the 
donor of last resort. The amount of potential exposure IDRC has in these situations was most clearly 
demonstrated in the WETV experience, but it has a more general application. These supplementary 
funds come off the top of other program funds and essentially limit what is available to other program 
modalities. 
IDRC has also not generally had an exit strategy for most Secretariats. Time frames and future 
evolutions to independent status or another host organization are either left vague in the initial 
proposals to establish a Secretariat, or if specified, are generally not acted upon. 1DRC finds it hard to 
close its Secretariats, even when they do not meet their targets financially or programmatically. This 
problem and the associated risks are exacerbated by the lack of an overall strategic management 
framework for the Secretariats and regular review of their collective performance. 
Another problem that the Secretariats demonstrate is that IDRC has generally established Secretariats 
with funds that are minimal or even below critical mass to do the job they are intended to do. This 
reflects the missionary zeal that makes IDRC such an innovative and effective organization, but it also 
means that the operational to program ratios are often quite poor and do not compare well to possible 
benchmarks such as some donor agencies or public charities. For most of the Secretariats (excluding 
MI) the average ratio of operational costs is 40%. This is on top of whatever costs IDRC incurs to host 
the Secretariats, even though these may be hidden rather than charged. It should be emphasized that, 
for many Secretariats, operations are their program raison d'etre and therefore the distinction between 
operations and expenditures used by IDRC may not be particularly useful for assessing cost- 
effectiveness. 
Operational costs are influenced by the type of program activity the Secretariat carries out, but the 
ratios are significantly improved as the total budget increases. This is seen most dramatically in the case 
of MI which has operational expenditures of only 10% of its total expenditures since inception of over 
$44 million (although large parts of these expenditures did not impact significantly the internal 
Secretariat costs so it is hard to compare MI to the other Secretariats). Even so, a similar trend can be 
seen for the other Secretariats: as overall budget increases, the ratio of management and operational 
costs declines. While the data are only indicative, they suggest that a Secretariat needs a minimum of 
$1 million per year (or commitments of at least $5 million for 1992-98) to achieve a ratio of operational 
costs of under 40% and probably at least $2 million a year to get below 20% operational costs. This 
cursory conclusion must be interpreted with caution because many Secretariats are focused on network 
building rather than program delivery and hence are extremely labour intensive. 
Thus, most of the Secretariats established by IDRC have been less than cost-effective as a program 
modality, if one assumes that they should achieve program delivery of 80% of their budget. In effect, 
IDRC has risked cost-effectiveness by establishing so many small Secretariats and a better strategy 
might have been to allocate resources for the Secretariat mechanism to fewer and larger Secretariats. 
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This is perhaps most vividly demonstrated in Africa, where 1DRC has played a key role in establishing 
first AERC (1987), then ATPS (1993), and SISERA (1997), all of which have related mandates to 
strengthen research in economic and science and technology policy in Africa, and overlapping 
constituencies. 
EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE 
Secretariats are generally accountable to several donors and this has been cited as one reason for the 
relative clarity of their objectives and workplans when compared to other program modalities in IDRC. 
The same does not seem to hold true for evaluation of their performance. While some Secretariats, 
notably EEPSEA, have undertaken evaluations of their programs and tried to assess their impact, 
others have not yet undertaken evaluations much beyond surveys of stakeholder opinions. Some 
Secretariats are too new to expect much in the way of evaluation, but interestingly, evaluation of 
Secretariats' performance was rarely mentioned during the interviews with Steering Committee 
members, Secretariat staff or IDRC. It would seem that greater attention to evaluation of the scientific 
program implementation of Secretariats as well as the quality of the Secretariat performance itself 
should be more firmly on the agenda during the next few years, and here IDRC has an important role 
to play to provide a framework for evaluation and some common criteria and indicators. 
RECOMMENDATION 2 - PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
While the overall performance of Secretariats has been positive, some issues about performance 
management remain. First, as indicated by the need for a strategic framework, performance standards 
and expectations for Secretariats as a whole are not clearly defined and need to be developed as part of 
the corporate strategy. Second, it was observed that performance indicators for individual Secretariats 
are in many cases underdeveloped. Finally, serious concern was expressed about the quality and 
reliability of performance reporting to senior management and the Board. While almost all 
interviewees were generally comfortable with performance levels, many expressed discomfort with the 
fact that this belief was based largely on anecdotal evidence. The lack of concrete performance 
measures and accurate, careful reporting were frequently mentioned as problems in this area. Sixteen of 
19 Senior Management or Board members who answered the question expressed serious concerns 
about the quality and appropriateness of the performance information they receive. 
As part of the strategic management framework and business planning process recommended 
elsewhere in this Review, 
RECOMMENDATION 2 - PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
a) Performance targets and measurement criteria should be developed to provide feedback 
to the Secretariats, donor partners, IDRC staff, management, and the Board 
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This is necessary not only to provide feedback to the Secretariats and to donor partners but also to 
IDRC staff, management and the Board. 
b) IDRC should assist the Board in determining the information they need on Secretariat 
performance so that due diligence can be exercised 
Board members have indicated the need for clear and concise information that is less narrative and 
more focused on assessing performance against approved targets and milestones, so that the Board can 
make judgements on the basis of information provided to them. IDRC and key Secretariat staff should 
assist the Board in determining the type, quality and timing of the information needed. 
c) Mechanisms should be established to share information with partners. 
The Review concluded that more information sharing is needed between the IDRC Board and 
management and the donor partners contributing to the Secretariats. A number of Board members 
indicated that they need more direct information from donors about how their needs are being met. 
Currently, the main information channel is the Executive Director of the Secretariat. While this will 
remain the most important channel, it needs to be complemented with mechanisms for direct 
consultations between IDRC senior management and the Board, and donor partners. These 
mechanisms could include a series of short reports, a survey, or meetings arranged around the time of 
the IDRC Board meeting to which key donors are invited. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE AUDIT 
As public institutions like IDRC move toward more autonomous organizations involving collaborative 
partnerships, accountability inevitably becomes a more important issue. Being precise about Who is 
responsible for what? and Who should answer to whom, for what? is a challenge for organizations 
using innovative structures and modalities involving an array of international partners. 
This challenge is compounded by the need for public institutions to account for results as well as 
compliance, as their focus changes from process to results (as it has in most public organizations). The 
emphasis on results, however, is only meaningful if those being held to account have sufficient 
autonomy to bring about desired results. Finding a balance between autonomy and compliance is an 
important issue faced by IDRC in its stewardship of Secretariats. As compliance requirements are 
removed, thereby increasing autonomy and the potential for achieving results, there is a simultaneous 
increase in the risk of imprudence and impropriety. Hence the need for a clear and practicable 
accountability framework. 
Recent changes in approaches to audit reflect these trends. Traditionally, the audit function dealt mainly 
with compliance issues. With the movement toward more autonomous structures and the shift of 
attention to management for results, audit has evolved well beyond compliance-a more 
comprehensive approach to audit has become the norm. It involves a combination of audits: 
Financial audit - provides a picture of the fiscal risk an organization takes 
Operational audit - examines the operation system, including hiring, purchasing, job 
classification, and often involves survey techniques whereby employees views can be 
considered 
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Management audit - designed to determine how well management is meeting its 
strategic goals in the planning and controlling of the corporation. It attempts to determine 
whether or not the managers are actually doing their job and if they are achieving the goals 
and objectives agreed upon 
Value-for-money audit - used in questioning whether or not the organization is 
achieving its goals at the lowest possible cost and if resources are being allocated in the 
most efficient and effective manner possible 
Compliance audit - looks to see if the organization is following the rules and regulations 
it has set for itself. 
This chapter first deals with a number of comprehensive audit questions that have been asked about 
Secretariats in general, even though audits of individual Secretariats have been done. Second, the 
chapter examines the accountability issues raised by Secretariats and makes some recommendations for 
improving accountability. 
AUDIT IssuES AND FINDINGS 
As noted, part of the Review design was to include a performance and accountability audit of the 
Secretariat as a management mechanism. The objectives of this audit were to: 
Assess whether the appropriate management and administrative mechanisms and structures 
are in place to allow the Secretariats to achieve their desired program objectives 
Assess whether the accountability framework of the Secretariats mechanisms allows IDRC 
to effectively discharge responsibility and fulfill its obligation to donors to achieve the 
intended performance targets 
Assess whether the reporting processes provide Secretariat management with effective 
(accurate, timely and relevant) information to discharge their responsibilities 
Determine if there are adequate processes in place to monitor Secretariat performance and 
the environment in which they operate to allow management to learn from Secretariat 
processes and adapt them as necessary 
Review the costs and benefits of the Secretariat mechanism and the deployment of 
resources, including IDRC's contribution, to Secretariat activities 
Based on the results of the above assessments, identify ways to improve the accountability 
and performance reporting frameworks and make recommendations on changes to 
management mechanisms and structures to increase the effectiveness of Secretariats. 
A large part of the effort of this Review was directed toward these audit objectives. For example, the 
interviews included questions designed to gather information about these issues. The following brief 
examination of these objectives offers another helpful lens through which to view findings. 
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APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS AND 
STRUCTURES 
A number of problems were found regarding the appropriateness of management and administrative 
mechanisms and structures. Most notable was the fact that the work plans of some Secretariats often 
reflected a very weak link between the volume and level of work described and the amount of effort 
required to carry out that work. The human resources supplied were not always appropriate for the 
work identified. Further, relatively little attention seemed to have been given to the types and amount 
of knowledge, expertise, and experience required to achieve the mission identified for the Secretariat. 
Further, much attention was given to the fact that the leadership capacity of a Secretariat is critical. As 
mentioned elsewhere in this report, this capacity includes both time and expertise. One thing that has 
been demonstrated and re-demonstrated is that a part-time Executive Director does not maximize 
success and almost always forewarns failure. In addition, if the mission is to establish an international 
network of experts and become the focal point for a specific activity, very strong leadership and 
intellectual capacity is essential. Application of business planning rigour and determining the core 
capacities required to carry out the work of a Secretariat will resolve many of these problems. 
APPROPRIATE ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK 
As will be shown in some detail in the second part of this chapter, accountability problems need to be 
resolved quickly. While considerable attempts have been made to clarify these issues, confusion 
remains. As recommended in this chapter, the accountability framework has to be established from the 
top, at the Board level, and in doing so, must involve those affected. Once this framework is in place at 
the Board level, other key players including the Secretariat Steering Committees and Executive 
Directors, will need to clarify and post their own accountability frameworks. It is also clear that the 
Senior Management Committee will need to clarify its role and responsibilities in connection with the 
creation of an environment within which Secretariats can best achieve desired objectives. 
ACCURATE, TIMELY, AND RELEVANT REPORTING 
As discussed earlier in the report, serious concerns were expressed about the quality and 
appropriateness of information received by Centre executive and governors. Similarly, concerns were 
expressed about the timeliness of financial management reporting that does not enable Executive 
Directors to keep track of income and expenditures and to know their current financial status as 
effectively as they feel they need to. A recommendation has been made to improve reporting to the 
Board and Senior Management, starting with an identification of the types of information required 
upon which to base informed decisions. Once again, business planning rigour will go some way toward 
improving this area of concern. With respect to timely and accurate financial reporting, at time of 
writing, a new financial management system is being put in place that is intended to better meet the 
needs of Secretariats. In the meantime, Secretariats will have to continue keeping shadow books. 
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PROCESSES TO MONITOR PERFORMANCE 
Many interviewees expressed discomfort with the fact that most of their perceptions about 
performance were based on anecdotal evidence. The lack of performance measures and 
accurate/careful reporting were frequently mentioned as problems. The Review also concluded that the 
performance criteria and key result areas for individual Secretariats were often ill-defined. Further, 
there were no agreed upon critical success factors for Secretariats as a management mechanism. 
Exactly what is expected from Secretariats both collectively and individually has to be revisited and 
clarified. This point is underscored by the current lack of clear and agreed upon objectives for 
Secretariats as a modality and by the difficulty of measuring performance of any one Secretariat beyond 
providing a list, albeit impressive, of accomplishments and activities. In the cases where this was not a 
problem, careful evaluations had been conducted and widely circulated. These evaluations included 
data from partners and program participants. Developing a clear focus and manageable objectives, 
business planning, and implementing recommendations on performance management will improve this 
problem area greatly. 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE SECRETARIAT MECHANISM 
Many difficulties were examined in this area. Financial resource problems were evident in many of the 
cases examined for this Review. The problem of IDRC as the donor of last resort was seen in many 
forms. Indeed, not enough consideration was given to questions dealing with funding capacity. 
However, it was concluded that Secretariats offer excellent value for money when their 
accomplishments are measured against the relatively small amount of funding provided to the ten 
Secretariats included in the Review. As indicated in other parts of the Review, one of the issues 
emerging from Secretariats is under-resourcing and perhaps funding too many separate activities. 
WAYS TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE REPORTING 
The recommendations made in this report are aimed at improving performance and accountability. The 
establishment of performance targets and measurements for Secretariats is recommended as are regular 
assessments to measure individual and collective performance. It is also recommended that the Board 
be assisted in determining the information needed on performance in order to exercise due diligence 
with respect to decisions taken about Secretariats. Several aspects of this information need 
improvement. It must be clear and concise. It should also be less of a narrative and more focused on 
assessing performance against approved targets and milestones, so that the Board can make 
judgements on the basis of information provided to them. Moreover, it should come from external as 
well as internal sources, so that a more balanced picture is provided to the Board on the views and 
experiences of all stakeholders. In addition to these recommended actions, the development of the 
recommended corporate strategic framework (including performance management and accountability 
frameworks) for Secretariats will go a long way toward improving accountability and performance 
reporting. 
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ACCOUNTABILITY 
The IDRC Act intends and authorizes the Centre to undertake a broad range of initiatives fostering 
scientific, technical and social research and its dissemination, and to actually make a difference in 
development in the South. Parliament has given IDRC a high degree of statutory autonomy for its 
work, Secretariats being one result of this. From its inception, IDRC has received high recognition and 
praise for its independent support of agencies and groups working in the South to improve equity and 
people's lives. Within this context, people with responsibilities have the obligation to inform themselves 
adequately to do their jobs, and to answer to others when the discharge of their responsibilities affects 
those others in important ways. Due diligence therefore includes, at all levels of the organization, the 
obligation of informing oneself and answering for one's responsibilities. 
Learning is one aspect of accountability which is particularly relevant to IDRC. IDRC's mandate in 
research and knowledge dissemination makes learning a central theme of all of its activities and 
processes. IDRC itself has a learning responsibility. Learning from its efforts and activities needs to be 
reported and its application monitored. The learning gained and applied completes the accountability 
loop and informs the next round of intentions. As accountability expert Henry McCandless observes: 
Given that public servants are now expected to innovate rather than simply follow rules, top 
management's obligation to account for the quality of organizational learning would help those in the 
organization working for achievement in learning. This is particularly important to IDRC, statutorily 
charged to be innovative in identifying and sharing learning from developmental research. 
One of Senior Management Committee's main purposes for undertaking this Review was to ensure 
that an appropriate accountability framework is put in place. An analysis of the data collected during 
the interviews signalled confusion about accountability for Secretariats within IDRC. For example, 
each Secretariat has attached to it a President's Designate who, according to IDRC Secretariat 
Guidelines, is responsible for ensuring that the reporting, administrative, and other responsibilities with 
regard to the Centre and other donors are being fulfilled. Interviews of President's Designates revealed 
that this responsibility was not generally well understood and that views varied considerably on what 
the designation meant. Accountability of the President becomes an issue under this arrangement 
because there have been up to 20 organizations referred to as Secretariats or Quasi-Secretariats with 
President's Designates. Therefore it is critical that accountability arrangements be clear, well 
understood, and carefully carried out. 
Similarly a clear conception of the role and responsibility of Secretariat Executive Directors was 
lacking. Some believed that they embodied the ultimate accountability for anything that happens within 
a Secretariat, while others observed that sometimes they do not have signing authority for many 
routine management functions, including financial reports, financial commitments, and sometimes 
staffing decisions. The Secretariats Housed at IDRC document describes the role of the Executive 
Director (ED) as follows: 
The legal relationship between the enterprise and the ED lies through a contract between the 
ED and the IDRC Thus, IDRC is the sole supervisory body able to ensure that EDs carry out 
their duties. In addition, a Steering Committee typically exists which exercises program 
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responsibility. Therefore, in the program area, EDs are de facto responsible to the Steering 
Committee, with IDRC's role restricted to ensuring that there is compliance with the Steering 
Committee's wishes concerning the program.... With respect to all day-to-day operations - 
financial, legal, administrative, etc. - since IDRC is responsible to the Steering Committee 
for the integrity and soundness of Secretariat operations, EDs should be subject to IDRC 
management oversight and IDRC policies in these areas. 
The Guidelines section, which could be expected to be more specific on the Executive Director's 
responsibilities and accountabilities, says only that The Executive Director will have a dual reporting 
relationship to the President (or his or her Designate) and to the Steering Committee of the 
Secretariat. 
The Executive Director's responsibility for complying with IDRC policies in financial, administrative, 
personnel, legal and ethical matters is covered by the standard Letters of Agreement between newly- 
appointed Executive Directors and the President of IDRC which points the Executive Director to 
IDRC's Management Policy Manual. But neither the Guidelines nor the Letters of Agreement deal 
with standards for the Executive Director's reporting on intended and actual Secretariat performance. 
Secretariat financial statements are prepared and produced by IDRC staff, in IDRC format. There 
appears to be no accountability by IDRC to the Secretariats for these statements. The usefulness to 
Steering Committees for their own decision-making is questionable in terms of the form and timing of 
information and other things they may need to know such as financial impacts of alternatives. Evidence 
suggests that the Secretariats have to develop their own financial information tailored to their own 
needs. 
CLARIFYING ACCOUNTABILITIES IN SECRETARIAT-IDRC RELATIONSHIPS 
The IDRC Secretariat guidance documents and the case studies developed as part of the Review 
process show that work needs to be done to answer the question Who is accountable to whom, for 
what? for Secretariat operations. A robust accountability framework for Secretariats involves five key 
players: Board of Governors, President, President's Designate, Secretariat Steering Committee, and 
Secretariat Executive Director. Each can be held to account and has answering obligations. What 
follows are suggestions to be considered when developing the required accountability framework for 
Secretariats. 
BOARD OF GovERNoRs 
Roger Tasse, former Canadian Deputy Minister of Justice, was commissioned by the Deputy Minister's 
Task Force on Service Delivery Models (1996) to examine ways of ensuring accountability in 
government organizations, including those operating at arms-length. Because significant public sector 
improvement was deemed impossible without finding ways of using collaborative partnerships to 
increase the effectiveness of services provided to citizens, new approaches to accountability needed to 
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be found. Emerging horizontal, collaborative arrangements demanded special attention to 
accountability. 
Beginning with financial administration, Tasse notes that most administrative impediments to 
collaborative partnerships are found in the regulations and guidelines issued for the application of an 
Act, rather than in the Act itself. In other words, they are self-imposed and can therefore easily be 
changed. The focus in pursuing the goal of financial accountability (ensuring that expenditures are 
made in accordance with authorities conferred by Parliament) should not be a complex set of rules that 
limits flexibility in service delivery or achieves important organizational objectives. Rather, the focus 
should be on transparency and readily accessible clear and concise information about finances and 
about the collaborative partnership arrangements, their objects, monitoring, and evaluation processes, 
and governance framework. 
Tasse points out that the existing frameworks for accountability badly lack a systematic dimension, 
adding that it is difficult to get information about existing accountability arrangements and that there 
are no clear rules regarding ministerial or administrative accountability. Monitoring mechanisms, he 
observes, where they exist, are uneven. Adding to the already imperfect situation is the necessity to add 
even more complex horizontal and collaborative partnership arrangements. In response to this 
challenge, Tasse developed an Accountability Checklist which affords many helpful suggestions for 
clarifying IDRC's accountability arrangements with Secretariats and partners. 
Is the Board of Governors satisfied that the arrangement will achieve the goals of the 
legislation under which it operates? 
Is the Board satisfied that the persons who will carry out the tasks under the 
arrangement are properly qualified and trained to do so? 
Is there a proper provision for the monitoring, control, etc. of the work of Secretariats? 
Are proper means in place to receive reports on the carrying out of the tasks and to 
deal with problems as they arise? 
Does the arrangement clearly spell out the responsibilities of each party to the arrangement, 
the objectives pursued, and the information that will be collected and provided to monitor 
the carrying out of the arrangement? 
Does the arrangement achieve the goals of other federal legislation and policies that are 
relevant? 
Will information on the arrangement, financial and other, be readily available? 
More particularly, was there adequate consultation with affected publics before the 
arrangement was put in place? 
Is there transparency in the arrangement: is the arrangement itself and essential facts 
concerning its operation on the public record in a way that is easily accessible to the 
Board, partners, and the public? 
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Generally speaking, if the responsible Minister and the Board are satisfied with the answer to the 
foregoing generic questions, then, when called to account to Parliament (or the media, the public, or 
partners) for the arrangement and what has taken place under it, the Minister and the Board should be 
able to state credibly that what was done has been both prudent and reasonable. While this framework 
is no guarantee against any or all accusations, it should assist Governors in taking the necessary steps 
to ensure that, when arrangements are put in place, they can account properly for the decisions they 
have taken and defend them effectively. 
DECISIONS ONSECRETARIATS In authorizing a proposal for a Secretariat, the Board should 
require, in addition to statements of financial viability, a clarification of who would benefit from the 
Secretariat in the short and longer term; how, and why they should; and who would bear what costs 
and risks, and why. With the Board's involvement and approval, the business planning process 
recommended elsewhere in the report will help resolve this issue. 
REPORTING The Board should require rigorous and timely updating from senior management on 
the Secretariat's critical success factors. Depending on the Board's agendas, this may be a management- 
by-exception review from regular reporting, with the President proposing to deal in priority with the 
problems senior management thinks the Board should know about. Funding delivery failure by donors 
would be one such type of problem. The Board's understanding of issues it can do something about 
should be helped by the recently implemented practice of Executive Directors periodically meeting with 
the Board. 
PRESIDENT 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL As the person who, under the IDRC Act, has supervision over and 
direction of the work of the Centre, the President should: 
Be well-informed on the Secretariat's achievement objectives, critical success factors, and 
program effectiveness, including the dissemination of its learning 
Know the management control system for the Secretariat and its compliance with IDRC 
administrative policy, and whether its reporting to its stakeholders is adequate 
Ensure that IDRC's senior managers (and donors, to the extent IDRC can influence them) 
act usefully on performance and external constraints reported by the Secretariats. 
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE BOARD The President should report to the Board whether the IDRC's 
support of a Secretariat is within IDRC's mandate and, through regular reporting to the Board, whether 
the Secretariat is achieving the aims for which it was created and is cost-effective, and whether it is 
complying with IDRC's administrative policy. 
PRESIDENT'S DESIGNATE ON THE SECRETARIAT STEERING COMMITTEE 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL The Presidents' Designate should have expert knowledge of the 
Secretariat's objectives, critical success factors, and the management control system within which the 
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Secretariat strives to achieve its objectives. The Designate should know how the control system should 
adapt to funding shortfalls and the extent to which the Executive Director can deal with external 
constraints. The Designate should know, through the Secretariat's control and reporting system and 
personal observation, whether the Secretariat is meeting the Steering Committee's program 
achievement expectations, and whether the Executive Director is following IDRC's financial, 
personnel, legal, ethical and administrative policies and the terms of donor agreements. Under IDRC 
authority, the Designate is responsible for taking timely corrective action if Secretariat matters require 
it. The Designate should point out useful connections to IDRC and other program resources that could 
help the Secretariat achieve its objectives. 
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PRESIDENT The Designate's reporting should provide the President with 
what she should know about the Secretariat's aims, operations and funding and its relations with IDRC, 
donors and other stakeholders. This includes obstacles facing the Secretariat such that the President 
can fairly allocate, or approve the priority allocation of limited IDRC resources in helping all the 
Secretariats. 
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE SECRETARIAT EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The President's Designate 
should fully discuss with the Executive Director: 
The views of IDRC Senior Management and Board with respect to the Secretariat's 
authorized program objectives (which can be in the Letter of Agreement) and compliance 
with IDRC administrative policy 
IDRC's funding commitment and what IDRC will do about problems in Secretariat funding 
from others 
Steps IDRC is taking to remove barriers in the way of the Secretariat achieving its 
objectives. 
It should be noted that carrying out the responsibilities of a President's Designate is more than a casual 
arrangement requiring little more than showing up at meetings. Commitment of time and energy is 
demanded, a fact that some feel is overlooked by IDRC managers when assigning responsibilities. 
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT STEERING COMIVIITTEE 
ACHIEVEMENT OBJECTIVES Within the funding guidelines and achievement expectations agreed 
upon with the Secretariat's sponsors, the Steering Committee should establish: 
The intended program accomplishment of the Secretariat, the proposed program 
outcomes, the question of who would benefit from the program and why they should 
benefit, and who would bear what risks and costs 
The identification, dissemination, and application of the learning gained from the 
Secretariat's work 
The working division of powers among the Committee, the Executive Director, and IDRC 
with respect to adhering to IDRC administrative practices 
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The means by which the views of donors other than IDRC are incorporated in decision- 
making 
The feasibility, resource allocation, and programming of programs to be delivered 
How the objective(s) will be met, including administrative and other compliance 
requirements. 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL The Steering Committee should: 
Formally establish standards for informing itself, and for acting on reports it receives 
Establish the critical success factors and performance standards for the Secretariat 
program(s) and how program achievement is to be evidenced (measured) and shared 
Identify a realistic budget for the program(s) and the standards for cost-effectiveness 
Keep itself up-to-date on program achievement and finances, based on timely reports by 
the Executive Director 
Identify barriers in the way of staff achieving the program objectives and seek to remove 
the barriers. 
The Committee should also determine whether the Secretariat operations are complying with the 
agreed financial plan and donor agreements and, through the President's designate, know whether 
IDRC's administrative policies are being met. Finally, subject to the donor agreements, the Steering 
Committee should explain to IDRC and to other donors and major stakeholders the achievement 
objectives and progress on performance expectations, giving reasons for changes in objectives and 
explanations of variances between planned and actual performance. 
SECRETARIAT EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL The Executive Director is responsible for: 
Achieving common agreement with the Steering Committee on the Secretariat's 
achievement objectives and understanding IDRC's administrative policies 
Agreeing with the Steering Committee on the critical success factors for achieving the 
Committee's program objectives, the management control system for ensuring that these 
sub-objectives are met, and the program performance standards 
Ensuring the effectiveness of the control system, within the Executive Director's power to 
do so 
Complying with donor agreements and IDRC fundamental rules 
Giving alerts to the Steering Committee and President's Designate on emerging 
developmental issues affecting the Secretariat's achievement. 
ACCOUNTABILITY The Executive Director should account on a timely basis to the Steering 
Committee, President's Designate and donors, and assist the Steering Committee in reporting to other 
stakeholders. 
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The Executive Director should report to the Steering Committee on: 
Performance against program and financial plans, variance explanations, and corrective 
action being taken by staff 
Barriers standing in the way of staff doing their jobs which the Executive Director cannot 
remove, and how the Executive Director and staff are coping with these external 
constraints 
The effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the program(s) 
The learning gained from the program effort and how it has been shared in the 
development community and applied in the Secretariat's own work 
The extent of compliance with budget, donor agreements, and IDRC administrative policy. 
The ED should report to the President, through the President's Designate, beyond the reporting to the 
members of the Steering Committee on: 
The extent of compliance with key IDRC administrative policies for the Secretariat and the 
reasoning for requested waivers of particular IDRC policies 
Obstacles to program achievement that IDRC is positioned to help overcome 
Any problems of financial statements prepared by IDRC for the Secretariat in terms of 
usefulness or timeliness for Steering Committee decision-making. 
RECOMMENDATION 3 - ACCOUNTABILITY 
a) IDRC Senior Management Committee should work with the Board of Governors to 
develop an accountability framework for Secretariats. 
b) Within this Board approved accountabilityframework, each Secretariat Steering 
Committee should adopt its own accountabilityframework, which is approved by SMCC, 
c) IDRC should continue moving toward a more comprehensive approach in its audits of 
Secretariats including financial audit, operational audits, management audits, value- 
for-money audits and performance audits in addition to the traditional compliance 
audit approach. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STRATEGIC FRAwwoRK 
A strategic management framework establishing a conducive environment in which Secretariats can 
flourish is urgently needed. The term strategic management framework is carefully chosen and should 
not be confused with a policy framework. Typically, when faced with the need for a policy framework, 
organizations assign the task of developing it to an individual or group of individuals. The problem 
with this approach is that it is all too easy for the senior management team to approve such frameworks 
without becoming engaged and internalizing the new policy framework. The development of a strategic 
management framework requires much more engagement and therefore commitment by senior 
managers thus setting the stage for improved corporate management and leadership. 
The 93 interviews carried out during the Review process resulted in a variety of views and perceptions 
on all but one point. Everyone, including Senior Management and Governors, was unanimous that a 
strategic framework for Secretariats was essential and missing. 
While this suggests that immediate action is called for, it is not an indication of management's 
blameworthiness for not having undertaken the development of a Strategic Framework earlier. It seems 
clear that the movement toward Secretariats at IDRC was not a deliberate management strategy but 
rather something that happened spontaneously and progressively. As the interviews revealed, everyone 
has their own particular notion as to why this movement occurred. 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
The reasons matter little now. The fact is that IDRC has launched into a new collaborative partnership 
modality, has experimented with several forms and learned many lessons. The global conclusion is that 
the approach has merit. Successes have been accompanied by failures. However, as stated by a number 
of experts in innovative organizational forms and organizations with a mandate for collaborative 
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innovation (Bennis, Hirshberg, et al), the greatest success rate that can be expected is 70%. In this 
regard, IDRC has performed relatively well with only one or two clear disappointments among the 10 
Secretariats examined. For the remainder, there are a number of extremely successful Secretariats and 
others that could be improved by implementing the recommendations made here. This Review is very 
timely since only now has a reasonable length of time passed and enough experience been gained to 
draw generic conclusions. The time is right for IDRC to take strong strategic leadership on the 
question of Secretariats. 
The strategic management framework that seems to be missing can be conceptualized in many ways. 
The model that seems most suitable for IDRC is adapted from general systems theory and provides the 
direction and integration required for a complex research organization. It suggests that, in similar 
sophisticated and well functioning organizations, there are three levels of activity: business unit, 
corporate integrating channels, and corporate management. 
LEVEL I -BUSINESS UNIT A business unit has three characteristics: a distinct set of operations, a 
distinct market or region, and a distinct management. It is a system in its own right, but also a 
component of a larger corporate system. Although it tends to preserve and assert its individuality and is 
quasi-autonomous, it also needs to function as an integrated part of a larger whole. If denied the 
autonomy, creativeness, innovativeness, and commitment that it needs to be highly productive, a 
business unit will falter and the whole system will suffer. On the other hand, if integration is non- 
existent or weak, synergetic potential is lost and the business unit will drift. Business units are linked to 
corporate management by two main channels: direct personal relationships, the importance of which 
we have seen in Chapter 2 - Lessons from Experience, and through corporate integrating channels 
(Level 2). A well functioning business unit could quite likely survive on its own in some other form or 
with another host organization. This describes Secretariats and their milieu. 
LEVEL 2-INTEGRATING CHANNELS In order to utilize the potential for synergy that only a larger 
system can provide, an integrating channel is necessary that provides a linkage between organizational 
levels. An integrating channel level unifies, integrates and regulates the total organization. It includes: 
0 
Routinized information flow, reports to SMC and the Board, and financial data 
A set of key performance indicators 
Guidelines on corporate requirements and parameters for business units 
Identified shared corporate services. 
As seen in Chapter 3 - Performance and Results, key indicators are a critical element of this 
integrating mechanism. They must balance financial and non-financial measures as well as internally and 
externally oriented measures. Corporate parameters are also important to know and follow. Rather 
than a voluminous and oppressive set of operational policies and procedures, they are the constants 
that all members of the organization must observe - accounting procedures, planning cycles, rules of 
probity, corporate ethical values are examples. Corporate integrating channel also include corporate 
business management functions: financial services, Chief Financial Officer, evaluation, audit, 
performance management systems, and human resource management. 
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LEVEL 3 -CORPORATE MANAGEMENT Corporate management is responsible for direction and 
integration. As noted by Henry Mintzberg in a recent Globe and Mail interview (October 12, 1998), 
Strategy is about venturing, championing, and integrating. Corporate management has three basic 
functions: 
Ensuring the full utilization of the capabilities inherent in the total organization 
Integrating all components for the organization to ensure unity in action and purpose for 
the entire organization 
Preparing for future-related activities consistent with the orientation and strategy of the 
organization. 
This level encompasses several corporate and strategic planning functions that cannot be delegated to a 
lower level. Financial and personnel planning, overall resource allocation, forecasting, in short, future- 
related activities that define the direction of the organization. For leadership to occur, the top team 
must be intimately engaged in these future-related activities and communicate them to the rest of the 
organization and the outside world. The challenge for corporate management is to direct and integrate 
the organization as a whole so that it becomes more than the sum of its parts. 
There are several unique characteristics of corporate management that are can only be found in the 
total organization. In this sense, they create the framework in which Secretariats can function and 
flourish. These characteristics include: 
Overall financial strength that none of the business units have alone 
Ability to set priorities and corporate standards, and to plan on a larger global scale to 
ensure that efforts are made where the needs are highest 
Capacity to know what's going on, monitor and appraise performance, and internalize 
learning, together with enough flexibility to take corrective actions when required 
Agility to enter or exit new areas without major disruption and to shift resources among 
functions and units as required by the situation 
Individual business units able to draw on resources, name, credibility, and organization of 
the entire corporation to perform transactions. 
These are the types of overall capabilities that corporate management needs to exercise and foster. 
Coupled with the three main functions of corporate management, they provide the strategic framework 
within which Secretariats can thrive. Together with vision and commitment, they spell leadership. 
Weaknesses most often found in organizations examined using this model include: 
A lack of understanding of the overall purpose which is not always clearly articulated 
Unanticipated or harmful results of decisions being made in one part of the system without 
an understanding of the consequences for other systems or the whole system 
Overly bureaucratic management that overloads the integrating channels 
Poorly understood or performed corporate management functions 
Poorly or inappropriately defined business unit boundaries 
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Excessive involvement of corporate management with business units activities, and weak 
or ineffective integrating channels 
Future-related activities neglected by corporate management 
Poorly thought out performance measures and key indicators 
Inability to learn from experience, adapt, and continuously improve. 
A corporate management framework, which can create the environment for success and high 
performance or the opposite, demands that several simultaneous functions be carried out effectively. 
Following are seven such functional areas: 
Designing and developing the enterprise: designing operating units, infrastructure, 
management processes, corporate and unit performance indicators; maintaining an ongoing 
effort to adapt the organization for effectiveness, survival and growth; maximizing the 
synergetic capabilities inherent only in the total organization 
Corporate culture and values: developing and communicating corporate ethics and 
values 
Leadership and management: establishing and maintaining a management team ensuring 
full participation and engagement, effective leadership of the various parts of the 
organization, particular functional expertise complementary to the team; developing and 
maintaining a corporate management system; ensuring that each member of the top 
management team is accountable for providing corporate oversight for at least one 
dimension of the total operation that applies throughout the organization 
Human resources: identifying and developing the corporate competencies upon which the 
organization builds its success; personnel appointments, promotions, succession planning, 
training and development; incentive and reward systems 
Finance and administration: risk management, accounting, budget processes and overall 
resource allocations 
Information flow and monitoring: informing the Board of Governors about the state of 
the corporation and the implementation of its decisions - no surprises; identifying key 
corporate indicators and ensuring adequate routinized data flow centered around these 
indicators; monitoring ongoing business to learn about issues in order to deal with them 
before they become problems 
Representation and Promotion: representing and promoting the organization to the 
outside world; entering into contractual obligations on behalf of the total organization. 
Within this corporate management environment, a strategic framework for IDRC Secretariats needs to 
be developed. Elements of this framework would include notions of where IDRC would like to go with 
Secretariats as a modality. One of these directions could be to encourage Secretariats as relatively low- 
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risk, cost-shared ventures into new and innovative areas. In fact, Secretariats could be utilized as 
carefully controlled learning experiments designed to keep IDRC on the leading edge of collaborative 
partnerships in development research. 
In this regard, IMFN highlights one of the hitherto unmentioned advantages of Secretariats: they 
constitute a relatively low cost way of experimenting with new and innovative approaches in an 
environment where risks are relatively controlled. By diversifying funding sources, it is possible to 
somewhat reduce the risk. In addition, Secretariats can be quickly started and stopped. Relatively bold 
experiments can occur without precluding what the results might be. Here we are reminded of Dror's 
belief that many of our traditional approaches to public management are ineffective in dealing with the 
new and most often unique problems created by technology and globalization. Governments, he 
argues, should be spending some of their resources, even small amounts, on bold new ways of 
addressing emerging issues that transcend all boarders. Indeed, as exemplified by IMFN, one of the key 
advantages of Secretariats is that it makes it possible to do just that. 
At the other end of the spectrum from these types of innovative piloted learning opportunities is the 
need for IDRC to further develop a framework for Secretariats that includes parameters, and reporting 
and information requirements. This would be a continuation of the ongoing effort to improve and refine 
the Guidelines for Secretariats Housed at IDRC. However, without elements of the strategic 
corporate management framework described above, these sorts of guidelines fall well short of what is 
required in at least three respects: 
Official endorsement of the Secretariat modality. While there has been considerable 
discussion about the merits of the modality, at no time has the corporate centre removed 
some of the ambiguity surrounding their existence. Five years of experience and the current 
Review has set the stage for this to happen 
Directional leadership. Where does IDRC want to go with Secretariats in the medium 
and longer-term future? 
Performance requirements. These have to be more clearly established. Exactly what is 
expected from Secretariats both collectively and individually has to be revisited and 
clarified. This point is underscored by the current lack of clear and agreed upon objectives 
for Secretariats as a modality, and by the difficulty of measuring the performance of any 
one Secretariat beyond providing a list, albeit impressive, of accomplishments and 
activities. 
RECOMMENDATION 4 - STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR SECRETARIATS 
Interviews indicated a broad consensus about the lack of a strategic framework for Secretariats. 
Everyone, including Senior Management and Governors, was unanimous that a strategic framework 
for Secretariats was essential and missing. The need for a framework establishing a conducive 
environment in which Secretariats can flourish was seen as urgent. Interestingly, while almost all 
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respondents saw value in Secretariats, few, if any, could identify where IDRC intended to go with the 
modality, or what criteria were used in making decisions about Secretariats. 
A strategic framework for Secretariats should be developed under the leadership of the 
President The five interrelated elements of this framework are: strategic direction, business 
planning, performance management, accountability, and operations and structure. The 
strategic framework should: 
Ensure the full utilization of the capabilities inherent in the total organization 
Integrate all components for the organization to ensure unity in action and purpose for 
the entire organization, and 
Identifyfuture related activities that define the direction of Secretariats within the 
organization. 
The systems thinking approach to management assumes a strong element of organizational learning. If 
effective frameworks for performance, accountability, and strategic management are in place, and the 
organization has open and well functioning feedback systems, individual units and the organization as a 
whole will be self-controlled. Hence, command-and-control systems or rigid hierarchies are detrimental 
and not needed. The strategic framework for Secretariats should include elements of other 
recommendations made in this report, namely: business planning, performance management, 
accountability, and operations and structure. 
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CHAPTER 6 
OPERATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK 
ADMINISTRATION OF SECRETARIATS 
The administration of Secretariats at IDRC has evolved from a set of ad hoc arrangements that were 
put in place for the first Secretariats in 1992-93, to a well developed set of administrative guidelines 
which have been elaborated between 1993 and 1998. These administrative arrangements cover the 
following general areas: 
Definition of, and rationale for a Secretariat 
Requirements for establishing a Secretariat 
Legal status of Secretariats 
Relationship to IDRC Programs and Corporate Program Framework 
Performance monitoring of Secretariats 
Accountability for overseeing financial operations 
Applicability of IDRC administrative policies 
Core and additional services provided by IDRC 
Co-ordination of supporting services by Client Services Group 
Allocation of overhead received from Secretariats to IDRC units 
Staffing policies and status of Secretariat personnel 
Reporting relationships and principal responsibilities 
Signing authority within Secretariats. 
The challenge for IDRC in all these administrative areas has been to maximize the mutual benefits of 
the relationship for the Centre and for the Secretariats, and to minimize the costs and, where necessary, 
the ambiguities. The starting point for IDRC administrative policies towards Secretariats is that they 
are legally part of IDRC. The Centre is therefore responsible for them and for the funds invested in 
them by other donors. IDRC management is accountable to the Board for its management of the 
Secretariats, to other donors individually for the management of the funds that they contribute, and to 
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donors collectively for the performance of the Secretariat with respect to its work plan and budget. In 
addition to its formal responsibilities and accountability to other donors, IDRC has a role in seeking 
and taking account of their views and needs as its partners. 
The following are some administrative issues arising from this Review of Secretariats that are not dealt 
with in detail in other chapters. 
RELATIONSHIP WITHIDRCPROGRAMS One of the defining characteristics of Secretariats is 
that they are related to IDRC program activities. However, many of them are now related to them at 
only the most general level, primarily as a result of the fact that IDRC programs have become focused 
and a number of areas such as fisheries, forestry, and nutrition have been eliminated since the 
Secretariats were created. It is clear that the degree of intellectual exchange between Secretariat staff 
and IDRC program staff is relatively limited in most cases and that the level of more formal 
collaboration, such as funding project activities, is also low. Most Secretariat staff and Executive 
Directors have more contact with the Resources Branch than with the Programs Branch. 
There have been various administrative stratagems to fix this problem, including the designation of a 
Program Officer in Programs Branch to act as liaison with each Secretariat, and to define specific 
linkages between Secretariats and certain Program Initiatives (PIs). A senior manager has been 
appointed within the Programs Branch who is specifically responsible for Secretariats on a part-time 
basis and provides a link to the VP Programs. A special fund has been established to support 
collaboration between Pls and Secretariats. While each of these initiatives may help, the general view 
within IDRC is that Secretariats are not likely to have much greater linkage with PIs than they 
presently do, and that another approach is needed which is not based on trying to increase the 
Secretariats' fit within the structure of Programs Branch. 
FIT WITHIDRC CORPORA TE PROGRAM FRAMEWORK While Secretariats are generally not seen as 
having a close relationship with the other program modalities of IDRC such as PIs, they are viewed as 
having a major contribution to make to IDRC's corporate program framework and objectives. They 
are the main mechanism for establishing collaborative partnerships with other development agencies 
and for making certain Canadian foreign policy initiatives more visible internationally. Moreover, they 
have significantly contributed to IDRC's resource expansion, making other donors' funds available for 
objectives and activities dear to IDRC. 
However, most people in IDRC think that the administrative arrangements presently in place for 
Secretariats mitigate against their having an effective input in program or corporate policy 
development. There is no collective mechanism for Secretariats to have an input in policy development 
at the senior management level or at the Board level. Nor are there mechanisms in place for other 
donors who are brought around the separate Secretariat tables to contribute to IDRC's policy planning 
process. These donors to the Secretariats are IDRC's key partners, but IDRC does not have a 
mechanism to receive their views on the Centre's own strategy with respect to their joint enterprises. 
As a result of this lack of integration in corporate planning and strategy, Secretariats have been viewed 
more as a collection of separate and unique entities rather than as integral parts of IDRC's corporate 
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strategy. They have been described to us as unique and marginal to IDRC's main business. This view 
reduces the power that the Secretariat mechanism can provide to IDRC. From a strategic point of 
view, some interesting questions emerge about the role of Secretariats. For example, are Canadian 
public policy on the one hand and a move towards increased collaboration with international 
development agencies on the other among the forces that influence IDRC corporate strategy? If these 
two forces are considered together, it is clear that some Secretariats, such as MI, IMFN, and ITI, are 
closely identified with Canadian public policy and have so far attracted relatively little international 
resources. 
At least two Secretariats, Bellanet and SIFR, were established through wide consultation and 
agreement among international donors and have global mandates. Yet both have experienced 
difficulties attracting other new donors or implementing their mandates as initially envisaged or within 
the time frame initially set out. They have survived through changing their strategies. This may tell us 
something about some of the bottom lines IDRC should impose before agreeing to respond to requests 
to host Secretariats. 
In Africa, IDRC has three Secretariats with mandates to strengthen capacity in closely related policies 
(economic, trade and industry, science and technology policy), in addition to its ongoing support to 
AERC, originally established by the Centre to focus donor resources on economic policy in Africa. It 
would seem that the need for three related initiatives should be reconsidered strategically in relation to 
IDRC's broader goals for programs in Africa and in relation to the cost-effectiveness of supporting 
four separate units. There is a clear regional strategic planning context in which ATPS, SISERA, and 
TIPS need to be considered as their individual performance and contribution is examined. Among the 
questions to be asked are: How do the objectives of each Secretariat contribute to IDRC's regional 
objectives for Africa? How do the Secretariats relate to Canadian policy for Africa? Who are IDRC's 
main international and regional partners in Africa and how do the Secretariats relate to their interests 
and the common interests that they share with IDRC? What are the Secretariats in Africa doing that 
could not be done more cost-effectively by AERC where IDRC already has donor partners, and which 
has more resources and a good track-record? 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT The financial management reporting system used in IDRC does not 
enable Executive Directors to keep track of income and expenditures and to know their current 
financial status as effectively as they feel they need to. Several have reported that they have set up their 
own budget tracking systems to help them manage their finances. Those that have not done so appear 
to have the greatest difficulty keeping well informed about the financial status of the Secretariat. It has 
been reported to us that a new financial reporting system will soon be available for the Secretariats 
which will alleviate this problem. 
A somewhat different issue in financial management is that, now that IDRC Financial Services must 
prepare and sign off all financial statements and reports from the Secretariats, there is a concomitant 
accountability on the part of IDRC Financial Services and the VP Resources for the financial 
management of the Secretariats. This recommendation was made by an Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Board for WETV, following advice from the Independent Investigator appointed by the Board for 
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WETV. It ensures balance and integrity in financial reporting. Although justified at the time, it has the 
effect of truncating the Secretariat as a responsibility and accountability centre. 
RELATIONSHIP OFSECRETARIATS WITHIDRCSUPPORT UNITS One of the most detailed 
aspects of administration in the Policy Guidelines for Secretariats deals with the provision of support 
services to Secretariats, such as administrative, financial, human resources management, information 
management, and legal services. The Client Services Group within the Resources Branch has been 
charged to provide overall assistance and co-ordination of support services to Secretariats. In a 
Regional Office, this service is performed by the Regional Controller. 
Two problems have emerged with the current arrangements. The first is that maintaining relationships 
with all the units in IDRC that provide support services is very time consuming for the Executive 
Directors. One estimated that 30% of his time was absorbed in dealing with IDRC as a service 
provider. Another complained that there is no one stop shopping in IDRC and that getting services 
from the Centre was as complex as buying services outside the organization. On the other hand, it is 
clearly necessary for Secretariats to have direct access to the expertise in the different support units. 
Moreover, the Client Services Group cannot perform a surrogate role for providing that expertise. 
These seem to be problems that can be solved with further discussion between the parties, and it is 
clear that the will is there to improve the situation. 
A second problem, which is easier to deal with, is that not all service providers are well informed about 
the Administrative Policies relating to Secretariats, and Executive Directors and other Secretariat staff 
must spend more time informing them and negotiating with them. 
As a result of the downsizing that took place at IDRC, support units are often severely stretched in 
their resources. This means that the support that they can provide to Secretariats is perhaps less than 
adequate from a corporate point of view. For example, Secretariats have tended to publish reports 
without the professional resources that are available in IDRC Books in terms of review, editing and 
designing a common format. This is already being addressed but is nonetheless something that IDRC 
should consider in developing its strategic management framework. 
STAFFING POLICIES AND STATUS OFSECRETARIATPERSONNEL IDRC policy requires that 
Secretariat staff are recruited and treated according to IDRC personnel policies. In the past, this has 
raised a number of issues. The first is that, since Secretariats are legally part of IDRC, they are part of 
the same organizational pool of jobs as IDRC. Thus, as IDRC downsizes, IDRC staff must be offered 
the first opportunity for any position in the Secretariats. In practice, this appears to have meant some 
pressure on Secretariats to take redundant IDRC staff rather than hire from outside. Two concerns 
have been raised: the Secretariats may not always have been able to select the best qualified people and 
they have been seen by some as excessively dominated by former IDRC staff. 
Another problem faced by IDRC in hosting Secretariats is that current IDRC professional salary scales 
have often made it difficult to recruit internationally, particularly for the position of Executive Director. 
This has been an issue for some of the donor partners who naturally want the best leadership possible 
for the Secretariats and do not always understand why a competitive international salary cannot be 
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paid, especially when they are contributing to the operational costs of the Secretariats. The reality is 
that IDRC, as a Canadian Crown Corporation, must comply with federal legislation such as Pay 
Equity, the Canadian Labour Code, and the Official Languages legislation, legislation that applies to all 
the Secretariats based in Canada. Therefore, Secretariats, even when they are also funded by other 
donors, cannot have a separate pay structure, nor can they avoid publishing in both of the official 
languages of Canada. These limitations, that have not been adequately discussed with other donor 
partners in the past, should be part of the negotiations that take place before any agreement about 
being host institution is reached. 
On rare occasions in the past, Executive Directors and professionals have been engaged as consultants 
with remunerations set outside IDRC scales, but this then means that, strictly speaking, they are 
advisors to IDRC without specific authority to sign contracts or to supervise IDRC staff. It also 
exposes IDRC to certain risks under Canadian legislation as full-time, long term consultants working in 
IDRC offices might be deemed to be employees. In these situations, the accountability waters become 
muddy as someone else must countersign on behalf of IDRC as well as the Executive Director. One 
approach to staffing which has not been used often is secondment from another organization, 
particularly from donor partner organizations. A secondment does not fall within IDRC's reporting 
requirements under Canadian legislation and can be remunerated at a higher salary. It can also mean 
that another donor could be more involved and knowledgeable about the work of the Secretariat. 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT FEDERAL IDENTITY PROGRAM An 
administrative issue which has recently developed is how the Secretariats, which are legally part of 
IDRC, can conform to Canadian legislation and still be effective as international Secretariats serving 
international partnerships. IDRC is presently in discussions about the decision by Treasury Board to 
require IDRC, along with other federal agencies, to include the Canadian wordmark on all their 
corporate materials. Some donors to Secretariats have been uncomfortable in the past with the fact that 
IDRC's visibility in joint enterprise far exceeded theirs. If enforced, the wordmark requirement would 
affect Secretariats differently. Some, such as IMFN, MI and ITI, are clearly Canadian-led initiatives. 
Others, such as Bellanet and ATPS, are less so. It is likely that all could compromise their international 
funding if the directive were enacted, and this may be an opportune time for IDRC to examine possible 
future scenarios for the Secretariats. Could they become more explicitly Canadian and survive? Is this 
the time to change their legal status and/or host institution? 
REPORTING RELATIONSHIPS 
The Policy Guidelines for Secretariats pay particular attention to the responsibilities of the various 
bodies and roles in IDRC with respect to Secretariats. What emerges is a very complex set of reporting 
relationships and some confusion about who is responsible for what. What appears to be missing is any 
effective mechanism for getting information and advice from the Secretariats and their Steering 
Committees to IDRC senior management and the IDRC Board. One simple mechanism is to deposit all 
reports from Secretariats in one electronic site within IDRC so that they can be accessed by everyone 
who requires them. This is a fail-safe mechanism to put in place in addition to specific reporting lines. 
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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The Executive Director of a Secretariat has the most challenging set of 
reporting relationships. He or she is required to report to the Steering Committee on the performance 
of the Secretariat, the implementation of the work plan and budget, and on future plans. He/she must 
also deal with each donor and partner represented on the Steering Committee individually, and ensure 
that their separate requirements for technical reporting are met. 
The Executive Director is also required to report to the President of IDRC (usually through the 
President's Designate) on the operations and work of the Secretariat, and also to the Board at regular 
intervals, or as requested by Governors. In practice, the President usually designates a senior manager 
to represent her on the Steering Committee and the Executive Director reports to this person regularly 
on Secretariat operations. However, the Vice President Resources (and CFO) is responsible for 
overseeing the financial operations of each Secretariat and the Director of the Resources Services 
Group is responsible for preparing the financial reports, so that the Executive Director must also 
consult with these people. 
The reporting relationship with the Vice President Programs is less clearly laid out in the Guidelines but 
certainly, the Executive Director is expected to consult with the program liaison person designated for 
the Secretariat, and with the senior manager in Programs Branch responsible for Secretariats. If the 
Secretariat is located in a Regional Office, the Executive Director will also have to report to the 
Regional Director on administrative matters within the Regional Office. 
PRESIDENT'S DESIGNATE Interviews with the President's Designates for the Secretariats indicated 
that they had different views of their roles and responsibilities. Some saw themselves as champions or 
cheerleaders for the Secretariat within IDRC, some as technical experts, others as providing a channel 
to the President and the Board, and still others as, representing IDRC's interests of donors on the 
Steering Committee. Few seemed to take the role as it is formally defined by the IDRC Board: that the 
President's Designate should be accountable for ensuring that the Centre's responsibilities are 
fulfilled. Taken literally, this puts heavy responsibilities on the President's Designate. Fulfilling this role 
would probably take more time than is currently allocated to them. It also calls into question some of 
the reporting relationships of the Executive Director to various parts of the Centre. The responsibilities 
of the President's Designate needs more elaboration and clarity. 
STRUCTURE 
One point of broad consensus within the Secretariats and IDRC was that the mechanisms for getting 
input from the Secretariats to IDRC policy development, both program and administrative, were weak 
or non-existent. Secretariats are part of IDRC yet they are kept somewhat apart. They are usually 
physically and electronically separated from other parts of IDRC. Significantly, they have no voice 
representing their interests around the senior management table. Many people see this situation as not 
good for the Secretariats and less than ideal for IDRC. There are some attempts underway to create a 
forum in which Secretariats can discuss common problems and share strategies and lessons. The larger 
question remains about how Secretariats are to be better integrated into the IDRC management and 
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accountability structure, as well as its corporate planning processes. Further, this must all be done 
without weakening Secretariat's ability to maintain a single focus. 
Discussed below are some of the options for the structural integration of the Secretariats into IDRC's 
corporate identity and strategy. For reasons explained in the last section, we do not recommend any of 
these structural options at this time. Our overall view is that IDRC should focus first on getting its 
accountability and strategic management frameworks in place before turning to the option of changing 
the structure. At the outset of this Review, we set out the need for organizations that develop 
innovative mechanisms, which the Secretariats are, to also adapt and innovate in their own 
organizational cultures and systems. This should be IDRC's first task. 
STATUS QUO One option is to keep the present arrangement with all Secretariats reporting to the 
President, with a better understanding by the President's Designates of their roles as approved by the 
Board. This has some advantages in that it involves minimal disruption but it does not answer the 
important issue of Secretariats' representation at the senior management level, since the President must 
represent more than the interests and views of one program modality: the Secretariats. The status quo 
solution also does not provide a mechanism for Secretariats to be involved in corporate planning and 
strategy, although they are key players internationally in terms of the perception and implementation of 
that corporate strategy. Thus Secretariats have both a stake, and relevant expertise in corporate 
strategy development that are not being used under the status quo situation. 
CREATION OFSPECIAL UNIT OR TASK FORCE Another option is to keep the present structure and to 
create a transverse special unit or task force responsible for providing liaison and co-ordination 
between the Secretariats and other parts of the Centre. This unit could also be made responsible for the 
flow of certain information between the Secretariats and IDRC and could act as the Secretariat for the 
Secretariats in ensuring their participation in IDRC planning and policy activities. It would be 
important for the unit to directly engage the experience of the Secretariats and to involve them in the 
development of its terms of reference and competencies. The unit should be part of the President's 
Office, reporting directly to the President and providing liaison with other central groups such as Policy 
and Planning, Internal Audit, Legal Services, and Evaluation. The functional dividing line between such 
a special unit and other co-ordinating units such as Client Services Group would need to be worked 
out but, in general, the special unit should focus on supporting the integration of Secretariats in IDRC's 
policy, strategy and planning processes rather than dealing with Secretariat operational issues. 
CREATION OF BRANCH FOR SECRETARIATS One option which arose in discussions with both 
governors and senior managers was the creation of a new International Secretariat Branch in IDRC, 
with a Vice President for Secretariats. This has the biggest implications for IDRC in terms of structural 
change and would clarify current roles and responsibilities which presently cut across the Centre. It 
would probably also improve the oversight of Secretariats and streamline the systems in place for 
managing and administering them. 
Opinions are more divided on whether a structural option like this would give Secretariats a sense of 
being part of the mainstream of the Centre, or would further marginalize them. One of the concerns 
expressed in creating a separate Branch for Secretariats is that it would give structural recognition to 
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the view that the intellectual and program implementation links between the Secretariats and other 
program activities in Programs Branch are such that they can be just as effective if they are separated in 
two different branches in the Centre. An alternative view is that the Programs Branch is already too 
large and complex to add on all the Secretariats. Further, some Executive Directors indicated that this 
idea was sub-optimal because it could in effect, and in the eyes of donors, remove Secretariats at least 
one step away from the corporate centre. 
SECRETARIAT DONORS FORUM One link which does not exist today is that between the Board and 
IDRC's external partners in the Secretariats. Some Governors have commented that all the 
information they receive on the performance and relevance of the Secretariats comes from the 
Secretariats and from IDRC, and they have no other information against which to balance this internal 
view. While this may be appropriate for Program Initiatives and projects, it may not be for the 
Secretariats which are joint ventures, even if IDRC is the controlling shareholder. It has been suggested 
that the reports to the IDRC Board from the Secretariats should come from the Secretariat Steering 
Committees and be signed off by them so that there is a direct link between the IDRC Board and its 
partners in the Secretariats. Such a report should not have to be approved by SMC but SMC could 
comment on it. 
Another initiative might be a mechanism such as a Secretariat Donors Forum which could be 
surveyed, or meet from time to time to discuss generic issues related to the Secretariats and which 
might also meet occasionally with the IDRC Governors. It could help create a greater sense of 
participation and ownership in the Secretariats on the part of external donors, whilst also providing the 
views and experience of external partners to the IDRC Board on the performance and value of 
Secretariats. 
RECOMMENDATION 5 - OPERATIONS AND STRUCTURE 
We do not recommend adoption of any of these options immediately, except perhaps to put in place 
the donor forum. As a cautionary footnote here, it should be said that no structure, however seemingly 
perfect, will work if the people in the organization don't want it to work, and the mechanisms to make 
it work are not also in place. Rather than immediate structural changes, it is recommended to invest 
first in improving the strategic and accountability frameworks, training people to better understand and 
carry out their responsibilities, changing the corporate culture where necessary, and providing the 
resources and mechanisms to achieve both. These improvements can begin immediately. We are also 
very aware that, once in place, structures are hard to take down. 
On the issue of the possible structural changes or new units to improve the performance of the 
Secretariats and IDRC's support to them, our recommendation is to proceed with caution. We would 
suggest that a senior person, from outside IDRC, be asked to work with a small internal task force 
which would facilitate input from all Branches and Secretariats, without becoming too large and 
unwieldy itself. A senior person seconded from another donor agency familiar with IDRC and the 
Secretariats would be appropriate and perceived as independent. One of the difficulties we see is that, 
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at present, the views within IDRC are somewhat polarized and some senior managers are perceived as 
supporting one or another structural option. 
The terms of reference would be to help IDRC to develop a strategic management and accountability 
framework for the Secretariats, with the aim of sorting out most, if not all, of the many issues raised in 
this Review. The group would be asked to undertake further consultations with donors, with Executive 
Directors, and with IDRC senior managers. They would work within a five to six month time frame. 
We believe that it is urgent to do something and that the status quo is not a good option. The terms of 
reference for this present Review do not allow us to develop the strategic management and 
accountability framework that is the necessary first step before contemplating either major structural 
changes in IDRC or establishing new Secretariats. We also believe that when, as part of that 
framework, targets are established to measure performance, and cost-effectiveness issues are 
examined, there may be further rationalization of the current Secretariats. 
RECOMMENDATION 5 - OPERATIONS AND STRUCTURE 
a) Core individual and team competencies should be determined for each Secretariat 
before staffing actions are taken. 
b) An external senior person reporting to the President should be engaged to work with a 
dedicated task force to develop the strategic framework required for Secretariats. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Review concludes on a positive note for IDRC. The Secretariat modality is working well and has 
the support of IDRC and its funding partners. The overwhelming evidence from the survey and from 
the case studies is that the mechanism is viewed positively, that it is on the right track, and that, where 
problems are encountered, there is a will to put them right. There are notes of caution however. The 
lessons of the case studies underscore that IDRC has been lucky: even though not all the necessary 
systems for accountability, sharing information, resource allocation, and contingencies were in place, 
there have been few failures. The case studies point to specific instances of IDRC's unnecessary 
exposure to risk and to avoidable misunderstandings with its funding partners. Most of the problems 
caused by Secretariats are attributable to the lack of a coherent strategic framework leading to some 
confusion and to misplaced and misdirected effort. Nevertheless, the Centre has been able to capitalize 
on the opportunities presented by the Secretariats. 
Partly because the Secretariats were established at a time and some for reasons which cause IDRC staff 
to have some mixed feelings about them, they have never really been part of the central strategic 
thinking of the organization. Secretariats have been marginal: neither separate nor a part of IDRC. 
Occasionally they have been seen as having a detrimental effect on conventional programming. This 
sense of being neither fish nor fowl was particularly evident in the early years when administrative 
policy for Secretariats was poorly articulated, and as new Secretariats came on stream which did not fit 
within the Guidelines being developed. However, the situation has been improving year by year. 
Five years on, the Centre needs to make some decisions about what the Secretariats collectively mean 
to its mission and how they fit into its corporate strategy. From this will flow decisions about individual 
Secretariats. This Review of the Secretariats as a program delivery modality has been a part of the 
Centre's planning process aimed at the next five year Corporate Program Framework. It has arrived at 
a number of key recommendations for improving both the performance of the Secretariats and the 
oversight and leadership role that IDRC should play with respect to them. This chapter reviews the 
recommendations and tasks ahead and suggests who should take responsibility for implementing them 
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or for seeing that they are acted upon. The key responsibilities for action lie with the Board of IDRC, 
the President and Senior Management, the staff of IDRC and with the Secretariats themselves - their 
Steering Committees, Executive Directors, and staff. The recommendations therefore do not appear 
consecutively in this chapter but are ordered by who should be responsible for acting upon them. 
WHAT THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NEEDS To Do 
The IDRC Board of Governors is responsible for IDRC achieving its objectives. With respect to the 
Secretariats, the Board has a responsibility to ensure that it has adequate information on which to base 
its own decisions and on which to accept that appropriate oversight, management, and accounting 
systems are in place within IDRC in the name of the Board. The evidence of the interviews with 
Governors themselves and the lessons from the case studies point to a number of weaknesses in the 
present systems for providing information to the Board and for assuring Governors that appropriate 
oversight systems are in place. 
The Board needs to discuss these issues and to work with the President and senior management to set 
out what information it needs in order to carry out its own duties under the IDRC Act. It can be 
anticipated that the information required is of several types: 
Information relating to the proposal to establish, significantly change, or terminate a 
Secretariat 
Information on the ongoing performance of each Secretariat 
Information from IDRC's donor partners on their perspective on the collaboration through 
the Secretariat 
Information on the strategic objectives of IDRC in adopting the Secretariat modality and 
how those objectives are being reached. 
The Board needs to be clear about the information it requires when considering proposals to establish, 
modify or terminate a Secretariat and when in the planning process it wishes to be either informed or 
involved. In the past, the Board has approved major funding for Secretariats with little more than a 
concept paper before it. It should spell out the questions that it wants addressed in any Secretariat 
proposal or business plan that comes before it in order to make its decisions. Some of these questions 
are discussed in the report and are summarized under the other sections in this chapter. 
A related task is for the Board to provide its views to the President about the accountability system that 
it would like to see in place for the Secretariats. As discussed below, there is still uncertainty within 
IDRC and the Secretariats about who is responsible for what, and this uncertainty has, in the past, led 
to problems in IDRC's oversight of the Secretariats. The Board should approve the final accountability 
framework that is agreed upon with IDRC, with the Secretariats, and with the other donors who are 
IDRC's partners. 
Following its consideration of this report, the Board should consider and approve a new working 
definition of an IDRC Secretariat. The current criteria for Secretariats need revision as they do not 
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adequately describe the existing Secretariats, nor do they distinguish between Secretariats and other 
program modalities of IDRC. Further, only eight of the 20 entities referred to as Secretariats have 
actually been approved as such by the Board. Senior management should work with the Board to clear 
up these ambiguities. 
WHAT THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT NEED To Do 
The President exercises overall supervision and direction over the work of the Centre. She should 
therefore be well informed about the Secretariats and confident that there are adequate management 
and accountability systems in place, both for compliance with IDRC policy and for discharging IDRC's 
obligations to the funding partners in the Secretariats. Senior managers assist the President in these 
tasks and also represent the President on Secretariat Steering Committees. When a senior manager acts 
as a President's Designate, the Board has charged him/her with specific responsibility for ensuring that 
IDRC obligations are met. 
One of the most important findings of this Review is that IDRC does not have a strategic framework 
for its international Secretariats. This is seen as urgently needed by the Board, senior management, and 
the staff of IDRC and the Secretariats. It should be a key responsibility of the President and senior 
management to lead the process to develop a strategic framework which can be submitted to the Board 
for its consideration and formal approval. This strategic framework for the Secretariats as a whole 
clearly needs to be articulated with the overall corporate program framework on the one hand, and will 
itself frame individual Secretariat strategies on the other. 
RECOMMENDATION 4 -A strategic framework for Secretariats should be developed under the 
leadership of the President. The five interrelated elements of this framework are. strategic 
direction, business planning, performance management, accountability, and operations and 
structure. The strategic framework should: 
Ensure the full utilization of the capabilities inherent in the total organization 
Integrate all components for the organization to ensure unity in action and purpose for 
the entire organization, and 
Identify future related activities that define the direction of Secretariats within the 
organization. 
A related task requiring leadership from the President and senior management is the development, in 
collaboration with the Board, of a comprehensive accountability framework for Secretariats. For 
various reasons, relating to the history of the Secretariats, and the changes within IDRC over the past 
five years, accountabilities are less clear to all concerned than they should be. President's Designates 
have very different views about their responsibilities. Executive Directors have front-line 
accountabilities to their Steering Committees, to IDRC, and to their staff, which can be shadowed by a 
parallel set of accountabilities within the delegated authority system of IDRC. Secretariat Steering 
Committee members are not clear where the responsibility and authority of the Steering Committee 
ends and that of IDRC begins. Part-time Executive Directors have their loyalties and time split between 
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their IDRC role and their position leading the Secretariat. Program Officers who are asked to travel for 
a Secretariat or represent it do not know when they should be charging the Secretariat for their 
services. All of these add up to a considerable lack of clarity about accountabilities. 
RECOMMENDATION3 (a) - IDRC Senior Management Committee should work with the Board of 
Governors to develop an accountability framework for Secretariats. 
Given the time frame for the new Corporate Program Framework that has to be ready in 1999, a 
strategic planning process for the Secretariats needs to be launched very soon. While this should be 
participatory and include input from different parts of IDRC, including the Regional Offices, as well as 
the Secretariats and the other donors, it needs to be a streamlined process, led by the President and 
senior management and developed with the support of a small internal task force. Leadership in this 
process should clearly rest with senior management. The attachment of a senior outside person to 
work with the task force is recommended to ensure that the work is completed within six months and 
to provide a neutral role unattached to any Branch or Regional Office. 
RECOMMENDATION 5 (b) -An external senior person reporting to the President should be 
engaged to work with a dedicated task force to develop the strategic framework required for 
Secretariats. 
WHAT IDRC STAFF NEED To Do 
IDRC administrative staff have already taken the initiative to develop administrative guidelines and 
practices which provide better support to the Secretariats. What is needed now is a comprehensive 
approach to business planning for the Secretariat modality as a whole, in conjunction with the business 
plans which should be developed by each Executive Director for their own Secretariat. These business 
plans should focus on the key issues which arise from IDRC's experience with Secretariats so far: 
financial and human capacity; mandate and focus (particularly in relation to resources available); and 
organizational and interpersonal relationships. 
The business plan for the Secretariats should address the short term and longer term commitments of 
financial and human resources to Secretariats, the contingency plans in place if anticipated funds from 
outside are not received, or are received late, the opportunity costs of the Secretariats for IDRC's 
other program activities, the desirability of delimiting the budget line for IDRC funding to Secretariats 
so that Secretariats essentially compete with one another for resources, as PIs do, and the staff 
resources in the Secretariats in terms of their overall impact on IDRC core competencies now and for 
future initiative. 
While individual Secretariat plans will be developed by their Executive Directors and Steering 
Committees, IDRC must consider how the missions and objectives of the Secretariats fit into its own 
strategic framework. This must particularly involve Programs Branch which has historically had less 
interaction and direct contact with the Secretariats and has sometimes appeared to be in competition 
and even conflict with some of them. Do Secretariats create a patchwork of programs rather than a 
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coherent program focus and related core competencies? Does IDRC support to its Secretariats 
enhance or weaken the Centre's effectiveness in implementing its other programs? Is IDRC's strategy 
regarding Secretariats understood inside and outside the house? 
These are the types of important questions which IDRC must now address as it considers the 
Secretariats as a mainstream modality for Centre program delivery, and not as unique separate 
initiatives. The Centre's corporate strategy for the Secretariat modality will have to grapple with the 
thorny questions of resource allocation between different program modalities including Secretariats; 
which Secretariats should IDRC continue to host; what new Secretariats might be established; and if 
so, under what partnership agreement and arrangements with other donors. IDRC's business plan for 
partnerships will be based on a more realistic assessment of external resources and firmer negotiation 
with potential donors, if the Centre learns the lessons of its past experience. 
RECOMMENDATION 1- A business plan outline for Secretariats that reflects lessons learned and 
IDRC's unique mandate should be developed and applied 
IDRC will also have to work closely with the Executive Directors of Secretariats to develop 
performance targets and measurement criteria. Although each Executive Director will be concerned 
with a particular Secretariat, IDRC must be concerned with the overall performance of Secretariats. 
RECOMMENDATION 2 (a) - Performance targets and measurement criteria should be developed to 
provide feedback to the Secretariats, donor partners, IDRC staff, management, and the Board 
One of the general findings of the Review is that communication can be improved. The Board of IDRC 
expressed concern about the quality and timeliness of the information they receive on which they must 
base their decisions. IDRC staff can clearly help the Board identify what information would be most 
useful for them to exercise due diligence with respect to Secretariats, and then ensure that the 
information agreed upon is submitted on a regular basis. The Board might also wish to share some 
information directly with the donors which support the Secretariats and IDRC should develop some 
alternative mechanisms for achieving this to present to the Board. 
RECOMMENDATION 2 (b) - IDRC should assist the Board in determining the information they 
need on Secretariat performance so that due diligence can be exercised 
RECOMMENDATION 2 (c) - Mechanisms should be established to share information with partners. 
IDRC staff have an important role to play in developing a comprehensive approach to audit for the 
Secretariat modality and for individual Secretariats, once the decision has been taken by the President 
and the Board to put in place a comprehensive accountability framework for Secretariats. 
RECOMMENDATION 3 (c) - IDRC should continue moving toward a more comprehensive 
approach in its audits of Secretariats including financial audit, operational audits, management 
audits, value-for-money audits and performance audits in addition to the traditional compliance 
audit approach. 
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WHAT SECRETARIATS NEED To Do 
Secretariat Executive Directors and the Steering Committees will be asked by 1DRC to engage in a 
number of strategic planning activities within a common framework which IDRC will develop. These 
will include the establishment of performance targets and measurement criteria for assessing the 
performance of Secretariats and the adoption of an accountability framework compatible with that 
approved by IDRC for Secretariats as a whole. There will be a need for specific studies within common 
IDRC planning frameworks, such as of core competencies, and future funding scenarios. Some 
Secretariats will already have undertaken these or similar studies and may be asked to modify them to 
fit in with a standard approach. 
The major exercise in strategic framework development which is recommended in this Review will 
require the involvement of Executive Directors, Steering Committee members, and Secretariat staff, if 
it is to be successful. 
RECOMMENDATION 2 (a) - Performance targets and measurement criteria should be developed to 
provide feedback to the Secretariats, donor partners, IDRC staff, management, and the Board 
RECOMMENDATION S (a) - Core individual and team competencies should be determined for each 
Secretariat before staffing actions are taken. 
RECOMMENDATION 3 (b) - Within this Board approved accountability framework, each 
Secretariat Steering Committee should adopt its own accountabilityframework, which is approved 
by SMC. 
While this chapter has focused on who should do what, it is clear that the different parts of IDRC and 
the Secretariats need to work together, particularly in the intensive planning processes envisaged for 
the next six months. The signs are good that this will be achieved, as communication and co-operation 
between IDRC and its Secretariats seems to be on a more positive note than in the early years. The 
enthusiasm of donor partners and their appreciation of IDRC's performance in hosting the Secretariats 
is also a positive indicator that they can be engaged in the process. Finally, it is on the leadership of the 
President, the Governors and senior management that the success of the strategic planning process will 
rest, and with it the outlook for Secretariats as a key program modality for international collaboration 
and program delivery for IDRC. 
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LEARNING PARTNERSHIPS: 










ATPS developed as a direct outcome of two IDRC research networks, the East and West African 
Technology Policy Studies Networks (EATPS and WATPS) which IDRC had been supporting since 
1982 and 1984, respectively. The two former networks had operated in 15 countries and been 
successful in building a multi-disciplinary network of academic researchers, for the main part, who 
produced a large number of research studies (80) and related publications. The decade of IDRC 
experience with the regional networks had identified three critical weaknesses: 
The research studies tended to be isolated case studies which lacked a critical mass of 
results to influence policy 
There was insufficient visibility at either national or regional levels and links with policy 
makers had not been made 
The administrative procedures were too cumbersome. 
ATPS was created to respond to these problems. It was designed to put a greater emphasis on 
research utilization and policy relevance; to ensure greater research comparability by focusing research 
effort on a few themes; to streamline administrative procedures; and to improve on the quality of 
individual research projects. The proposal was prepared by the coordinators of the two networks, 
based at IDS at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and NISER at the University of Ibadan, 
Nigeria and was funded by IDRC and the Carnegie Corporation in 1993. In recommending that the 
Board approve ATPS, it was foreseen that ATPS would be supported by a consortium of three to four 
donors providing funds to be managed by IDRC. The project was approved in March 1993 for a two- 
year first phase with only two thirds of the project budget assured from the IDRC and Carnegie 
funding. 
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2. CONTEXT 
Science and technology (S&T) policy research in Africa first emerged as a development theme in the 
1970's. The Ministers of African member states responsible for the application of science and 
technology to development underlined the importance of S&T to Africa in the recommendations of the 
CASTAFRICA I (1974) and III (1984) Conferences. A number of key organizations for S&T were 
established during this period: the African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT), the African 
Academy of Sciences (AAS), the Pan-African Documentation and Information Centre (PADIS) and 
the Regional Office for Science and Technology in Africa (ROSTA) of UNESCO. IDRC was at the 
forefront of initiatives to provide support to S&T policy research in Sub-Saharan Africa, together with 
UNCSTD and UNESCO. The Centre supported a series of training workshops in West and East and 
Southern Africa between 1979 and 1983 and it was this experience that led to the establishment of the 
two regional networks (EATPS and WATPS) which were the forerunners of ATPS. 
Until recently, the main focus was on building the capacity of individuals in science and technology 
policy but it is now also realized that Africa lacks effective institutions and inter-institutional structures 
that can undertake and apply S&T policy analysis. In the 1980's African governments began to 
establish national institutions such as Ministries and Councils for Science and Technology which were 
potential users of IDRC-supported research. By the 1990's, there was a greater move to coordination 
of S&T policy with other macro-economic development and national planning policies. Coordinating 
units have been set up in Presidents' offices and across national ministries. The S&T Councils, whose 
function is to undertake policy formulation, have become distanced from the S&T ministries which are 
responsible for policy implementation. 
A third trend in the African S&T policy context is that major reforms of civil services and public 
enterprises are underway, with an eye to improved cost-effectiveness and quality. In most of the 15 
countries in which ATPS operates, research and development institutions are required to be more 
needs-oriented, to undertake contract research, and to engage in needs assessment. The objective is to 
develop a new performance culture based on quality and therefore on capacity for monitoring, 
feedback and innovation. National S&T programs are required to facilitate the acquisition, growth and 
utilization of technology for development and that demands a better understanding of both human 
resource development and institutional assessment. 
This is the development context out of which ATPS itself developed and the new policy realities to 
which it must successfully respond. 
3. VISION, MISSION AND OBJECTIVES 
VISION The vision of ATPS is to become a Centre of Excellence for technology policy in Sub- 
Saharan Africa; to be a brokerage body between researchers and policy makers; and to be a Reference 
Centre for people addressing key technology policy issues in the region. 
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MISSION The mission is to improve human and institutional capacity for technology policy 
formulation, implementation, research, analysis, assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and dialogue. 
OBJECTIVES ATPS has four objectives: 
To build and improve human and institutional capacity for technology policy 
implementation and research 
To generate a critical mass of knowledge on technology policy issues 
To foster networking and collaborative research 
To disseminate research results widely by different means, with the aim of fostering links 
among researchers and between researchers and users in the productive and policy sectors. 
The mission and objectives of ATPS have stayed the same since its establishment in 1993. The vision 
of ATPS as a Centre of Excellence, a Reference Centre, and its explicit brokerage functions were more 
fully articulated in 1997 in its Strategic Framework for the Next Decade (October 1997). 
4. FUNDING AND FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
By the time ATPS was established, IDRC had provided $1.7 million to the EATPS and WATPS 
Networks over the 1982-1993 period and the Carnegie Corporation had contributed an additional 
US$1 million bringing the total to nearly US$2.5 million. In the initial project phase for ATPS, the 
global budget was US$1,595,050 ($2,041,664 CAD). The actual budget provided by the three 
contributing donors (IDRC, Carnegie Corporation, and Rockefeller Foundation) was only 70% of that 
required. 
Funding to ATPS 1993-1998 
Donor 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 Total % 
Carnegie 561528 38246 691938 710250 2001962 56% 
IDRC 550000 150000 340000 1040000 29% 
Rockefeller 263240 208725 56820 528785 15% 
Total 1374768 38246 1050663 1107070 3570747 100% 
In 1996, the Dutch government agreed to provide core funding of US$250,000 to ATPS on the 
assumption that it would be independent of IDRC, and to provide partial funding of US$100,000 for a 
regional research project called Technological Capabilities in the Context of a Changing Policy 
Environment. The core funds were transferred to a newly created ATPS Ltd. and the project funds to 
IDRC. Following a major crisis in governance, both sets of funds were returned to the Dutch 
government in April 1997. IDRC delayed its second grant because of the crisis. This meant that ATPS 
was severely short of funds to continue operations. 
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An amended budget was presented by IDRC to the ATPS Interim Board in May 1997 which showed 
that ATPS had an outstanding balance of CAD$192,000 to cover commitments of CAD$702,000 
(these included 29 approved research proposals and the Annual Workshop and Board meetings 
planned for October 1997). The Interim Board decided to fund some of the proposals and hold a 
scaled-down Workshop. IDRC provided a bridging grant of $150,000 to allow Secretariat operations 
to continue. 
5. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
The crisis that led to severe restrictions in funding, the withdrawal of one donor, and the threatened 
withdrawal of others, was a crisis in governance and management, with conflicting views on where 
decision-making authority laid. The antecedents to the misunderstanding and conflict that occurred in 
1996-97 appear to date from the earliest days of ATPS in 1992-93 when the governance structure was 
laid out. 
In the original project document which was approved by the IDRC Board in March 1993, the 
governance of ATPS was presented as: 
Steering Committee at the top of the structure, composed of representatives of each of the 
sponsors [donors]; five eminent scholars; three representatives of the Network (to be 
chosen at the annual meeting) and, ex officio, the Coordinator (who also serves as the 
secretary to the SC) 
Coordinator who is appointed by the Steering Committee to serve as a full time employee 
of the Network 
National Focal Points who will be appointed by the Network and be directed by the 
Coordinator. These individuals were to replace the national committees that coordinated 
the WATPS and EATPS activities at the national level. 
The document did not fully address the relationships between the Steering Committee, the 
Coordinator, and IDRC but at the time this governance structure was outlined, these relationships 
were not seen as crucial, or as structured by existing IDRC accountability structures as they are now. 
In the initial ATPS document, the Steering Committee was described as having the following 
responsibilities: 
It will make all the major decisions regarding the policies and practices of the Network It will 
approve the timing, location and program of annual meetings; it will approve requests for 
research grants; it will approve a work program for the Network's ancillary activities 
(publications, training, policy round-tables etc); and it will recruit the Network coordinator 
(Project Summary for ATPS, approved March 17, 1993). 
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The former IDRC Deputy Director for the East African Office in Nairobi was appointed as the first 
Chair of the Steering Committee. 
From the outset, it was envisaged that ATPS would be housed in the Nairobi office of IDRC during 
the initial two year start-up period only. A search for a suitable African host institution in the 
development of the project had not been successful but a central element in the first two years was to 
identify alternative longer term institutional alternatives to IDRC. 
Thus, ATPS began with a multi-donor stakeholder group, a mandate that explicitly gave overarching 
powers to the Steering Committee (which contradicted IDRC's own delegation of authority, although 
this was not pointed out to ATPS at the outset), and the task to find alternatives to IDRC as host 
institution within two years. 
The specific mechanisms for IDRC oversight were not described in the project document approved by 
the Board but, in practice, they were several. On the Steering Committee, IDRC had a representative 
who was a program staff member currently based in EARO. A former Deputy Regional Director of 
IDRC/EARO was the Chair of the Committee and a former IDRC/EARO Regional Director sat as an 
independent member. IDRC/EARO was responsible for administering and housing ATPS under the 
authority of the IDRC Regional Director, who was appointed as the President's Designate. There were 
thus four current or former IDRC officials on the ATPS Steering Committee. The IDRC Controller in 
Nairobi and the responsible Program Officer kept close oversight over the financial management of 
ATPS. The Secretariat itself consists of a Coordinator, a graduate assistant and a secretary. 
THE CRISIS The crisis in governance (and consequently also in funding) took place October 1996- 
February 1997. The Steering Committee of ATPS (by then called the Interim Board) decided, on the 
advice of the Coordinator, to establish ATPS as an independent legal entity, ATPS Ltd., which was 
registered in Mauritius in October 1996. The then Chair of the ATPS Interim Board, together with 
other Board members became Directors of the new corporation. The rationale provided for taking this 
step was that the search led by the Coordinator for an alternative host organization for ATPS in Africa 
which was acceptable to the donors had proved fruitless, and this was frustrating for the ATPS Board. 
At their meetings in May and October 1996, the ATPS Board had apparently discussed (and 
approved?) the proposal to formally incorporate ATPS as an independent legal entity. 
Secondly, the Dutch government had promised core funding to ATPS, and reportedly had made this 
conditional on ATPS being independent of IDRC. Certainly, in their letter of March 27, 1997 
requesting the return of their funds to ATPS and IDRC, the Dutch government expressed 
disappointment at the absence of a shared vision among the ATPS Board members and outlined a 
preferred governance structure in which the various African stakeholders would form the apex and 
there would be no donors on the Board. They proposed that the donor group should meet with the 
ATPS Board once a year. 
IDRC and Carnegie Corporation strongly opposed the actions of the Coordinator and the Board in 
establishing a new ATPS corporate entity in Mauritius, and threatened to withdraw their support for 
ATPS. The ATPS Board itself became split on the matter, with some supporting the Coordinator and 
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others supporting the views of the two main donor members. At an emergency ATPS Board meeting 
on February 27, 1997, the Coordinator was dismissed by a majority vote of one and it was agreed to 
appoint an Acting Coordinator. 
The money provided by the Dutch government to ATPS Ltd. (US$250,000) and to IDRC for ATPS 
(US$100,000) was returned, ATPS Ltd. was wound up by a resolution of the Board on May 2, 1997, 
and a committee was established to propose a new governance structure for ATPS and to identify a 
new home for the Secretariat. The Chair of the ATPS Interim Board resigned at the end of the 
February 27, 1997 meeting and all but two of the other Board members would step down at the end of 
their terms in October 1997. 
AFTER THE CRISIS At the May 1997 meetings of the Interim Board and National Focal Points, the 
three donors-IDRC, Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation-reiterated their vision of 
having an independent ATPS hosted in an African institution and urged that the move should take 
place by January 1998. They outlined that future relations between the donors and ATPS would be less 
hands-on in that there would be less involvement of donor representatives in the program and 
governance of ATPS and that future funding would depend on a competitive proposal from ATPS 
being successful. The loss of funding from the Dutch government meant that the 1997 Annual 
Workshop was scaled down and very few research grant proposals could be funded. 
An Acting Coordinator was appointed for six months, beginning June 1, 1997. The Interim Board 
formed a small Committee (composed of the Acting Coordinator, a Board member, and one National 
Focal Point) to Articulate the Way Forward and to prepare a report by September 1997. The terms of 
reference were to: 
Examine the options and recommend an institutional base for ATPS 
Examine and recommend the form, structure and decision-making processes for ATPS, 
given its new home and the commitment of the Interim Board to an international decision- 
making organ 
Examine the questions around the legal personality of ATPS and how that might affect the 
relationship with the new host, as well as examine the possibility of an independent ATPS 
including a time-frame (if necessary) required to attain this status 
Negotiate the text of an agreement between ATPS and the chosen institutional base 
Prepare a project document reaffirming ATPS's mission and objectives and outlining its 
achievements and gaps so far, and the strategy for the next phase of its development. 
The Committee delivered its report in October 1997. It had investigated possible host institutions, 
reviewed other IDRC Secretariats and successful networks, and examined the legal options for ATPS 
as an independent organization in Africa. The Committee recommended that the best eventual 
governance option was to establish ATPS as an independent non-profit company registered in one of 
the fifteen ATPS member countries which could apply for exemption from tax. However, as it would 
take up to three years to achieve independent status, it was recommended that ATPS remain in IDRC 
as a Secretariat until it could move. 
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At its meeting on October 28-29, 1997, the Board of ATPS decided to change the structure of the 
Board over the next year with a Donor Board responsible for policy and administration, and a 
Technical Advisory Committee responsible for the program direction, work plan and outputs. IDRC 
was requested to continue to support ATPS as one of its Secretariats for another three years. The 
Carnegie Corporation offered to lead the establishment of a Donor Consortium and Board. Beginning 
January 1, 1998, the Acting Coordinator was appointed as Coordinator by IDRC after an international 
search. 
RECENTDEVELOPMENTS A new Steering Committee met on June 5-6, 1998 and discussed the 
governance of ATPS and their own role in the light of the IDRC Guidelines for Secretariats. The 
Steering Committee still included representatives of IDRC and the Carnegie Corporation. The role and 
performance of the National Focal Points were also reviewed and decisions were taken to relieve four 
of them of their duties and place two others on probation for one year. Again, there was a lengthy 
discussion of future governance options for ATPS and another sub-committee was established to 
report back by October 1998 on the future of ATPS and provide a time frame for it to become 
autonomous. 
The second Coordinator resigned suddenly in September 1998 to return to his university appointment 
from which he had been on leave-of-absence; and the runner-up in the international search conducted in 
October 1997 was immediately appointed by IDRC to be the third Coordinator. 
6. PERFORMANCE 
ATPS set for itself a number of objectives relating to building capacity, generating knowledge, 
fostering networking and collaborative research, disseminating results, and fostering links between 
researchers and policy users. These are the outputs by which its performance will eventually be judged 
in the light of its available resources and benchmarks provided by other initiatives. Within the scope of 
this case study, performance cannot be properly assessed but some indication of strengths and 
weaknesses as seen by the stakeholders and reflected in the evaluation report can be given. 
RESEARCHACTIVITIES The research activities are seen as a strength of ATPS. By 1997, 300 
research proposals had been received and reviewed, 35 small individual projects had been funded, of 
which 13 had been completed and six had been a subject of dissemination workshops. Twenty nine 
additional projects had been approved in 1996 just before the crisis occurred. This is an impressive 
number of projects for a small unit to develop, monitor and administer. Compared to the research 
supported in the EATPS and WATPS networks, the ATPS research is higher quality and more likely 
to be completed on time-two of the goals of combining the two regional networks and creating 
ATPS with a full time Coordinator. The Secretariat also reports that it is more cost-effective than the 
earlier two networks. 
It was also seen as desirable that ATPS should facilitate comparative research across African countries. 
While performance was seen as weak in the first years, it was improved in two ways: by clustering 
projects around themes and basing them on exchanges between researchers; and by designing an ATPS 
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network project covering six countries (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). 
There is concern that comparability is achieved by being too top-down but some direction to achieve 
international collaboration is almost always required. 
NETWORKING ANDDISSEMINATION Networking among researchers is seen by everyone as a great 
strength of ATPS. The quality and effectiveness of the meetings are high; peer review processes have 
been strengthened and they are a major benefit for African researchers. Dissemination activities by 
ATPS have been organized through annual workshops and national dissemination seminars. Between 
1994 and 1997, dissemination workshops have been organized in association with national S&T bodies 
in Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia and have attracted both policy makers and 
researchers. 
Publications have been quite successful also. By 1997, ten research reports were published in the ATPS 
Working Paper series and a newsletter, the A TPS News, was launched in 1994. Some stakeholders feel 
it is necessary to improve the output of publications now that there are a good number of completed 
research projects. 
POLICYDIALOGUEAND UTILIZATION OFRESULTS One of the key aims of ATPS, also a key one 
given the policy context for S&T in Africa, is policy dialogue with users in government and in the 
private sector. ATPS has been less successful in bringing policy makers and policy implementation 
institutions into its orbit than it has been in reaching IDRC's traditional partners in academic and 
research institutions. It is an area seen within ATPS as needing strengthening in the future and the 
national dissemination workshops are a move in the right direction. Some activities were launched in 
1996 to begin policy dialogue at the national level. 
The national workshops will help to give ATPS visibility at the national level, which was seen as 
another weakness in the first few years. The question of visibility relates to critical mass: in only a few 
countries such as Nigeria did ATPS support enough researchers to create a critical mass to share ideas 
and make an impact at the national level. This is a function of the overall resources available to ATPS 
to fund researchers and workshops, and disperse results over 15 countries. 
Given the experience of the earlier EATPS and WATPS networks in not adequately reaching policy 
makers, and a better understanding within IDRC and elsewhere that policy uptake requires decision 
makers to participate early in the research process, it is surprising that ATPS followed a traditional 
(and demonstrably ineffective) research strategy in which academics wrote proposals, undertook 
research projects, produced reports and then disseminated the results to the policy community. This 
weakness in the strategy of the first few years has been clearly recognized in the Strategic Framework 
for A TPS in the Next Decade (October 1997) where proposals are put forward for policy dialogue 
involving decision-makers and better training for researchers to make their results more relevant to the 
needs of policy formulation and implementation. 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REPUTATION ATPS' internal reputation within IDRC has been 
clouded by the substantial problems it has had with its management and governance, but, among 
professional experts in S&T policy, it has a good reputation for the quality of its research activities and 
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its administration of research grants and research outputs. This view is echoed by the external review 
which found that ATPS generally had a good reputation for research quality among its African 
stakeholders. Partner organizations among donors and the UN also underscored the quality of ATPS's 
work and that the fact that there was no other comparable organization for S&T policy research in 
Africa. ATPS has defined an important niche and is begiuung to achieve visibility and a reputation for 
quality. 
7. LESSONS 
ATPS has identified a number of lessons for itself in terms of program strategy, which are indicated 
above. For the purposes of the Review of IDRC Secretariats, the main lessons from the experience of 
ATPS lie in the areas of governance, accountability, and communications. There is also a lesson in the 
appropriate level of resources for the mandate of the Secretariat. 
GovERNANCE Unlike many Secretariats in IDRC, ATPS was charged with finding a new 
organizational home and structure in its founding documents. It was probably premature and 
unrealistic to expect that a new unit could get up and running with program activities in 15 African 
countries at the same time as finding a new organizational home for itself. This is particularly true given 
that donors had not been able to find a satisfactory host institution in Africa before they decided to 
house ATPS in IDRC/EARO. Clearly the task was going to be difficult and the time-frame of two 
years made it more so. The Steering Committee and the Coordinator spent much of their time on this 
issue from the outset. 
The 1993 project document clearly mandated the Steering Committee to be the decision making body 
for ATPS. This document was approved by the IDRC Board without discussion of the governance 
issues that it raised the ATPS Board discussions and the actions of the first Coordinator show that they 
did not understand their roles in the same way that IDRC saw them. The goal of ATPS being 
independent from IDRC in a short time frame also encouraged the ATPS Board and Coordinator to 
believe that they were in charge and that IDRC's role was to provide administrative support and 
services. 
COMMUNICATIONS Linked to ATPS's governance is a major communications problem between 
IDRC and the Board of ATPS. The Board of ATPS did not understand that the Secretariat was 
subject to IDRC policies and guidelines for Secretariats even after the crisis that occurred in 1996-97. 
At their meeting in October 1997, a governance structure for ATPS was agreed upon which was still 
incompatible with IDRC policy. It was not until 1998 that the Guidelines for IDRC Secretariats were 
properly communicated to the ATPS Board at their meeting and discussions on governance. Given that 
IDRC had representatives on the ATPS Board, this continued misunderstanding is difficult to 
understand. One problem may be that board meetings were not always attended by the same IDRC 
staff and a consistent message was not given or received by IDRC. The lack of communication 
between the ATPS Board and IDRC was also surprising given that two of the key African players on 
the ATPS Board were former IDRC/EARO directors who knew personally the IDRC managers in 
Nairobi and Ottawa. 
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A formal written agreement between the ATPS Board and IDRC would have helped clarify roles and 
ensure that communications were instituted at least on a formal level. Although the President's 
Designate on the ATPS Steering Committee kept senior management informed on all major 
developments, the IDRC Board was informed of the problems of ATPS only after the crisis erupted. 
This, together with similar experiences with information on other Secretariats, has contributed to the 
IDRC Governors' feeling that they have not always received the quality of information that they 
needed to carry out their responsibilities as a Board vis a vis the Secretariats. 
ACCOUNTABILITY Related to the problem of poor communications between IDRC and ATPS is a 
diffusion of responsibility within IDRC. No one seemed to take responsibility for seeing the crisis 
looming in ATPS and for dealing with it before it burst with all its attendant embarrassment and 
acrimony. The proposal to establish ATPS as an independent entity had been discussed and recorded in 
the ATPS Board for months before it happened, the donor whose views precipitated the crisis was 
known to IDRC and could have been consulted directly, the workload and frustrations faced by the 
two Coordinators who have since left were not hidden by them, and members of the ATPS Board and 
IDRC managers and staff knew one another personally. As one participant said there was no `suivi ' on 
the part of IDRC. 
There is an obvious lesson for making roles within IDRC clearer and for putting adequate support and 
systems in place to support those roles. The accountability and role of the President's Designate was 
not made clear, although, since the March 1996, the IDRC Board has determined that the President's 
Designate is accountable to the Board for IDRC's responsibility with respect to a Secretariat. In the 
Guidelines for Secretariats Housed at IDRC, the President's Designate is described as having overall 
supervision of the Executive Director and is required to ensure that the responsibilities of the 
Secretariat to IDRC and to other donors, including reporting, are fulfilled. These constitute major 
responsibilities and a considerable time commitment, but this does not seem to be sufficiently 
recognized within the Centre. 
The President's Designate for ATPS was not able to attend ATPS Board meetings on a regular basis 
because of conflicting duties as Regional Director, and the Program Officer found himself in the 
difficult situation of having to represent IDRC's view when it conflicted with that of the ATPS Board 
and to provide oversight to a Coordinator who was older and more senior. In Ottawa, when the IDRC 
Board initially approved the establishment of the ATPS Secretariat, there was insufficient recognition 
that ATPS was subject to the control of IDRC in a way that went far beyond the language of 
Secretariat autonomy that was being spoken at the time. When problems arose with other Secretariats 
with respect to their autonomy and the IDRC Policy Guidelines for Secretariats were put in place, no 
one ensured that the ATPS Board understood and stayed within the realities of their limited decision- 
making powers. 
In short, the early warning system that should have been in place between the ATPS Board, the ATPS 
Coordinator, the President's Designate, IDRC Senior Management, and the IDRC Board did not 
operate effectively, despite the fact that many of those involved knew one another personally. As one 
person put it, No one in IDRC picked up the phone and found out what was going on. 
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APPROPRIATELEVEL OFRESOURCES One of the questions that ATPS raises is the appropriateness of 
the level of human and financial resources for the mandate given to the Secretariat. IDRC/EARO 
provided substantial and effective administrative, financial and technical support to ATPS, including 
ongoing back-up in terms of accounting and professional project review. The Program Officer and the 
President's Designate were in frequent and regular contact with the Coordinators. Despite this 
significant support, the ATPS Secretariat consisted essentially of one professional, with the support of 
a graduate assistant and secretary who was responsible for running a small grants program in 15 
countries across Africa, supervising 15 national focal points, organizing meetings and workshops, as 
well as publications, and at the same time trying to secure additional funding and find a new 
organizational home. 
The two Coordinators, who were both recognized for the quality of their work, felt over-burdened 
with work, so that they could not adequately fulfill all tasks. They also saw themselves as unfairly 
treated. The first Coordinator was a consultant to IDRC and, as such, did not receive the same 
overseas benefits as IDRC staff based in Regional Offices. The second was an IDRC employee but felt 
he was asked to do IDRC program work for which neither he nor ATPS were given sufficient credit. 
The employment status of Coordinators or Executive Directors for Secretariats based in Regional 
Offices may need to be considered differently from those based in Ottawa because of the important 
aspect of overseas benefits for IDRC staff. 
The larger question remains of the appropriateness of the size of the Secretariat staff in relation to the 
program and geographic mandate of the ATPS Network. A related question is whether the spread of 
ATPS financial resources over 15 countries and different activities can produce the critical mass of 
activity in any one country that is necessary for ATPS to effectively influence policy. 
ATPS was established with only two-thirds of its needed resources in hand, in the hope that other 
donors would take up the slack. That did not happen until 1996 and the crisis meant that the money 
had to be returned. Activities were drastically curtailed and bridging funding needed on an emergency 
basis. Funding has always been a problem for ATPS and a restraint on its ability to perform and to 
achieve its goals. On the other hand, IDRC moved into the resource expansion mode without knowing 
very clearly what it wanted and this created unnecessary tensions and misunderstandings with other 
donors, with Secretariat employees and with recipients at a time when IDRC's own operating 
procedures were changing. 
8. SOURCES 
ATPS Annual Reports for 1996 and 1997 
ATPS Board Meeting Minutes, October 1996, May 1997,Oct 1997, June 1998 
ATPS Report of the Committee to Articulate the Way, October 1997 
ATPS Strategic Framework for the Next Decade, October 1997 
Evaluation of the African Technology Policy Studies Network, August 1996 
IDRC project summary for ATPS, March 17 1993 
IDRC Internal Audit of ATPS, November 1997 
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Interviews with members of the ATPS Steering Committee, the Secretariat staff and the 
President's Designate. 
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The idea for Bellanet was first discussed in July 1992, immediately after the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, at a National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council 
session in Washington DC. Six months later, in January 1993, at an informal consultative meeting on 
donor concerns and funding strategies in furthering scientific and engineering contributions to Agenda 
21, also in Washington DC, the idea took shape. The donor agencies participating in these meetings 
agreed on the merits of a wider consultation among donors involved in supporting research and 
research capacity building in developing countries. An ad hoc steering group was struck, consisting of 
the World Bank, the MacArthur Foundation, the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with 
Developing Countries (SAREC), and IDRC. The Rockefeller Foundation offered to host the next 
meeting. IDRC was asked to chair the steering group and IDRC and SAREC agreed to provide 
support for the preparation of background papers. 
Considerable effort was put in the preparation of the proposal that would go to a wider group of 
research donors. A consultant visited each of them to identify their priorities, experience, 
organizational capacity and willingness to collaborate with other donors, resulting in a paper laying out 
different models for cooperation among donors. A second consultant reviewed existing donor 
approaches to capacity building for research. Two themes emerged from these consultations: donors 
wanted a mechanism to facilitate collaboration across the major groupings of donors (multilateral, 
bilateral, foundations, and others) where there were no effective collaborative structures; and they 
wanted to use information and communication technologies (ICTs) to facilitate rapid and cost-effective 
information exchange. 
The proposal was discussed by a group of 13 donors at the Rockefeller Foundation Study and 
Conference Center at Bellagio in November 1993 and again in September 1994. At the second 
meeting the participating donors agreed that Bellanet (then called DonorNet) should consist of 
High level dialogue between donor organizations 
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Multi-level dialogue within member organizations 
Capacity-development for the use of computer mediated communication (CMC) in 
member organizations 
Research into the role of CMC in collaboration and organizational change 
Knowledge brokerage for exchange of lessons learned and dissemination of ideas. 
Although some donors had wanted Bellanet to include collaborating organizations, particularly 
research institutions and NGOs working on Agenda 21 in developing countries, at the outset, the 
donors agreed to collaborate in a three year pilot project to start and test the concept, focusing first on 
working with the donor agencies themselves. A Steering Committee was struck at Bellagio consisting 
of SAREC (Sweden), DGIS (Netherlands), the Rockefeller Foundation, the World Bank/GEF, IDRC, 
and UNDP. IDRC was asked to host the Bellanet Secretariat which would manage and serve the 
initiative, because of its long track record in information sciences and because it had led the Bellanet 
initiative to that point. 
The IDRC Board approved $1 million for Bellanet: A Global Forum for Sustainable Development 
Research and Capacity Development and the establishment of an international Secretariat at IDRC in 
October 1994. The other founding donors included the Rockefeller Foundation, the MacArthur 
Foundation, SAREC (now SIDA), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNDP, and CIDA. 
2. MISSION, OBJECTIVES, AND IMPLEMENTATION 
MISSION Bellanet's mission is to increase the impact of development programming by 
supporting broader collaboration through more effective use of ICTs. Emphasis is placed on increasing 
interagency information sharing and knowledge diffusion, transparency and stakeholder participation, 
and learning throughout the development community. 
OBJECTIVES Bellanet has four specific objectives in pursuit of its mission: 
To build organizational capacity (organizational change) in the use of ICTs for 
collaboration 
To identify and solve problems hindering effective collaboration 
To build relevant capacity in developing country institutions and partnerships 
To identify, share, and apply lessons learned and best practices. 
These objectives have not changed since the early discussions among donors leading up to Bellanet 
although they are more crisply stated. The third objective of building capacity in developing country 
institutions was always part of the original vision of Bellanet but was not seen as a priority for Phase I. 
As Bellanet enters Phase II, more emphasis will be given to this objective. 
IMPLEMENTATION Bellanet's activities fall within four program areas that correspond to its four 
objectives: 
LEARNING PARTNERSHIPS: A REVIEW OF IDRC SECRETARIATS 106 CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
ICT Policy Advice and Technical Assistance 
Research and Development 
Strategic Outreach Assistance Program 
Learning for Development in the Information Age. 
3. CAPACITY 
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP 
Once the Secretariat for Bellanet was established in 1994, the leadership for achieving its objectives 
rested at two levels: the Executive Director of the Secretariat and the members of the Bellanet 
International Steering Committee (BISC). The leadership role of the members of the BISC was 
particularly relevant for Bellanet because they were to be champions for the inter-donor collaboration 
and infra-organizational change that Bellanet was established to facilitate. 
WITHINIDRC The current Executive Director has been leading the Bellanet Secretariat since it was 
started. His appointment as Executive Director was formally agreed to by the BISC in 1995 and he 
moved from his IDRC program officer position to take up the appointment. In addition to being highly 
and almost uniquely qualified to lead the Bellanet initiative, he had the advantage of knowing IDRC 
well. His leadership of the Secretariat staff (now numbering five program officers, three technical 
specialists, and two support staff) is well regarded both inside and outside the Secretariat. The 
Executive Director has secured the necessary resources that the Bellanet Secretariat needs to operate 
and has maintained very good relations with the program and administrative branches of IDRC. 
WITHIN OTHERDONORAGENCIES One of the important characteristics of the Bellanet initiative is 
that the members of its Steering Committee have roles to play, not only in the governance of the 
Secretariat but also in implementing its mission with respect to their own organizations. The mission of 
Bellanet is that it will help to transform the way donors and others collaborate and share information 
within and between their organizations. To achieve what is essentially a change in organizational 
culture, Bellanet needs a champion within each participating organization. The Mid-Term Review 
conducted for Bellanet as well as interviews undertaken in the course of this study identified that this 
strategic leadership was not effective. Members of the Steering Committee did not have the time, nor 
sometimes the role or opportunity, to act as change agents within their own organizations. This meant 
that Bellanet was not strategically positioned within the donors that are one of its key targets for 
achieving organizational change. Bellanet is now trying to identify operational contacts in each donor 
organization partner whose job it is to facilitate networking and inter-agency collaboration. 
GOVERNANCE 
Bellanet is legally a Secretariat within IDRC, subject to the general policies and practices governing 
IDRC international Secretariats. Unlike some other Secretariats, its genesis was genuinely international 
with a three year gestation process involving several international meetings and many donors. The 
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current Steering Committee (BISC) has evolved naturally from the initial group of donors which came 
together to take the lead in establishing a facility to support collaborative action between them. 
Early on in the history of Bellanet there were discussions about whether donors which had not 
contributed to the funding could sit around the governance table. It was decided that while Bellanet 
could provide some advice and facilities to donors before they actually contributed, the governance 
structure should consist of contributing donors. Unlike many Steering Committees, this one did not 
invite experts to sit on the Steering Committee in their personal capacities. It has therefore remained a 
donors group. All funding members are represented on the Steering Committee and will be until they 
number 10. At that point, a representative group would be identified and approved by representatives 
to represent the interests of all donors. 
The Steering Committee sets overall policy for Bellanet, reviews the work plan and budget, identifies 
priorities as well as benchmarks and performance indicators, and monitors Bellanet's progress and 
cost-effectiveness. It also invites other donors to join the initiative. Since one of the Secretariat's 
activities is providing services directly to the donors, the Steering Committee has taken a greater 
interest in the budget than has been the case for some other Secretariats and it has played a genuine 
oversight role, especially at the beginning when the fiscal message to the Executive Director was to be 
prudent with resources. The Steering Committee meets annually face-to-face and also through 
computer facilitated meetings but, interestingly, its members prefer the face-to-face meetings to get 
their business done. 
There has been an effective rotation of the Chair, which was held initially by IDRC, then by Swedish 
SIDA and now by the representative from UNDP. Some members have changed in the Steering 
Committee but the general level of information and commitment has remained high. The current 
Steering Committee understand their role in the governance of the Bellanet Secretariat vis a vis that of 
IDRC, since the IDRC policy regarding Secretariats has been made clearer. In the first year, however, 
there was some concern among the donors that IDRC was controlling Bellanet and putting too much 
of an IDRC stamp on it. This concern now seems to have abated. 
MANAGEMENT 
Over the first three years, the staff of the Secretariat slowly grew to five persons, including the 
Executive Director. This slower than anticipated growth in human resources enabled the project to be 
extended over four years with the same funding base but restricted the work that the Secretariat could 
take on. The decision not to expand Bellanet too rapidly was in part a function of needing to create and 
nurture a demand for its services in the participating organizations and to undertake a broader 
assessment of where the Secretariat should be strategically positioned within the overall development 
community. The Executive Director was keenly aware that Bellanet had to develop credibility in the 
international arena and to build up confidence that it could deliver high quality services. However, it is 
a decision which has some critics, both within IDRC and among other donors, for it meant that 
Bellanet a reduced presence, and perhaps a reduced impact in other international agencies and fora due 
to its limited human resources. 
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The Internal Audit of the Bellanet Secretariat conducted by IDRC in December 1997 pointed out that 
the Secretariat had significantly under-spent its program budget for that year and recommended that 
the budget be revised to reflect major departures from planned activities. However, IDRC Financial 
Services discouraged revision of budget plans and the International Steering Committee continued to 
urge slow growth. 
The current staff includes an Executive Director, Senior Program Specialist, three Program Officers, an 
Internet Communications Specialist, an Administrative/Information Officer and an Administrative 
Secretary. Another Program Officer position and a second Technical Officer position are funded by 
contract services provided by Bellanet. 
The Bellanet Secretariat has a good track record for being well managed and for working well within 
IDRC administrative and financial systems. It is committed to a transparent operating style and posts 
documents, including its mid-term evaluation and discussions on future strategic directions, on its 
website, inviting comments and consultations and providing a full-text searchable document repository. 
Bellanet has been a source of innovation and best practice in the use of ICTs in IDRC and is 
increasingly well appreciated in Programs Branch for its support to the activities of the Program 
Initiatives and special projects. 
FUNDING 
During Phase I, Bellanet has been funded by CIDA, DGIS (Netherlands), the MacArthur Foundation, 
the Rockefeller Foundation, SIDA (Sweden), and UNDP, in addition to IDRC which has provided 
46% of its budget. It is anticipated that most of these donors will continue to support Bellanet in Phase 
II and there are plans to expand the membership and number of funding partners. The core group of 
Bellanet Funding Members contribute unrestricted funds which provide Bellanet with important 
flexibility in developing its activities. In addition, Bellanet has received restricted funds directed to the 
provision of specific services from the World Bank for InfoDev and from the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Canada. IDRC activities, including the Acacia Initiative, GAIT, and the Micronutrient Initiative 
Secretariat have also paid for services from Bellanet. 
For Phase II (April 1, 1999 - March 31, 2003) Bellanet is requesting a contribution of $965,000 from 
IDRC and plans to raise about $1.9 million from other core donors (Members contributing 
approximately $250,000 each); a further $2.6 million in restricted contributions; and $2 million in 
contract services. This will allow the Secretariat to expand its staff and allow its programs to include 
greater outreach to partners in developing countries. 
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FUNDING TO BELLANET SECRETARIAT PHASE I (1994-1998) 
Donor 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 Total % 
IDRC 1,000,000 28,075 1,028,075 46% 
DGIS 210,251 210,251 9% 
RF 210,000 210,000 9% 
MacArthur 206,960 206,960 9% 
UNDP 68,725 137,000 205,725 9% 
CIDA 160,000 160,000 7% 
SIDA 142,859 142,859 6% 
WB 36,518 31,400 67,918 3% 
DFAIT 5,000 5,000 < 1% 
Total 1,210,000 628,795 333,518 64,475 2,236,788 
4. PERFORMANCE 
RELEVANCE 
By almost any measure, Bellanet is a highly relevant initiative for IDRC and for its partner 
organizations. When Bellanet was first mooted in 1992, e-mail and interactive electronic conferencing 
were not common in most institutions and especially not in the donor agencies. IDRC was ahead of 
most other donors in using computer assisted communications and was recognized as a leader. Some 
of the donor organizations sitting around the table at Bellagio in 1994 could not even have direct 
access from one desk officer to another in a different organization without having communications pass 
through a visa system of supervision and control. There was a recognition that their methods of 
working and collaborating needed to change and a hope that Bellanet could promote and facilitate that 
transformation. In the years following UNCED, when foreign aid budgets were declining, donor 
agencies also felt keenly that they needed to enter collaborative partnerships to provide a critical mass 
of funds to development activities. 
Times have changed. In some respects, the overall climate and the rapid spread of ICTs into the office 
arsenals of institutions around the world have overtaken part of the initial vision of Bellanet as a 
promoter of organizational change towards greater collaboration using computer assisted 
communications. But the growth of the Internet has made Bellanet even more relevant today, as ICT 
technology outpaces the human and organizational capacity to adapt to the potential that they bring for 
changing the ways people work together. Bellanet never saw its mission as a technical support facility 
but as a networking process to help transform the ways in which development and other agencies 
work. In this, it remains highly relevant today and into the next century. 
LEARNING PARTNERSHIPS: A REVIEW OF IDRC SECRETARIATS 110 CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
ACTIVITIES 
COLLABORATIVEINITIATIVES At the beginning of Phase I, Bellanet focused on building its credibility 
as a neutral source of expertise, and developing the capacity to respond to the increasing demand for its 
services. It saw its role more as a catalyst for the use of ICTs in development partnerships and the 
transformation of the way in which agencies work. A major part of its effort has been invested in 
Collaborative Initiatives which consist of partnerships of development agencies and recipients working 
together on a specific focus. Bellanet provides support to their use of ICTs in collaborative planning 
and implementation, at the request of funding partners, other development agencies, or project leaders. 
A summary of Collaborative Initiatives is given in Appendix 1 (taken from Bellanet's Proposal for 
Phase Il). One example is the support that Bellanet has given to the Association for the Development 
of Education in Africa (ADEA) which was established in 1988 to foster collaboration between 
development agencies that support education programs in Africa, especially between Ministers of 
Education and funding agencies. Bellanet developed and hosted ADEA's website and provided 
electronic mailing list facilities that offer a discussion forum for government ministers and development 
agencies, and continues to provide ongoing technical assistance to the group. 
PROJECTS Bellanet also undertakes projects to find technical solutions to problems impeding 
effective collaboration and provides strategic help to organizations wanting to develop new ways to 
use ICTs. One such project was the creation of an online data base mechanism that enables users 
themselves to update and retrieve data using the Internet, thus making it easier to share information in a 
dynamic way. Bellanet first applied this new tool to the African ICT-Activity Information System for 
PICTA (Partnership for ICTs in Africa). Since then, it has been asked by the Global Knowledge 
Partnership, which includes most of Bellanet's funding agencies, to construct a globally oriented online 
information facility. This is a good example of Bellanet developing best practices. A list of Bellanet 
projects is given in Appendix 2 (taken from Bellanet's Proposal for Phase II). 
COLLABORATION WITH IDRC In addition to collaborating with international agencies, Bellanet has 
worked closely with CIDA and other Canadian government departments on the major conference 
Global Knowledge 97. It has also played an important catalytic role in many of IDRC's own initiatives 
by providing policy advice and technical support. These include Acacia, PAN Networking, Peace- 
building and Reconstruction, and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity. Specific inputs to these PI's include 
facilitating electronic consultations, design and implementation of a web-based pipeline management 
mechanisms and a web-based mechanism for capturing and sharing lessons learned. 
More generally, Bellanet has been a source of innovation for IDRC in its use of ICTs. It has promoted 
the use of dynamic web-based databases by the Centre and has partnered a web-to-email gateway. 
IDRC is both the largest fonder of Bellanet and its main client for services and advice. One of the 
foreseen dynamics in Phase II will focus on how to meet IDRC's demand and also that of the other 
partner organizations, which is now increasing. 
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OUTPUTS 
In addition to the activities underway, Bellanet has already achieved some important results relating to 
its objectives. It played a key role in the creation of PICTA (Partnership for ICTs in Africa), an 
informal group of donors and executing agencies committed to improving information exchange and 
collaboration based on ICTs in Africa. Bellanet manages the main PICTA website and discussion 
group as well as its database resources to promote and support dialogue among PICTA's partner 
organizations. As part of PICTA, Bellanet created a set of online information management tools for 
collaboration between agencies. These include agency profiles and programs, a project/activity 
database, a public and private online document repository, and a listing of upcoming events that 
PICTA members update themselves. In helping to create PICTA and providing it with the tools for 
sharing information and collaborative planning, Bellanet has demonstrated that it can fulfill its initial 
objective of helping donor agencies to better work together for development. 
Another Bellanet output supporting interagency collaboration is its role in the Information for 
Development Program (infoDev) of the World Bank. This is a global multi-donor program to support 
projects related to the use of information technology in development. The World Bank contracted 
Bellanet to provide web, database, and group-communication support, and ICT policy advice to the 
program. Bellanet created the infoDev Forum which is a record of the proposals, activities, and results 
from infoDev activities. Donors can use the infoDev Forum to monitor activities, to collaborate on 
policy, and to seek out interesting proposals and partners. The inclusion of proposals in the online 
database, which Bellanet advocated in its design work, is a first. Proposals have never been so openly 
shared between donors before. 
Bellanet recognized that many organizations in the South can only access Internet by email alone and 
this led to its work in promoting web-to-email gateways which allow those with only email access to 
retrieve information from the Internet. Bellanet created, and continues to host, an electronic mailing list 
for developers of web-to-email gateway software. In collaboration with IDRC's Unganisha project, a 
web-to-email gateway was created and tested. The test was very successful and an ongoing gateway is 
maintained by IDRC. 
Bellanet was closely involved in the planning and follow-up for Global Knowledge 97, which was held 
in Toronto, and had a significant presence at the event. This has led to its involvement in a number of 
partnerships using electronic communications to coordinate activities at the international, regional, and 
national levels. One such partnership facilitated by Bellanet focused on donor coordination in Ethiopia 
and again was regarded at the time as a breakthrough in interagency collaboration for development 
planning. 
IMPACT 
Bellanet is clearly beginning to have a significant impact on interagency collaborative initiatives, both 
within Canada and internationally. It perhaps has had greatest impact in donor activities in Africa, 
where the information gap is considered greatest. It is also increasingly an having impact within IDRC. 
Bellanet has the greatest impact where there is a readiness and existing agency capacity for absorbing 
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its services and for using ICTs. Its cutting edge technical capability, together with its familiarity with 
international development, has made it the Secretariat of choice to play a lead role in the development 
of ICT-based collaborative mechanisms between development agencies. It has been said that, if 
Bellanet did not exist today, it would have to be invented. 
Where Bellanet has had less impact is within some of its own member organizations which, as early as 
1992, had identified a need for improved collaboration among themselves. Member organizations 
which appear to be less advanced in their use of ICTs in their work, especially mechanisms beyond 
email, have used Bellanet's services the least. Other organizations have stepped in and contracted 
Bellanet to work with them. This problem is recognized not only in the Bellanet Secretariat but also 
among the member organizations. 
It is now better recognized that organizations need to transform themselves internally before they are 
able to fundamentally change the way they interact with external agencies. An external Secretariat like 
Bellanet cannot be effective in achieving internal organizational transformation by itself. Bellanet has to 
be requested by the agency to help them change their culture towards greater collaboration using ICTs. 
Bellanet's role must be to make agencies aware of its services and to be able to respond effectively to 
requests for help. Thus, part of the early vision for Bellanet among its founding members is changing in 
the light of experience. 
INTERNAL-EXTERNAL REPUTATION 
Interviews with IDRC staff and management as well as with external agency representatives attest to 
the excellent reputation that Bellanet now enjoys for its expertise and its ability to deliver best practice 
and policy advice. Bellanet is seen as able to deliver in an increasingly competitive ICT world. This 
reputation did not come quickly. For the first three years, it grew slowly, sometimes more slowly than 
had been expected. Within IDRC, and even more so in other agencies, Bellanet was unknown it was 
often asked What does Bellanet do?. 
Today, within IDRC, it is regarded as a well-managed Secretariat with good leadership and staff. It has 
extended its reach to a number of program activities which has increased its reputation. Bellanet staff 
are also seen as having a helpful and positive attitude to their clients. Bellanet fits in with IDRC and 
tries hard to be a good neighbour. In general, Bellanet also feels that the Secretariat mechanism and 
the support it receives from IDRC both work extremely well, and that Bellanet could not have worked 
successfully in any other way. 
Bellanet's external reputation falls into two camps: the agencies involved with Bellanet in its projects 
and Collaborative Initiatives rate Bellanet highly for its expertise, its technical competence, and its 
achievements in best practice. Some of these agencies are not core members of Bellanet. They either 
contract its services or are beneficiaries in developing countries. The representatives of the agencies 
providing core funding to Bellanet which are not as involved in these contractual activities are more 
circumspect in their praise and present a very real challenge to Bellanet in Phase H. In some cases, their 
organizations are not involved at all in collaboration through Bellanet; in other cases, they are, but the 
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members of the Steering Committee are not aware of the extent of the collaboration that Bellanet is 
mediating for them. 
According to the mid-term evaluation of Bellanet, some of its funders feel poorly informed about its 
activities and even question if there is a continuing role for Bellanet because of the rapid spread of ICT 
use within the donor community. Indeed, Bellanet was judged as having been unsuccessful in having 
any real influence within its funding partners and has had only marginal impact in increasing 
collaboration between them. Clearly, Bellanet's promotion of best practice has not influenced its own 
inner circle, a problem which is further discussed under Lessons. 
FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
Bellanet has attracted more than 50% of its funding from outside IDRC and would appear to be on an 
upward trend in terms of contract services. It currently has seven core donors and plans to enlarge this 
group in Phase H. It plans to expand its Strategic Outreach Assistance Program in which it uses 
targeted donor funds to support capacity-building in developing countries in the use of ICTs for 
collaboration. This was one of the early objectives of Bellanet but it was agreed by the donors that it 
would be implemented only in Phase H. Bellanet will be able to attract increasing funds for its services 
on a contractual basis as it becomes better known. It could almost certainly be financially viable in the 
medium term on contract funding. 
However, this would raise questions about its program flexibility and its capacity to provide support to 
institutions which could benefit from its help but which could not pay, particularly institutions in 
developing countries. The main question facing Bellanet about its longer term financial viability is 
whether the member agencies which currently provide its core support for the Secretariat and 
unrestricted funding for its programs, will maintain their contributions in the future and even increase 
them. If they do not, the mix of funding will shift towards more restricted contract funding and an 
inevitable decrease in the flexibility with which Bellanet can operate. 
5. LESSONS 
LESSONS RELATING TO ICT-BASED COLLABORATION 
The Bellanet Proposal for Phase II sets out a number of technical lessons which have been learned in 
Phase I relating to the way they carry out their programs: 
Web-sites which are well designed and accessible to those with indirect Internet 
connections can be important tools for collaboration 
Increased interagency collaboration depends on better common databases which include 
agency profiles and programs, and information on what they plan to do and which are also 
secure and can enable agencies themselves to post and maintain updated information 
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Effective partnerships do not grow out of shared interests alone but require sustained 
efforts through information sharing and electronic dialogues. Internet use by organizations 
is largely limited to the sending and receiving of email 
Technical assistance in ICTs needs to be accompanied by advocacy and face-to-face 
contact to help organizations transform into a culture including electronic collaboration. 
THE NEED FOR REALISTIC OBJECTIVES AND TIME FRAMES 
Bellanet is an innovative concept, seeking to change decades of donor agency tradition using advanced 
technology and tools that, in some cases, did not exist until Bellanet developed them. The donors 
which conceived Bellanet and became, in part, its founding partners, did not understand the speed at 
which ICTs would spread around the world and permeate their working lives. Neither did they 
appreciate the sometimes extreme slowness with which organizational cultures change. The initial three 
year period envisaged for the pilot project was too short to adequately achieve and assess the 
objectives set at the beginning, and perhaps gave an inflated expectation of how soon Bellanet would 
make its mark. 
The core donor group also anticipated that more like-minded donors would join Bellanet within the 
first year before any results could be expected. This did not happen and, despite presentations and 
several visits by the Executive Director, some donors that had already worked together with IDRC on 
numerous projects, were reluctant to fund Bellanet. Part of this reluctance was related to some 
negative views in the donor community about IDRC's revenue generating strategy and the perceived 
use of the Secretariats to place surplus staff, as IDRC's reduced budget meant it had to downsize. But 
the reluctance probably also related to the specific mission of Bellanet, which posed some internal 
challenges in a number of agencies. The difficulty of understanding organizational change and the role 
of ICTs was also underestimated and posed real challenges in communicating the message. 
ROLE OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE AS CHAMPIONS FOR BELLANET 
The Bellanet Secretariat is dedicated to information sharing and for the transparency of its activities. 
More than many initiatives, it posts information on its website and sends information to its partners. 
Yet several of the members of its Steering Committee do not feel well informed about what Bellanet 
does or has achieved. Even more significantly, Bellanet has almost no visibility in some of its member 
organizations and therefore probably lacks both impact and relevance for them. How has this situation 
arisen? 
One important lesson for Bellanet and its fenders is that the donor representatives on its Steering 
Committee cannot also be champions for promoting Bellanet within the donor agencies. They are too 
busy, generally they are neither organizational change nor ICT experts, and most of them have no role 
within their organizations to lead a transformation in changing culture and modes of operation. It is for 
this reason that Bellanet is now seeking to create linkages with a second group of operational contacts 
in the partner organizations. 
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The first group of people who came together to champion the idea of Bellanet had a common program 
focus on environment and development and created Bellanet to support collaboration in fields related 
to environmental issues. This program focus did not emerge in the early activities of Bellanet, although 
the Secretariat sought to promote it. The weakening of the link with environmental issues reduced the 
role of the initial champions within the core group to promote Bellanet's programs within their own 
organizations. Bellanet began to be seen more as an ICT-based collaborative support capability than as 
one with sector specific program links and this changed its image and access within donor agencies 
structured along those program lines. Bellanet is now working to change this view among some of its 
members. 
It remains to be seen if this change in focus in Phase I will reduce Bellanet's support in those agencies. 
In the short term, it will be important for Bellanet to work with its Steering Committee members to 
ensure that the Secretariat understands the needs and aspirations for ICT-supported collaboration of its 
core donors, and that Bellanet is known to the key decision-makers in those donor agencies. 
HIGH SCIENTIFIC QUALITY AND FIT wrrH IDRC 
Bellanet is an audacious concept with a far-reaching mission. Its founding group was both over- 
optimistic and probably somewhat naive about how difficult the objectives were to achieve. That 
Bellanet has demonstrated success and achieved a number of significant outputs testifies to the 
leadership of its Executive Director and the technical quality of the Secretariat. It also attests to the fit 
of the Secretariat with IDRC's own culture. IDRC has provided a supportive environment that is 
probably unique, and has championed Bellanet within the larger donor community. Despite not having 
specific program links, Bellanet has proved to be a valued resource across IDRC programs and 
projects. There are many signs of a successful partnership and a compatibility of cultures between the 
Secretariat and its host organization. 
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APPENDIX 1:BELLANET COLLABORATIVE INITIATIVES (FROM PHASE II PROPOSAL) 
Collaborative Associated Bellanet Partners Status 
Initiative Outputs and Projects and Donors 
Partnership for ICTs in 
Africa (PICTA) 
Association for the 
Development of Education in 
Africa (ADEA) 
infoDev 
Learning for Development in 





African Information Society 
Initiative /Harnessing IT for 
Development (AISIIHITD) 
Women Leaders' Network 
(WLN) 
Strategic Initiative for 
Fisheries Research (SIFR) 
Indigenous Knowledge 
Program (IKP) 
Responsible for the development of 
PICTA and its website. Hosts 
PICTA-CL. Developed and manages 
AI-AIMS to support PICTA. Provides 
advice on coordination of PICTA. 
Developed and hosts ADEA website. 
Training (internship). 
Communication support for ADEA 
Steering Committee (ADEA-SC-CL). 
Managed infoDev Forum website, 
including online database 
development and maintenance 
(proposal information included). 
Also supports group communication. 
Development of conceptual 
framework. Website. Hosted Internet 
impact listserv (INET-IMPACT-L). 
Developed and implemented strategy 
to place MFN online and facilitates 
discussions via website and listserv. 
Designed, managed, and facilitated a 
set of on-line databases focused on 
knowledge and IT related 
development information. The 
system is called GK-AIMS. 
Developed and hosts AISI website. 
Training (internship). Advice about 
online database, etc. 
Facilitates 4 listservs 
(AISI-HITD-CL; NLCI4A-CL; 
NLCITECH-CL; ATAC-CL). Work 
on AI-AIMS, supports AISI. 
Developed strategy to place WLN 
online and facilitated discussions via 
website and listserv. 
Website. Advice on website design 
and on Fisheries Projects 
Information System (FIPIS). 
IKP website 
Members of African Networking Active, 
Initiative (ANI), Africa Internet Forum ongoing 
(AIF), and AISI 
World Bank, UNESCO, African Active, 
Ministries of Education, DFID, USAID, ongoing 
UNICEF, CIDA, IDRC, SIDA, 
Rockefeller Foundation, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, French 
Ministry of Cooperation, Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation, Club 
du Sahel (OECD) 
World Bank, infoDev donors Active, 
(numerous agencies including SDC, ongoing 
SIDA, DGIS, DFID, other bilaterals, as 
well as some corporate sponsors) 
CIDA, IDRC, Bellanet Active, 
ongoing 
CIDA, UNDP, DGIS, USAID, Active, 
Calmeadow, DFID, and many others ongoing 
Over 50 partners, including the World Active, 
Bank, UNDP, Bellanet, Carnegie ongoing 
Corporation, WHO, CIDA, DFAIT, 
SDC, SIDA, DGIS, USAID, British 
Council, IDRC, ILO, etc., and various 
corporate sponsors 
UN System (e.g.,UNECA, UNCTAD, Active, 
UNIDO); development agencies ongoing 
interested in ICTs for development in 
Africa (including ITU, IDRC) 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Completed 
(APEC) Economies 
SIDA, DGIS, UNDP, IDRC, CIDA, Status under 
World Bank, FAO, Commission of review 
European Communities, Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD) 
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Iwokrama Iwokrama website. Connectivity UNDP/GEF, IDRC, Government of Ended 
advice Guyana, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
DFID, USAID, University of West 
Indies Centre for Environment and 
Development; numerous other research 
partners 
African Networking ANI online donor database (led to UNECA, IDRC, ITU, UNESCO, Completed 




Global Water Partnership Electronic dialogue support SIDA, World Bank, and many other Support 
G(WP) donor agencies provided 
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APPENDIX 2 BELLANET PROJECTS (FROM PHASE II PROPOSAL) 
Bellanet Associated 
Project Bellanet Outputs 
Connectivity Study Matrix that provides guidelines 
for sending email and 
attachments via the Internet 
Email Directory Directory of funding members' 
staff 
INDLKICT Subset Online database of information 
on current and completed 
projects that involve ICTs 
Program Mapping Prototype database using 
Initiative Common Exchange Format for 
Development Activity (CEFDA) 
information about donor 
programs/priorities 
Pipeline/Program On hold, but listserv (PPWG-CL) 
Information was developed to discuss. PMI 
Management has led to formation of PPWG - 
representatives from 
organisations contributing to 
INDIX-DAI database 
Development of Listserv (NLCI4A-CL) to discuss 
Connectivity ways for ISPs to input and 
Information Services maintain their own data remotely 
- led to development of online 
database prototype 
Web-to-Email Gateway Collaborated with Unganisha 
(IDRC project) to launch GetWeb 
server. Informal survey of users. 
WMAIL-DEV 
-CL listserv for developers 
Dynamic Database Investigated technical issues and 
Development developing prototypes (e.g., 
GK-AIMS, AI-AIMS, Acacia 
customized database) 
Extensible Markup Initiated Donor consultation of 
Language (XML) existing activities/solicited 
Development Markup participation. Online dialogues, 
Language (DML) website for information 
exchange. 
Partners, Donors, 
and Main CI 
Bellanet Funding Members (CIDA, 
DGIS, IDRC, MacArthur Foundation, 
Rockefeller Foundation, SIDA, UNDP) 
Initially, Bellanet Funding Members 
(later, the broader development 
community) 
International Network for Development 
Information Exchange (INDIX), 
Coordinating Unit (housed at IDRC), 
which is supported by over 150 NGOs 
and more than 300 developing country 
organizations 
Bellanet Funding Members 
International Network for Development 
Information Exchange (INDIX) 
IDRC, UN System-wide Initiative on 
Africa partners, UNECA 
IDRC, UNDP, SatelLife 
Various CI partners, such as PICTA 
(with the AI-AIMS database) and GKP 
(GK-AIMS) 
IDRC, INDIX, Bellanet, CIDA 
Status 
Superseded by 





Evolved into a wider 
effort (see Pipeline 
below) 







Evolved into core 
Bellanet service to CIs 
Ongoing, exploring 
further opportunities 
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The Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) was established in May 1993 
to support training and research in environmental and resource economics. It was based on the idea 
that understanding the relationship between economic behaviour and environmental preservation is 
essential to the achievement of sustainable development. The policy and analytical tools to deal with 
this issue were underdeveloped and very few people were trained and experienced in their use. 
In addition, understanding the relationship between the economy and the environment became one of 
the most critical areas for research in the post-UNCED period. Maurice Strong, the former Secretary 
General of UNCED, observed that, while UNCED was initially presumed to be about the environment, 
in practice, it was about economics. He urged IDRC to make understanding this relationship a central 
component of its program and to establish it as the Centre's principal niche among development 
agencies. 
The proposed EEPSEA fitted well with IDRC's existing strategic theme of integrating 
environmental, social, and economic policies, encompassing all four dimensions of research, planning 
tools, capacity building, and the policy making process. Through attention to technology transfer and 
the effects of green technologies on employment, EEPSEA also fitted with the strategic theme of 
technology and the environment. 
The program began with a commitment of resources from IDRC, with the hope that other donors 
would eventually join the Centre as partners. It was maintained that IDRC had to make a commitment 
before serious negotiations with other donors could proceed. The proposal was prepared by David 
Glover who was to become, and still is, the Executive Director (ED) of EEPSEA. 
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EEPSEA was approved by IDRC's Board of Governors in March 1993 and was established in 
Singapore in May of the same year. Member countries are: Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua 
New Guinea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, China, and Sri Lanka. 
2. CONTEXT 
The work initiated by EEPSEA was seen as the first step in a process that might spread to all regions in 
the developing world. The choice to begin this work in SE Asia was made for several reasons: 
It was considered to be the region where the relationship between economic growth and 
environmental protection was the most obvious and critical, as large populations in several 
countries were enjoying relatively rapid rates of growth 
Economic management and performance in many countries was relatively good, making it 
possible to focus on longer-term environmental issues 
Research capacity, while variable across SE Asia, was, in many countries, sufficient to 
produce some useful results in the short and medium terms 
Many SE Asia countries were rapidly undergoing the structural transformation from 
agriculture to industry to services. The opportunity to study the environmental effects of 
this phenomenon and to draw lessons from it for other developing countries was extremely 
valuable 
Policy makers in these countries had been particularly quick to recognize the importance of 
environmental issues. 
There was also a precedence for EEPSEA-the Nairobi-based African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC) was seen as a remarkable success. Launched in 1988, it had held workshops 
involving researchers and policy experts from 15 countries. It provided a model for EEPSEA in the 
realm of consortium and network building, as well as approach. The AERC had adopted an approach 
that involved both strengthening local research institutions by developing their staff and involving 
senior government policy makers. While the consortium grew out of an IDRC venture initiated in 
1984, by 1988, it involved a number of donors and was administered by the Rockefeller Foundation. In 
1989, the World Bank maintained that AERC was so successful that it ought to be replicated in other 
disciplines and in other parts of the world. Against this backdrop, EEPSEA was very much modeled 
after AERC. 
At the present time, EEPSEA is faced with the challenge of adapting to the rapidly changing regional 
environment in South East Asia. Their work must take into account the following key features: 
The region is changing at an extremely rapid rate. Economic growth has been high but 
volatile recently and regional integration (for instance between ASEAN and Mekong 
countries) is proceeding quickly 
Research capacity varies widely across countries 
Environmental economics is a fairly new and difficult branch of economics, requiring not 
only a solid grasp of conventional theories and techniques but also their application to non- 
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marketed goods and services, externalities, irreversibility, the very long run, and so on. It is 
a highly applied field, not easily learned through classroom teaching alone 
Economy-wide issues, such as the effects of macroeconomic and sectoral policies on the 
environment, although increasingly recognized as important, are particularly difficult to 
address. 
A growing level of experience and increased resources are helping EEPSEA address these issues 
through expanded research and training. 
3. GOALS, MISSION, AND OBJECTIVES 
Unlike some other Secretariats, EEPSEA's mission is somewhat modest, if not understated. In fact, the 
words vision or mission are not even used in the documentation. Rather, the mission is referred to as a 
general objective. Also, unlike those of some other Secretariats, this general objective or mission is 
extremely focused. It states: 
The general objective of EEPSEA is to establish an integrated program of research and 
capacity building on economy and environment in Southeast Asia, by providing participants 
with opportunities to share information and experiences with peers, while making use of a 
range of support services. 
The specific objectives of the program are: 
To finance research projects on economy and environment, focusing on the 
internalization of external costs 
To provide support for researchers through the provision of literature, resource persons, 
peer review, attendance at network meetings, a newsletter, and other such facilities 
To provide training to current and prospective network members to increase their 
capacity as researchers, teachers and policy analysts 
To disseminate results of EEPSEA research projects to policy makers in local, national, 
and regional fora. 
4. FUNDING AND FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
IDRC funded the start up of EEPSEA with a grant of $985,000 in 1992. The involvement of other 
donors came gradually. In 1993, two others made modest contributions. The following year, three 
more did and four other donors came on board in the subsequent two years. Not counting IDRC, 
EEPSEA has attracted funds from 10 donors. Since the beginning, IDRC has contributed 32% of the 
funding and CIDA 21 %. 
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EEPSEA SOURCE OF FUNDS 
Donor 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 Total % 
IDRC 985,000 935,000 830,000 2,750,000 32% 
CIDA 1,768,000 1,768,000 21% 
DANIDA 131,889 138,230 147,125 150,150 152,350 719,744 8% 
MFA 442,050 272,300 714,350 8% 
MacArthur 699,000 699,000 8% 
SIDA 122,220 140,261 350,541 613,022 7% 
ODA 415,540 25,110 440,650 5% 
NORAD 418,000 418,000 5% 
SAREC 162,714 6,661 103,100 272,475 3% 
UNDP 131,318 131,318 2% 
Norsk 
Hydro 
40,800 40,800 1% 
Total 985,000 294,603 840,479 3,405,926 1,708,460 1,332,891 8,567,359 100% 
% Year 11% 3% 10% 40% 20% 16% 100% 
EEPSEA shows a relatively low unpaid pledge rate of 9%, or $212,925 of the $2,422,008 pledged. 
The Secretariat keeps a healthy cash balance-$462,318 at 30 June 1998 year end. 
For the period ending 30 June 1998, EEPSEA appears to have a well-balanced expenditure pattern. 
The total expenditure of $1,746765 was broken down as follows: 
Research Projects $467,140 27% 
Training/Courses $382,184 23% 
Regional Meetings/Workshops $260,983 15% 
Consultants $ 86,465 5% 
Publications/Subscriptions $ 15,715 1% 
Personnel Costs $353,477 20% 
Administration $180,801 10% 
Considering the labor intensive work carried out by EEPSEA and its relatively high administrative 
costs (including travel), it is a remarkable 70% of a relatively modest budget that are expended on 
mission-critical activities in the region. 
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5. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
EEPSEA's structure consists of three groups: 
Sponsors Group - all donors contributing at least $100,000USD per year. This group 
provides financial support, sets policy and approves the annual program of work and 
budget 
Program Committee - senior scholars and policy makers from the region and 
international resource persons. This Committee sets the priorities for research and training 
and recommends to the Sponsors Groups the annual program of work 
EEPSEA Secretariat - it administers the program and provides technical support to 
researchers. Its staff consists of a director and program assistant in Singapore (full-time); a 
secretary in Singapore (20% time); and a Deputy Director (60% time) in the Philippines. 
Essentially, the Advisory Committee recommends and the Sponsors Group approves. The Secretariat 
is administratively supported by the regional office in Singapore and IDRC headquarters in Ottawa. 
Also, a President's Designate and Program Officer are assigned to EEPSEA, as with other 
Secretariats. 
The three formal bodies interact through a four stage annual planning and approval cycle: 
An Annual Report on the fiscal year just completed and an audited Financial Statement 
for the previous fiscal year are submitted by the Secretariat to the Sponsors Group 
(September) 
A Draft Program of Work and Budget for the next fiscal year is prepared by the 
Secretariat and discussed with the Advisory Committee (November) 
A Program of Work and Budget for the next fiscal year is submitted to the Sponsors 
Group (March) 
The Program of Work and Budget is approved at the annual Sponsors Group meeting 
(May). 
6. PERFORMANCE 
ACTIVITY AND IMPACT 
Many of EEPSEA's activities blur the line between research and training, since they aim to produce 
both research products and research skills. However, these two activities are seen as mutually 
complementary. Research is carried out in the areas of. management of forests and wetlands, policy 
instruments for control of urban pollution, resource pricing, and economy-wide issues, with the latter 
receiving the most emphasis. From inception to the end of 1997, EEPSEA has approved 58 research 
projects. They are listed in Appendix 1. 
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EEPSEA offers a number of high-quality training programs and workshops. The focal points of 
EEPSEA's program are the biannual workshops. They bring together all active researchers, including 
Ph.D. thesis students and authors of new proposals, along with resource persons, eminent speakers, the 
Advisory Committee, and once a year, the Sponsors Group. This event includes consultations between 
researchers and their advisors. Research findings are also presented. Meetings are held in Singapore in 
May and November of each year and involve around 65 participants. 
Five-week intensive regional short courses for 25 participants from EEPSEA member countries are 
held on an annual basis. Topics include economics of natural resources, pollution control and extended 
cost-benefit analysis, valuation techniques, economy-wide issues, and proposal preparation. EEPSEA 
also offers a number of awards such as: Masters Degree Awards, Postdoctoral Awards, Dissertation 
Fieldwork Awards, and Apprenticeships (In-country Small Grants Programs). Introductory seminars 
on basic concepts of environmental economics are offered to specific countries or government 
agencies. 
In 1996, EEPSEA began to use a system of advisors, in which researchers were assigned a resource 
person who visited them once between biannual meetings to provide more detailed advice about 
research design, methodology, and write-up. In 1998, EEPSEA initiated grants to national associations 
for the purpose of starting associations of environmental and resource economists in member countries. 
Various means of broadening EEPSEA's reach are under consideration. A short course in 
environmental science for economists is proposed. In addition, EEPSEA has discussed curriculum 
development support for several universities and plans to hold a curriculum development workshop to 
review teaching materials, methods, degree requirements, and other practical matters. As a low-cost 
way of publicizing EEPSEA and environmental economics, EEPSEA is proposing to offer Chairs in 
economics sub-fields. The Chair would provide some prestige and a payment of between $1,000 and 
$2,000. Recipients would have to deliver a paper at the end of the year. 
EEPSEA gets involved in special topical issues. For example, between October 1997 and May 1998, 
EEPSEA collaborated with the World Wide Fund for Nature on a study of the economic impact of the 
1997 fires & haze in Indonesia. Results were presented at a 1998 meeting of ASEAN Environment 
Ministers, as input to the formulation of a regional haze action plan. The findings were also discussed 
as the first agenda item in a Meeting of the UN General Assembly Committee on Humanitarian & 
Social Affairs chaired by the Undersecretary General of the UN on June 2, 1998. Close to 100 media 
citations have been recorded, including Financial Times, BBC, CNN, Globe & Mail, Washington Post, 
and International Herald Tribune. After the report was submitted at the ASEAN Environment 
Ministers Meeting in February, Singapore's Minister was asked how much help in dealing with 
Indonesia's 1998 fires Singapore could provide, given the tight budget. He remarked: Even with a tight 
budget, we have to prioritize because if we do not help them, the economic losses to us and the entire 
region are tremendous... Whatever we can spend to help will be money well spent. (Straits Times, 
February 26/98). 
The resulting interviews and inquiries from the media had the secondary benefit of enormously 
expanding EEPSEA's contacts with the media. They are now part of their roster of experts, frequently 
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called on to comment on fires and other environmental issues. The final report is scheduled for 
publication as a book in early 1999. A summary of the study can be viewed on the EEPSEA Website. 
Work undertaken by EEPSEA is disseminated through publications in several formats: 
Research reports - peer reviewed and edited 
Special reports - commissioned papers 
Policy briefs - summaries of research reports 
Local language publications 
Books - compilations of reports, case studies, etc. 
Special issues - dealing with health valuation, pesticides, forests, contingent valuation, 
and so forth. 
Combined, these many activities position EEPSEA well for its networking and collaboration function. 
The Secretariat plays a role as an information clearinghouse and resource base for the region through 
its extensive Website and mailing list. Most related organizations are linked through EEPSEA's 
Website, facilitating collaboration with other organizations active in environmental economics. 
As illustrated by the research on the economic impact of the forest fires in Indonesia, work undertaken 
by EEPSEA has been influential, resulting in considerable increased awareness and positive impact on 
economic and environmental policy in the region. While not always as newsworthy as in this example, 
interventions in other areas have been positive as well. In 1996, the Sponsors Group commissioned the 
former Chief of the Environment Division at the World Bank to carry out a comprehensive evaluation 
of EEPSEA's first three years of operations. The report included results of a survey of researchers, 
resource persons, and others. The evaluation was highly favorable, finding that: 
The program met or exceeded most of the evaluation criteria 
The participation rate of women is remarkably high - over 50% 
% of respondents rated performance good to very good (4 or 5 on a 1-5 scale): 
Improved research skills 76% 
Improved interdisciplinary skills 76% 
Usefulness of workshops 98% 
Administrative efficiency 88%. 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REPUTATION 
EEPSEA enjoys strong support from IDRC and its staff. Its goals, mission, and objectives are widely 
understood, and its performance well known. The extremely thorough evaluation carried out in 1996 
helped to build both internal and external support for and confidence in the work carried out by 
EEPSEA. The evaluator noted that: 
Overall, EEPSEA has met or exceeded most of the evaluation criteria and objectives set out 
[... J. The program has also performed well relative to other relevant international capacity 
building initiatives [...J. Furthermore, while the program has largely kept to its original 
LEARNING PARTNERSHIPS: A REVIEW OF IDRC SECRETARIATS 127 CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
objectives, sensible adjustments have been made along the way in the spirit of learning by 
doing. As a result, there is a strong consensus that the program has improved over time. 
In his concluding remarks, the evaluator wrote: EEPSEA has achieved its major initial objective most 
successfully, in the sense that the program has contributed very significantly to the considerable 
increase in expertise on environmental economics in the region. 
The Executive Director takes great care to keep IDRC's Senior Management Committee and other 
stakeholders informed about EEPSEA activities and performance. The table below illustrates the 
approach taken. It should also be noted that the material and information provided is of relatively high 
quality, concise, clear, and usually accompanied by visual illustrations. With this relentless attention to 
effective communication, it is not surprising that many of the people interviewed for this Review 
mentioned EEPSEA when questioned about Secretariats' contribution to achieving IDRC's corporate 
and program objectives, or about the positive impacts of Secretariats. When asked if Secretariats 
positively influence development policies and the status and visibility of IDRC, one respondent replied: 
EEPSEA does and everyone knows it! EEPSEA too was the example most often used to support 
responses of quite well or completely to questions on the degree to which expectations of Secretariats 
have been met. Similarly, survey results showed that there was a relatively high level of belief that 
EEPSEA donors and constituents were getting what they need or want, and that there is evidence for 
this belief. 
EEPSEA's ANNUAL REPORTING SCHEDULE 
The following reports are provided annually to all donors: 
1. September Annual Report 
2. September Annual Financial Report 
3. December Minutes of November Advisory Committee Meeting 
4. January Newsletter 
5. April Draft Program of Work & Budget 
6. April Results-Based Management Report (to CIDA only) 
7. May Interim Annual Report 
8. May Annual Sponsors Group Meeting 
9. May Advisory Committee Meeting 
10. June Minutes of Sponsors Group Meeting 
11. June Minutes of May Advisory Committee Meeting 
12. June Final Program of Work 
13. July Newsletter 
14. Continuously Update of Website (announcements & publications) 
15. Continuously EEPSEA Research Reports & Policy Briefs, as published 
16. Every two years in October: Report to Board of Governors (to IDRC only) 
Every 3-4 years, the following additional documents are submitted: 
17. October External Evaluation of EEPSEA 
18. November Advisory Committee's Response to Evaluation 
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The benefits of good communication spring from more than frequent quality reporting. Personal values 
and relentless dedication have a great deal to do with it. All donors, Advisory Committee members, 
and IDRC's Senior Management Committee members conveyed that they were well informed about 
EEPSEA activities, as illustrated by some of the supporting comments provided below: 
EEPSEA's role and impact in the region grew as it built confidence in itself, among its 
constituency, and in the importance of environmental economics 
EEPSEA established its credibility and reputation for high standards very quickly so that 
I now believe that EEPSEA should expand its activities as quickly as possible 
Interview Question: Do you find that the communications between yourself and EEPSEA 
are two-way and supply timely, relevant, reliable information? Could communications be 
improved? 
Donor Response A: Yes. They just couldn't be any better 
Donor Response B: Yes. Communication is direct and succinct and very effective 
Donor Response C: Yes. The Secretariat is very responsive. We have intense 
interaction with frequent e-mail exchanges. They give forwarding e-mail addresses 
when they go on travel and they understand when we have time pressures and 
deadlines and they respond to those by getting the information to us on time. The 
financial information is excellent and on time 
EEPSEA donors and partners included in the survey indicated that their expectations of 
the Secretariat have been completely met. When asked how they rated the benefit related 
to costs or investments with other donor funded activities, respondents rated EEPSEA 
Far Above Average (five on a five point scale). One donor responded: EEPSEA is far 
above average. It outstrips every other approach. They use researchers from other 
countries in the region, from the South, who have immediate access to researchers from 
the North (via e-mail). This working method is effective and has a high cost-benefit ratio 
I am familiar with many development initiatives around the world and EEPSEA is one of 
the best 
EEPSEA is one of the best initiatives of IDRC The Centre sets the framework and allow 
the Executive Director a lot of autonomy to get the job done 
Question: Is EEPSEA responding to the changing needs of your organization? 
Donor Response A: Yes it is 
Donor Response B: Yes. They are ahead of us. We are learning from EEPSEA. They 
are building capacity in environmental economics both in the South and here in the 
North 
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Donor Response C: Yes. They monitor our needs very closely and visit us on a 
regular, timely basis. They are very open to our suggestions. 
Donors want careful evaluations of Secretariats. EEPSEA has made good use of 
evaluations, which both attracts donors and ensures that they are getting benefit for their 
investment. EEPSEA is a model in this regard. We know that donors get what they need 
and want, and there is evidence for it 
EEPSEA is very focused and results-oriented They have a clear focus on a single issue 
and a structure set up to deliver specific activities related to their mission. There is a high 
performance commitment. 
EEPSEA's external reputation is also positive. In addition to the wide coverage received by its 
research on the economic impact of the forest fires in Indonesia, EEPSEA has been called upon to 
testify before the British House of Commons Committee on Trade and Environment. Other examples 
of external influence include: 
EEPSEA attracts private sector funding from a Norwegian multinational corporation 
An EEPSEA research paper influences the formation of government policy in the mining 
sector in Sri Lanka 
Several projects in Vietnam and the Philippines, undertaken at the behest of local 
governments, provide advice on pollution charges, environmental legislation and damage 
compensation 
The Cambodian Minister of Environment endorsed the findings of an EEPSEA study and 
called for a moratorium on logging in the study area 
EEPSEA sponsored projects in Manila are used to help draft the contracts for the 
privatization of Manila's water supply services 
The Government of the Philippines provides co-funding for EEPSEA training courses 
EEPSEA has developed many partnerships with regional institutions, including the 
University of Agriculture and Forestry in Vietnam, the Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies, the Thailand Development Research Institute, China's Center for 
Economic Research, the Department of Agricultural Economics of the University of 
Peradeniya in Sri Lanka, and others. 
7. LESSONS 
There is little doubt that, by any measure, EEPSEA is one of the more successful Secretariats housed 
at IDRC. Lessons drawn from this case focus on elements of success that are transferable. 
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BUILDING ON STRENGTH 
In organization design as in architecture or technology, the more innovative the approach the more risk 
is involved. Compared to WETV and FoodLinks, for example, EEPSEA was a relatively low risk 
venture. The point to be made is not that IDRC should avoid innovation and experimentation, but that 
there should be a clear cognition of the risks involved in pushing forward the frontiers of development 
methodologies and modalities. 
The model for EEPSEA was adapted from an already successfully implemented experiment in Africa 
called AERC - African Economic Research Consortium. The similarities in program and 
organization structure are no coincidence. David Glover, the Executive Director of EEPSEA played a 
leading role in setting up AERC. The two organizations exhibit a number of similarities in approach, 
methodology, development philosophy, start-up, program, and mission, but are quite different in 
governance. Two different sources (the World Bank's sub-Saharan African: From Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth and English's The Governance of Networks: the Experience of IDRC's Social 
Sciences Division in sub-Saharan Africa) draw attention to the similarities and to the benefits of 
building on a proven model. These sources are quoted in Appendix 2. 
LEADERSHIP 
A high level of dedication and scientific leadership have been enjoyed by EEPSEA. However, 
EEPSEA's main success factor is its ability to work well with others. This case reminds us of Warren 
Bennis' Organizing Genius: The Secrets of Creative Collaboration, (1997) in which he points out that 
the ability to work with others is critical to successful collaboration. According to him, great groups 
require a more flexible kind of leadership that has more to do with facilitating than with asserting 
control. People in effective collaborative groups, Bennis continues, feel liberated from the trivial and 
the arbitrary... People are in them, not for money, not even for glory, but because they love the work 
they love the project. He further points out that they are staffed with talented people who can work 
together. Certain tasks can only be performed collaboratively, and it is madness to recruit people, 
however gifted, who are incapable of working side by side toward a common goal. 
In a more profound insight, Bemis observes that every successful collaborative group is an island - 
but an island with a bridge to the mainland. While they may tend to be physically removed, they are 
able to tap a wide range of resources. This notion describes what is perhaps the strongest characteristic 
of EEPSEA and its leadership: its ability to stay so focused, and yet to build and maintain such strong 
links to IDRC, the host organisation, as well as to sponsors and Steering Committee members, is 
remarkable. 
As the Executive Director pointed out during the interview, his full-time job is building relationships. 
Donors have made the following statements: He excels in networking and forging links and, when 
asked which area of the Secretariat's performance met with the most satisfaction: Networking and the 
Executive Director's leadership. He works tirelessly and has the ability to pick winners - those who 
succeed and benefit from the program. 
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Leaders of successful collaborations, Bennis points out, love talent and know where to find it. They 
also know that the quality of the group often reflects the network of its leader. This is certainly true of 
EEPSEA's Director and Deputy Director, as pointed out by another donor: 
The advisory committee plays a very important technical role in identifying new knowledge 
and skills. David is smart enough to know when he doesn't have the knowledge in 
environmental economics and he gets it from outside. His choice of his deputy - Herminia - 
is good because she complements his knowledge and skill set. 
STRONG, FOCUSED MISSION 
EEPSEA's mission is both strong and focused. More importantly, it is elegant in its simplicity. It is easy 
for everyone - IDRC staff, donors, and regional stakeholders - to understand and remember. Some 
stakeholders who are very pleased with the success of the Secretariat would like to see it expand as 
quickly as possible and, more dramatically, move into new areas. Based largely on the criticism that 
EEPSEA is overly academic,. directing too much of its activity at the academic elite, these new areas 
include more grass-roots involvement at the level of municipalities and industry. However, should this 
move be taken, it should be done with the utmost caution, as covering too much territory and 
significantly broadening the mission could weaken one of EEPSEA's primary strengths which is its 
very sharp focus. 
GOOD FTT WITH IDRC STRATEGY AND POLICY 
The expertise in EEPSEA fits well with IDRC's expertise and interests. They can draw upon each- 
other's resources and networks and both benefit greatly from their strong links. With the links as strong 
as they are, both parties benefit greatly. 
ATTRACTIVENESS To DONORS EEPSEA has been relatively successful in attracting broad-based donor 
support. In its October 1996 Report to IDRC's Board of Governors, EEPSEA attributed its success in 
fund raising to the following factors: 
The topic is timely 
Donors participate as equal partners 
Committee and sponsor are committed 
EEPSEA is a genuinely multinational effort 
Resource persons are contracted on the basis of merit 
The Secretariat is a small lean operation with low overheads, relying largely on part-time 
staff and consultants 
Adequate resources exist to pursue fund raising vigorously 
IDRC has made a substantial long term financial commitment that increases the confidence 
of other donors 
IDRC is highly visible as the initiator and administrator of the program. 
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND SPONSOR COMMITMENT AND INVOLVEMENT 
EEPSEA's structure is different from most Secretariats in that two bodies supplement the operational 
Secretariat in Singapore-a Sponsors Groups and an Advisory Committee- where most Secretariats 
have a single Steering Committee. Having two bodies keeps each to a manageable size, allowing more 
frequent interaction with the Secretariat. The Advisory Committee enables recipient countries and 
scientific expertise to play a stronger role in setting priorities than the more traditional Secretariat 
composition. 
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APPENDIX 1 
RESEARCH PROJECTS APPROVED JANUARY 1994 - DECEMBER 1997 
The Cost Effectiveness ofAlternative Policy Instruments for Water Pollution Control in 
the Meycauayan Tanning Industry, Philippines, Maria Nimfa Mendoza, University of the 
Philippines 
Overfishing in the Philippines Marine Fisheries Sector -A Disaggregated Analysis, 
Philippines, Danilo Israel, Philippines Institute of Development Studies 
Economic Appraisal of Environmental Impacts of Biogas Plants in Livestock Farming in 
China, Gu Shuhua et al, Tsinghua University 
An Environmental Bond for Clay Mining in Sri Lanka. Malik, Ranasinghe, University of 
Moratuwa 
Integrated Pest Management, Indonesia, Bunasor, Bogor Agricultural University 
Evaluation of Rural Sanitation Options in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam, Do Van Xe/Phan 
Thi Giac Tam, University of Cantho/University of Agriculture and Forestry 
Water Pricing for Nanjing, China, Zhu Xiaolin, Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences 
Natural Resource Accounting for Forests, China, Liu Xuelin, University College, London 
Regional Capability to Finance Irrigation Systems, Indonesia, Dibyo Prabowo, 
Gadjahmada University. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis for Recycling Suburban Livestock Waste, China, Jiang Xuemin, 
Huazhong Agricultural University 
Impact of Pollution Charges on the Textile Industry in Indonesia, Maria Ratnaningsih, 
Thammasat University, Thailand 
Willingness to Pay for Improved Water Quality in East Lake, Wuhan, China, Du Yaping, 
Hubei Academy of Social Sciences 
Economic Value of a Non-timber Forest Product (Parkia Speciosa), Malaysia, Woon 
Weng Chuen et al, Forest Research Institute of Malaysia 
Resettlement Program of the Three Gorges Dam, China, Jiahua Pan, Institute of World 
Economics and Politics 
Poverty and Deforestation, Northern Vietnam, Tran Thi Que, Socio-Economic 
Development Centre (SEDEC) 
Valuation of Health Effects ofAir Pollution, Bangkok, Dirgha Tiwari, Asian Institute of 
Technology 
Household Demand for Water in Metro Manila, Philippines, Cristina David/Arlene 
Inocencio, Philippines Institute for Development Studies 
Pricing of Industrial Groundwater in Metro Manila, Philippines, Maria C. Ebarvia, 
University of the Philippines 
Water Pricing and Welfare Improvement: Case Study from Semi-Urban Communities, 
Thailand, Direk Patmasiriwat/Areeya Boon-Long, Thailand Development Research 
Institute 
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Household Water Pricing in Jakarta, Indonesia, Budhi Sayoko, Centre for Economic and 
Environmental Studies 
The Economic Benefits of Watershed Protection and Trade-offs with Timber Production, 
Malaysia, Mohd. Shahwahid Haji Othman et al, Universiti Pertanian Malaysia 
Environmental Impacts of the Makban Geothermal Plant, Laguna, Philippines, 
Nicomedes Briones et al, University of the Philippines at Los Banos 
Valuing the Health Costs of Air Pollution: the Cement Industry in South Sulawesi, 
Rusdian Lubis et al, Center for Environmental Studies, Hasanuddin University, Indonesia 
The Pollution Charge System in China: an Economic Incentive? Yun Ping, Institute of 
Environmental Economics, Renmin University 
Damage Schedules for Thai Coastal Areas: An Alternative to Economic Valuation, 
Rattana Chuenpagdee, University of British Columbia (PhD thesis award) 
Economic Valuation and Conservation Policies for Tropical Forests in Sri Lanka, Cyril 
Bogawhatte, University of Paradeniya 
Economic Valuation of Mangroves and the Roles of Local Communities in their 
Conservation, Thailand, Suthawan Sathirathai, Chulalongkom University 
Marginal Cost Pricing for Coal Fired Electricity in Coastal Cities of China, Susan 
Zhang, Peking University 
Optimal Allocation of Water to Competing Uses in Taiyuan, China, Jing Xu, Ministry of 
Water Resources 
Economic and Health Consequences of Pesticide Use in Paddy Production in the Mekong 
Delta of Vietnam, Nguyen Huu Dung, National University, Ho Chi Minh 1-7, 
Environmental Policy Issues in Vietnam (7 sub-projects by various institutes) 
Marginal Opportunity Cost Pricing for Wastewater Disposal: A Case Study of Wuxi, 
China, Fan Zhang, China Centre for Economic Research 
Surrogate Pricing for Water. The Case of Mini-hydro Cooperatives in Northern Thailand, 
Siriporn Kiratikarnkul and Sitanon Jesdapipat, Thailand Environment Institute 
Estimation of the External Costs of Mining, Philippines, Eugenia Bennagen, Resources, 
Environment and Economics Centre for Studies 
Valuing Environmental Benefits: An Entrance Fee System for Thailand's National Parks, 
Adis Israngkura 
A Comparative Assessment of Natural Resource Accounting in Four ASEAN Countries, 
ASEAN Working Group on Environmental Economics 
Tradeable Permits for Water Pollution, China, Wendong Tao et al, Yunnan Institute of 
Environmental Sciences 
Cost Effectiveness of Control Measures for Automotive Pollution in Colombo, Sri Lanka, 
Sunil Chandrasiri, University of Colombo 
Air Pollution Tax for Controlling Emissions from the Manufacturing Sector in Manila, 
Catherine Corpuz, University of the Philippines 
Sustaining the Commons: The Role of Liquidity Constraints in Upland Households, 
Philippines, Asa Sajise, University of California at Berkeley (PhD thesis award) 
Econometric Analysis of Factors Affecting Deforestation in Papua New Guinea, Trevor 
Gumoi, University of New England, Australia (PhD thesis award) 
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China's Paper Industry - Growth and Environmental Impacts Under Economic Reform, 
Jintao Xu (PhD thesis) 
Farm Chemicals, Rice Production and the Environment in China, Jikun Huang, China 
Centre for Agricultural Policy 
Causes of Deforestation in China, Yaoqi Zhang (PhD thesis) 
Economic Analysis of Groundwater Extraction in Jakarta, Yusman Syaukat (PhD thesis) 
Environmental Costs ofArtisanal Gold Mining in the Philippines, Danilo Israel, 
Philippines Institute of Development Studies 
Impact of Trade Liberalization on the Environment - The Case of TariReduction for 
Potato in Sri Lanka, Jeevika Weerahewa, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka 
Water Quality Improvements: A Contingent Valuation Study of the Chao Phraya River, 
Churai Tapvong, Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University, Thailand 
Economic Analysis of Salinity Problems in the Mahaweli - H Irrigation Project in Sri 
Lanka, Selliah Thirucheivam, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka 
The Distributional Impacts of Climate Change Mitigation Policies in Indonesia, Agus 
Sari, University of California at Berkeley, USA (PhD thesis award) 
Electricity Pricing for North Vietnam, Nguyen Van Song, Hanoi Agricultural University 1 
Comparative Analysis of Alternative Forest Management Systems in the Mekong Delta, 
Vietnam, Mai Van Nam and Nguyen Tri Khiem, Cantho University. 
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APPENDIX 2 
AERC 
THE WORLD BANK: SUB SAHARANAFRICAN: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, 
WASHINGTON D.C., OCTOBER 1989 
The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) is a remarkable example of a successful regional 
capacity-building program. Twice each year, 35 to 50 African economic researchers, often from the 
universities, governments, and research institutes of more than 15 countries, gather to discuss and 
evaluate their ongoing research. 
Launched in 1988, the Consortium provides funding and technical support to networks of researchers. 
The initiative is two-pronged: to promote macroeconomic research and to strengthen local research 
institutions by developing their staff. It also seeks to make senior policy-makers and politicians more 
aware of applied research and its potential contribution to the decision making process. The 
consortium is currently supported by several donors and administered by the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Based in Nairobi, its current annual budget of $1.4 million supports some 20 teams, each with four or 
five researchers. 
In the early 1980s, newly trained African economists were challenged to contribute to the far-reaching 
reviews of domestic policy being undertaken by their governments. At that time, owing to the dearth of 
experienced local economists and the weakness of African research institutions, most economic policy 
analysis was conducted by expatriate consultants or staff from multilateral financial institutions; as a 
result, policy analysis was often poorly internalized and lacking in continuity. 
The consortium grew out of a venture initiated in 1984 by the Canadian International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) that provided funding to overcome the hurdles to quality research within the 
local institutions of Eastern and Southern Africa: lack of equipment, facilities, and library resources; 
bureaucratic bottlenecks that delayed the transfer of grants made in foreign exchange from central 
offices to the research teams; and the intellectual isolation of analysts from both academic peers in the 
region and senior officials. 
Leading African researchers and policy makers on the Consortium's Advisory Committee chose the 
research topics. National teams have so far been concentrating on the issues of balance of payments 
and domestic financial management, but the advisory committee is now considering adding external 
debt management, medium-term adjustment, and taxation policy to the research agenda. The common 
program facilitates comparison and discussion on a regional basis. For example, Tanzanian researchers 
have directly contributed to recent public debates on structural adjustment in that country. The 
consortium provides a venue for sharing experiences and assessing their applicability to other nations. 
The network creates opportunities for international exchanges of ideas and findings, as members of the 
networks travel and work abroad from time to time; scholars in Europe, North America, and other 
regions participate through meetings, joint or cooperative research, and as seconded personnel in other 
African institutions. National meetings to publicize and discuss research findings and their implications 
for policy also link senior technocrats and politicians so that the latter may better appreciate the 
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economic implications of political decisions. In addition, the consortium supports a scholarly journal, 
the Eastern Africa Economic Review, which publishes research emanating from the network. 
The consortium's success is largely due to its flexible, pluralistic approach, which tailors programs to 
the needs of individual groups. By enabling well-trained Africans to remain in contact with colleagues 
in Africa and overseas, it is helping them to stay at the frontier of their profession. Moreover, as it 
breaks down the traditional barriers between governments and universities, it is helping policymakers 
appreciate the potential of local academic resources. It is a model that merits replication in other 
disciplines. 
PHILIP ENGLISH, THE GOVERNANCE OF NETWORKS: THE EXPERIENCE OF IDRC'S SOCIAL 
SCIENCES DIVISIONINSUBSAHARANAFRICA, IDRC,1995 
The most successful network under review here is the AERC. Having begun in 1984 as an IDRC 
program run in-house, it is now an international NGO located in Nairobi with some 20 staff handling 
an annual budget of close to CAD 10 mil. contributed by 15 different donors. Spanning all of Sub- 
Saharan Africa, anglophone and francophone, it has become a model of capacity building and the 
example to which other economics networks in the region inevitably refer to at one time or another. 
The AERC has had a long and fairly smooth history. The turning point came in 1988 when a group of 
donors was attracted to set up a Consortium and the Rockefeller Foundation took over as executing 
agency until the new Consortium could become legally independent. It is incorporated in the US and 
registered in Kenya. A small grants competition, carefully monitored through semi-annual meetings, 
has always been the backbone of the AERC. In the early 1990s, however, a collaborative MA training 
program was launched in cooperation with most anglophone Departments of Economics. 
At the top of the governance structure is the Board of Directors composed of donor representatives. 
As its size grew, a budget and finance committee (now called the Executive Committee) was set up 
which could meet more regularly. AERC is headed by an Executive Director who reports directly to 
the Board. He is assisted by a Research Coordinator and, since 1992, by a Training Coordinator as 
well. On scientific matters, the Executive Director has received guidance from an Advisory Committee. 
It consists of some 15 members, fairly evenly divided between African scholars, African policymakers, 
and international resource persons, plus the Executive Director and the Research Coordinator. In 1995, 
the AERC presented an image of maturity and stability. 
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FoodLinks has a number of features which distinguish it from other Secretariats, notably: it was the most 
recent of Secretariats considered by IDRC; it experienced one of the shortest lives of any Secretariat - 
six months - and, it was novel in that it was to derive funding from business ventures and royalties, rather 
than from other funding agencies alone. 
FoodLinks was based on the idea that 25-40% of the world's food production is lost due to spoilage and 
mishandling because of the lack of value-added processing. The application of better process, storage, and 
handling technologies, it was argued, would have a positive impact on poverty alleviation. Further, 
northern distributors are always looking for new and innovative foods to serve an ever more culturally 
diverse, sophisticated, and adventuresome clientele and the South is growing ever more interesting and, 
in some cases, higher-quality crops. However, limited access, coupled with inadequate food processing 
and handling, makes it almost impossible to take advantage of this large, untapped export market. 
The key, it was argued, is to link small producers to the markets that are demanding the products that are 
already being produced or that could potentially be produced. Identifying and capitalizing on strategies 
allowing small producers to access potential markets for their products within a sustainable and equitable 
development framework will not only prove a market niche, but also contribute to discussions surrounding 
issues of environmentally-sustainable agriculture and gender equity. 
In many ways, FoodLinks was like other IDRC-housed Secretariats, in that it began as a number of 
projects and was therefore based on sound research and a considerable track record that went back to the 
beginnings of IDRC. The projects that FoodLinks sought to translate into marketing and value-added 
ventures for small producers built on sometimes 20 years of research support by IDRC and its partners in 
genetic improvement of crops and animals, better farming systems and improved post-harvest technologies. 
This long term developmental research included the Goldfinger banana which was to be a feature in 
FoodLinks' early efforts. 
LEARNING PARTNERSHIPS: A REVIEW OF IDRC SECRETARIATS 139 CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
The products which FoodLinks wished to include in its brokering activities were many. In addition to 
the Goldfinger bananas in South America, there were: organic coffee in Laos, Amazonian products, 
ecosystem products, mangoes in Guatemala, fruits and vegetables in Vietnam, cashew apples in El 
Salvador, and northern areas apricots. Considerable experience was also gleaned from IDRC's long 
term relationship with PRODAR (Program for the Development of Rural Agroindustry), an 
international network in Latin America and the Carribean. FoodLinks thus grew out of IDRC's 
research and research networks, and IDRC provided the principal source of funding. It was the result 
of IDRC's attempt to move the Centre into another form of partnership and enterprise, with its stock 
of products mostly developed through earlier IDRC investments in research. This is how it could boast 
of extensive experience with over 1,400 food-related projects in the developing world. 
FoodLinks operated somewhat as a Program Initiative for some years before the Board officially gave 
it Secretariat status. It had an advisory Steering Committee for over six years. First as a project in 1994 
and then as a Program Initiative, FoodLinks experimented with business partnerships before the 
Secretariat was established. First was the collaboration with Lassonde, which led to a linkage with 
CECI using cashew apple in fruit juices. A second collaboration was established between the Loblaws 
supermarket chain and Ecos del Agro producers in Latin America to market Mona Lisa bananas as 
environmentally friendly products on an experimental basis in Canada. 
This latter experiment led to a concern on the part of IDRC that the challenges faced by FoodLinks in 
maintaining these partnerships and in getting the products into highly competitive retail food markets 
was more daunting than was at first realized. Retailers in North America require large quantities of any 
product, delivered on time and with a consistent quality. These were the very requirements that have 
largely kept small producers out of these markets in the first place and FoodLinks did not have the 
capacity to ensure that they would be met. Loblaws decided not to continue with the banana 
experiment before FoodLinks was approved as a Secretariat. 
However, getting the FoodLinks-brokered banana into Loblaws even on an experimental basis was a 
considerable success and FoodLinks moved to establish an External Advisory Group of six senior 
Canadian food industry executives, whose purpose was to provide advice on issues such as fund raising 
and suitable commercial arrangements. An Organics Advisory Group was also established to assist the 
initiative by assessing the marketability of food products proposals received by FoodLinks. 
In October 1997, a prospectus on FoodLinks went to the Board of Governors. At that meeting, the 
Board suggested, and then approved, that FoodLinks become a Secretariat and granted it $2.5 million. 
Up until that point, it had been a Program Initiative under the responsibility of the Programs Branch. At 
a subsequent Senior Management meeting in December 1997, a President's Designate from outside the 
Programs Branch was appointed. The new President's Designate examined the plans and funding 
expectations with the Executive Director who was in the process of being appointed. Upon scrutiny, it 
was quickly concluded that the new Secretariat had little chance of achieving its program or external 
funding objectives. In consultation with the Board Chair, it was decided to abolish the Secretariat. 
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2. CONTEXT 
FoodLinks represented a departure from the usual way IDRC does business. In addition to promoting 
equity and sustainability through research, it was intended to act as a catalyst for building partnerships 
through the provision of commercial brokering and project management services. The intent was to 
link southern food suppliers to northern business partners. FoodLinks was to offer northern food firms 
access to unique and high quality food products from around the world: 
The FoodLinks Initiative, will focus on the commercialization and marketing of rural 
community products... the increased attention to the value-added and market aspects of rural 
development, poverty alleviation and food security are increasingly being recognized by other 
donors. 
FoodLinks was intended to pioneer new ground in private-public partnerships by exploring various 
partnership models for the agri-food industry. Perhaps foreshadowing the inherent weakness in the 
idea, the original proposal for FoodLinks stated: 
Experiences in partnership development and revenue generation have taught us that, 
although much enthusiasm exists across the Canadian food industry for FoodLinks activities 
and objectives, it has been difficult to convince private sector companies of the reality of the 
FoodLinks venture without pre-existing private and public co funding. 
3. VISION, MISSION, AND OBJECTIVES 
The mission of FoodLinks was to create partnerships among food producers, processors and 
marketers in developing countries and Canada through the provision of commercial liaison and project 
management services, leading to increased capacity, employment, and incomes for developing country 
communities in a sustainable and equitable manner. The four objectives were to: 
Support research and training by testing a range of market-oriented strategies and 
interventions and improving capacity for using markets to support sustainable 
development 
Improve the well-being and capacity of small producers in developing countries by 
facilitating greater market access and value-added activities through private sector 
partnerships 
Promote the use of information and communication networks to disseminate 
methodology, results, and lessons 
Expand the resources of FoodLinks through collaboration with other donors and partners, 
and develop its capacity and strength as a commercial entity within a Secretariat model. 
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It was believed by some that moving this idea to a Secretariat Modality would take it from the research 
stage to the implementation stage, and would provide FoodLinks with a more entrepreneurial image 
and greater opportunities for expanding resources. 
4. THE END OF FOODLINKS 
The approval of FoodLinks by IDRC's Board of Governors in October 1997, and the overturning of 
the decision by IDRC's Senior Management Committee in March 1998 cannot go unnoticed. The 
decision to stop the implementation of the Secretariat was based on a memorandum from the 
Executive Director dated March 30 1998. It listed a number of original assumptions on which the 




Projects need much more intensive attention from FoodLinks and other IDRC staff than 
was anticipated, causing heavy workloads and stress, due to demands for rapid decision 
making and excessive document preparation 
Dealing with the private sector requires specific skills, not all of which are available at the 
Centre, and our capacity to ensure fast and efficient delivery is limited 
The process of attracting private companies to FoodLinks projects needs persistence and 
much longer time frames than originally assumed 
Revenue streams are difficult to negotiate and do not occur until well into the future in 
most cases 
Fewer donors than expected are interested in co-funding and their time lines for 
collaboration are long. 
The memorandum concluded with the assessment that the probability of the FoodLinks Secretariat 
achieving its goals were much lower than anticipated. 
Three days following this memorandum, the IDRC Vice President, who was the President's Designate 
to FoodLinks, wrote to the Chairman of the IDRC Board of Governors informing him of the Senior 
Management Committee's concerns and of their decision: 
In fact, I am even firmer [than the Executive Director] in my own conclusions. Based on 
FoodLinks' limited progress to date in laying the groundwork and on what I consider 
management deficiencies, if IDRC were to continue the Secretariat it would be committing 
itself to: 
Investing the balance of FoodLinks $2.5 million budget in a series of activities that 
would not add up to an acceptable success level for the Secretariat as a whole 
Becoming the `banker of last resort , when anticipated co funding from other donors 
does not materialize 
Hiring two new senior staff (one of whom would be a Peruvian national relocated to 
Ottawa with family) with a high probability of having to lay them off within a year 
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Running the risk that the Executive Director might resign if his strong interest in 
working overseas were to materialize in a job offer from another employer. 
There was, of course, some anxiety among Governors about why these concerns had not been raised at 
the Board of Governors meeting earlier in the month. The reason given was the lack of definitiveness 
on the part of the Executive Director and the lack of a clear management critique of FoodLinks as a 
Secretariat. 
Three days after the VP's letter, the Chairman of the Board informed other Board members of the 
decision and his concurrence with it. He explained that IDRC senior management had become 
concerned about the slow rate at which FoodLinks was making progress. They in turn requested an 
assessment by the Executive Director who provided an objective and frank opinion confirming 
management's concerns. Factors related to the timing of this decision were described as follows: 
The Secretariat was on the point of making job offers to two senior persons, externally 
recruited, both of whom would have had to relocate to Ottawa (one from Peru). Both the 
Centre and the individuals would have been prejudiced if the hiring had gone ahead and 
then the Secretariat were closed 
Delaying a decision past the end of this fiscal year, without a firm conviction that the 
Secretariat would continue, would have prejudiced the chance of any of the three affected 
FoodLinks employees to apply for the early departure benefits available to public sector 
employees. 
The Chairman of the Board concluded with a request for a full briefing and lessons to be drawn from 
the experience and presented to Governors at the upcoming June meeting on the closure of FoodLinks. 
In response to this, the Board was assured in a subsequent memorandum that steps were being taken to 
ensure that the lessons to be learned from this experience were not overlooked. 
A critical look at the FoodLinks idea revealed two fatal flaws: divergence from IDRC's integral 
organizational identity, and financial and funding issues. The lack of a clear management critique of 
FoodLinks as a Secretariat was obvious. 
DIVERGENCE FROM IDRC'S INTEGRAL ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY From the beginning, the 
foundations of IDRC, its organizational DNA, have been clear - the cornerstone of the Centre's 
foundation is a commitment to improve people's lives through the generation and use of knowledge. 
Its objectives have remained unchanged since the IDRC Act was passed by Parliament in 1970: 
The objects of the Centre are to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the 
problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and 
adapting scientific, technical and other knowledge to those regions, and, in carrying out those 
objects: 
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To enlist the talents of natural and social scientists and technologists of Canada and other 
countries 
To assist the developing regions to build up the research capabilities, the innovative skills, 
and the institutions required to solve their problems 
To encourage generally the coordination of international development research 
To foster cooperation in research on development problems between the developed and 
developing regions for their mutual benefit. 
It was clear in all the documents prepared for approval of FoodLinks that the Secretariat was designed 
specifically to attract the participation ofprivate sector companies [and] result in the establishment 
of business ventures with developing country partners. Although it would receive funding from donors 
and IDRC, it was always envisioned that the Secretariat would become a business enterprise generating 
revenue from fees for service and royalties. This initiative would clearly move IDRC from its research, 
knowledge, and information brokerage role to a business brokerage role, as indicated in the 
Secretariat's mission statement: FoodLinks will create partnerships among food producers, processors 
and marketers... through the provision of commercial brokering and project management services... 
This, it is to be observed, is a long way from IDRC's mission: empowerment through knowledge. 
FoodLinks brochures clearly indicated that the initiative went steps beyond the Centre's traditional 
research partners to include private enterprise. In a mangoes for sale ... newjuice ...and better 
bananas approach, FoodLinks marketed the idea with slogans such as: Building profitable 
partnerships, Let's do Business, and Canada's IDRC is Open for Business!, copies of the political 
rhetoric of several newly elected governments. 
The approach needed to make FoodLinks successful was simply too divergent from the IDRC 
approach to result in a healthy relationship. FoodLinks would have led, in part, to the corporatization 
of IDRC, which would require adherence to different core values - values of private, rather than 
public interest. In this sense, the corporatization of FoodLinks went beyond IDRC's food security 
theme of providing research and knowledge on policies and frameworks to link commodity chains from 
production to marketing, in that it would become the actual broker and business agent for the process. 
FINANCIAL AND FUNDING ISSUES 
Without a doubt, the figures reported in various reports about FoodLinks were confusing for decision 
makers. For example, the draft proposal to establish the Secretariat, which was very widely circulated 
to IDRC officials, to several SMC members, and to Advisory Committee members, in July 1997, 
projected a 10 year revenue of $28 million, of which $11 million would come from IDRC. The bulk of 
the balance was to come from commissions ($7.5 million) and other grants ($6.5 million). These 
projections were based on a Business Plan appended to the draft. However, there was a paucity of 
information about how these revenues would be developed. 
When the report went to SMC and the Board of Governors, discussion about potential revenues was 
of a general nature only: Revenue generation will take a number of forms: contract services royalty 
schemes, co funding program grants, and so on... The FoodLinks initiative has been well received by 
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private industry ... Efforts will continue to seek co funding. The budget appended to the report made 
scant mention of revenues. Showing expenditures of $1.4 million for the first six months operation and 
$2 million for the first full year operation, a note is added stating: IDRC will cover $1,200, 000 in Year 
1 and $1.3 million dollars in Year 2. The balance will be covered from revenue generated 
Given the fact that IDRC had closed its Agricultural Division, it was easy for some Board members to 
suspect that the initiative was motivated more by the supply of experts than the demand for the activity. 
One did not need to scratch very far beneath the surface to realize that, in spite of great revenue 
generating plans, FoodLinks continued to be 100% IDRC funded. 
5. LESSONS 
The FoodLinks experiment raises a number of significant issues, including the governance framework 
and managerial oversight necessary to embark on a highly innovative venture. Highly experimental 
ventures need relatively close monitoring, which appears to have been missing in the case of 
FoodLinks. One Board member noted that [Secretariats') independence is supposed to be an 
advantage but experience shows that they need close supervision. 
It could be argued that the upcoming end to the government's Early Departure Initiative program 
played a very large role in the decision to close the Secretariat and in the sudden clarity of vision about 
future chances of success. However, this factor played a part only in the timing of the decision since the 
decision to close FoodLinks had already been taken. Given the failure of Loblaws to continue with the 
banana before the Secretariat was approved in October 1997, the reasons given by SMC for the 
decision should have been known earlier. In other words, if it were not for the Early Departure 
Initiative program, IDRC might have found itself in a very unattractive financial situation similar to that 
of WETV. One Board member viewed the FoodLinks experiment as an exercise in career enhancement 
and management that never had any possibility of attracting additional funds. 
Out of this controversial experience, two compelling lessons emerge: the need for a fit with the 
organizational mission, and the need for objective, clear and concise information. 
ORGANIZATIONAL MISSION FIT 
As Peter Drucker has pointed out, with all organizations, missions come first. Organizations must 
focus on doing better what they already do well. The following critical questions must be asked: 
Does the opportunity or identified need fit us? Does it match our strengths? 
Are we likely to do a decent job? 
Are we competent and experienced in the area? 
Moving outside the realm of core mission can, and often does, lead to a breakdown of the organization 
and should be avoided. In the case of FoodLinks, IDRC was asked to bankroll an initiative that would 
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make most venture capital providers cringe. When asked to identify areas where Secretariats could 
improve significantly, one Board member responded that the funding mechanism should be looked at. 
In many cases, IDRC put money up front in the expectation that other funds would come, but they 
never materialized. A case of IDRC rushing where angels fear to tread. Clearly the expertise and 
capacity necessary for this kind of high risk entrepreneurial venture were not part of IDRC's stock and 
trade. 
OBJECTIVE, CLEAR, AND CONCISE INFORMATION 
Effective governance cannot be achieved if decision makers are not provided with clear and concise 
information. Certainly, in areas of innovation and experimentation, room must be made for some 
uncertainty. However, these areas of uncertainty should receive as much clinical precision as possible. 
The documentation provided to decision makers fell short of the standards necessary for informed 
decision making. First, the documentation was too long and too general to be meaningful to decision 
makers. At least two of these decision makers referred to it as techno-babble having the effect of 
obfuscating rather than informing. Another Board member commented: 
The termination of FoodLinks came as a complete surprise soon after the Board had 
approved its establishment. A letter from the Chair just arrived between Board meetings 
saying he had approved the management decision on the Board's behalf. But I can't recall 
any prior discussion of any possible concerns with the Board about FoodLinks. So it makes 
you wonder a bit about whether we really are receiving all the information we might and what 
might happen next. 
Whether this is intentional or not is an irrelevant discussion. It is easy to see how people can become 
caught-up in their work and slightly over-enthused about an idea. The point is that there is no substitute 
for precise and concise information when it comes to good decision making. 
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Unlike most other Secretariats, IMFN began outside of IDRC. In the late eighties and early nineties, 
countries around the world became more and more aware of the present generation's responsibilities 
regarding the Earth's forests and related resources. The need to manage them in a sustainable manner 
and to find new approaches to put sustainable management into actual practices became more and 
more obvious. 
The Model Forest concept itself emerged in Canada in 1991, at which time 10 model forests were 
established in major forest ecoregions of the country. The establishment of these forests was based on 
grass roots partnerships and the development of consensus and innovative approaches. A year later, at 
the 1992 Earth Summit, the Canadian government announced an initiative to develop this concept 
internationally and the International Model Forest Program was created. This International Model 
Forest Program was funded under the Green Plan and given a term of three years. 
Initial participation included Canada, Mexico, Russia and Malaysia, with 20 other countries expressing 
interest in joining the IMFN. The initial work was spearheaded by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade (DFAIT) and Natural Resources Canada, and managed out of the Global 
Issues Bureau in DFAIT. By 1995, there were 16 Model Forests in Canada, Mexico, Russia, and the 
U.S.A. 
After exploring several options, early in 1995, DFAIT and Natural Resources Canada asked IDRC to 
house the IMFN as a Secretariat. It was concluded that the goals of IMFN fitted well with IDRC's 
mandate and that there were a number of links with ongoing work supported by the Centre within the 
Biodiversity, Food Systems Under Stress, and Technology and Environment Themes. In addition, 
IDRC had a proven track record of expertise in sustainable forestry, as well as experience in research 
and capacity building in developing countries. However, it was IDRC's familiarity with international 
donors, the Secretariat model that it had been experimenting with, and the Centre's position as a 
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Canadian agency at arm's length from government that made it an ideal environment in which IMFN 
could thrive. 
At this time, IMFN was entering a more international and multi-donor phase of operation-one where 
common research and evaluation protocols and international networking experience were needed. It 
was concluded that the existing institutional structure did not provide an optimal mechanism for 
effective development and management of the network. Development of model forests in other 
interested countries and building of the network was constrained due to the fact that the international 
initiative remained essentially a Canadian government program. While this was a Canadian initiative, it 
was clear that, in the future, it would be better if Model Forests were perceived as relatively 
independent from the Canadian government and if it were to attract new participants and support from 
outside of Canada. Further, the $12.5 million budget for the three year program was the responsibility 
of DFAIT, and these funds would terminate on March 31, 1997. More efficient administration would 
be facilitated by bringing these projects under a single Secretariat and the framework would be in place 
to advance development of the IMFN and to secure the support of other governments and the donor 
community. 
On March 24, 1995, the IDRC Board of Governors, agreeing with this reasoning, passed a resolution 
authorizing the Centre to enter into negotiations and to conclude an agreement to house the IMFN 
Secretariat at IDRC. This agreement would enjoy the support of four Canadian partners: IDRC, 
NRCan-CFS, CIDA, and DFAIT. 
What is a Model Forest? 
A working scale forest encompassing a landscape that includes the full 
range of values associated with forests 
A partnership of people who are prepared to work together to help 
develop forests that are sustainable for future generations 
A grass roots approach in decision making that leads to collective and 
constructive activities and policies in the management offorests. 
2. CONTEXT 
The thinking behind moving IMFN to IDRC proved to be sound. The administrative and legal 
framework provided to Secretariats housed in IDRC appears to be ideal for both the Secretariat and 
the Centre. The legal framework provides IMFN with the organizational stability, visibility, and 
prestige required to progress effectively with its work. The administrative framework has two main 
benefits. First, it enables Secretariat staff to get on with their very focused work with a minimum of 
organizational complications or interference. However, it should be noted that the Executive Director 
spends a considerable amount of time ensuring that the appropriate people in IDRC know what IMFN 
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is doing and why. These exchanges are most often initiated by requests for administrative assistance or 
information about administrative matters. Second, the donors are pleased with the arrangement 
because they are assured that funds are managed in a responsible manner. 
The Secretariat receives broader program support from IDRC. It also enjoys a high level of political 
support that spans government agendas, because of the broad public appeal of the program and the 
high visibility and success it has enjoyed. There is a clear historical and ongoing link with the 
government's environmental policy and its international strategy and mandate with respect to forestry. 
IMFN is an important player since it deals with a key international sustainability issue with so many 
governments at a variety of levels. Further, the Secretariat enjoys public support due to growing 
awareness of the importance of retaining and maintaining world forests over the last two decades or so. 
In short, the values reflected in the Secretariat's mandate, vision, and activities are in accord with those 
of the public, as well as with broader government policy, and, as demonstrated by the involvement of 
many other that are seeking to promote and demonstrate sustainable forest management. 
Not mentioned in the rationale to move IMFN to IDRC was the well established technological 
infrastructure available through the Centre. Established technologic networks, coupled with IDRC's 
eight strategically located international field offices, considerably enhanced the Secretariat's 
performance ability. It also contributed to the involvement and building of stakeholder support in other 
countries and governments, adding to the already strong support from partners and donors. The strong 
relationship, based on common goals, developed with LACRO is an example. 
3. THE FUTURE OF IMFN 
Early in 1997 a decision was taken by the Steering Committee - IMFN's Canadian sponsors (IDRC, 
CIDA, DFAIT, and the Canadian Forest Service) - that they would continue supporting the 
Secretariat, but at a reduced level of funding until March 31, 2000. In the meantime, funding for new 
model forests will have to come from sources outside Canada. The future beyond March 2000 will be 
defined by the support obtained from other countries. In other words, if IMFN is to play a global role 
in forestry, global sponsors have to be found. 
To advance this policy decision, IMFN established an international consultation process. Canadian 
partners and IMFN have been working diligently to promote the model forest concept, assist in the 
development of model forests, and to internationalize the Network. The consultation process is aimed 
at advancing the dialogue on the future development of the IMFN and the formalization of its 
organizational arrangements with interested countries familiar with the model forest concept, or at 
various stages of pursuing their interest. A number of regional workshops were held to discuss the 
following issues: 
Refining the definition of a Model Forest 
Determining the interests and needs of individual countries 
Determining networking needs at national and international levels 
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Defining organizational structures, governance and coordination for the International 
Network 
Defining obligations in support of the International Network. 
Records of two of these 1998 consultation sessions (Tokyo and Oregon) have been published. Two 
other sets of consultations (Russia and the Southern Cone of South America) have been held. While 
the latter two workshop proceedings had not yet been published, based on the verbal summaries they 
received, evaluators concluded that these additional consultations produced results similar to those of 
the already published proceedings. These intensive consultations seem to indicate a very strong support 
for IMFN. The Oregon Report, based on workshops involving 74 international experts, concludes: 
The Network's focus on people, technologies and research, and on sustainable development, 
positions it well to address the broad range of issues associated with the rapidly changing 
interface between people and forests. The model forest concept can provide a link to 
understanding the interactions between societal values, benefits and forest management 
practices. Model forests represent an application at the local or field-level that can 
demonstrate this understanding and positively influence our natural resource management 
decisions and practices.... 
The advice from the working group deliberations focused on elements of the potential role for 
the Network as well as a coordinating body such as the IMFN Secretariat. The consensus of 
workshop participants was that networking in support of model forest initiatives needs to 
occur at local, regional, national and international levels and for networking to be effective 
and efficient it must be resourced and given structure and coordination. At the international 
level, there was seen to be a need for coordination and facilitation and the preferred 
mechanism was through an IMFN Secretariat which could focus efforts in a number of areas 





Networking and strategic alliances 
Leadership and principles 
Monitoring and evaluation. 
The conclusion drawn from the four consultations is that there is strong conceptual support for IMFN. 
Japan and the USA have also made substantial commitments to the process by way of funding 
international meetings and workshops. However, no solid financial commitments to the direct 
operating costs of IMFN have been made by interested nations. Should this continue to be the case, it 
is likely that IMFN will redefine its role beginning April 1, 2000. As one interviewee put it, IMFN must 
either fly [internationally] or fold. Another donor stated that the future of IMFN depends on external 
financing and interest in the network and particularly the core funding to run the Secretariat. The 
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collective funds from Canada are not going to be increased nor even maintained at current levels. All 
people interviewed about IMFN were concerned about being able to internationalize the network. 
Formal discussions are underway with 12 countries. As the Executive Director pointed out, if real 
support in terms of sponsorships is not forthcoming, Canadian sponsors will reassess their 
commitments. It was also pointed out that this support can come in many forms, including direct 
sponsorship of activities rather than grants to IMFN through IDRC. Many countries do not have 
mechanisms to flow funds to other governments. Therefore, the internationalization of IMFN may 
necessitate evolving into an international organization outside of IDRC. 
4. VISION, MISSION, AND OBJECTIVES 
The IMFN is built upon the belief that the sustainable management of forests is context-specific: social, 
cultural, economic, and ecological characteristics will influence forest management practices. The 
IMFN also believes that forests can be managed to meet environmental, and economic goals. The 
Network provides practitioners around the world with access to the best knowledge available on 
sustainable forest management and enables them to adapt and adopt that knowledge in keeping with 
their local conditions. A variety of working models of sustainable forest management can provide 
useful lessons to all nations struggling with policy and land-use planning conflicts. As the IMFN 
expands, the prospect for improving forest management on a global level increases. The IMFN vision 
is: 
To foster cooperation and collaboration in the advancement of management, conservation, 
and sustainable development of forest resources, through a world-wide network of working 
model forests. 
IMFN has carefully defined and limited itself to three critical objectives: 
To foster international cooperation and the exchange of ideas relating to the working 
concept of sustainable forestry 
To support international cooperation in critical aspects of forest science and social science 
that underlie the search for new models of forest management 
To support ongoing international discussions on the criteria and principles of sustainable 
development. 
Unlike most other Secretariats, IMFN has a truly global reach, encompassing both northern and 
southern countries. There are, for example, several model forests in countries that fall outside of 
IDRC's mandate. Perhaps because the idea is so compelling and so closely linked to the theme of 
sustainable development, this fact has not emerged as a policy issue in any of the interviews or other 
discussions about IMFN. 
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5. FUNDING AND FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
Sponsors can contribute in two ways: directly and indirectly. Indirect contributions play an important 
part in IMFN. In 1997/98, the USA and Japan sponsored IMFN international workshops and 
conferences, and this, along with contributions from other countries provided support to IMFN 
activities at an estimated value of $500,0000. In addition, Japan has earmarked funds contributed to 
FAO to be used in model forest development in the Asia region. The table below summarizes IIv1FN's 
sources of direct contributions. IMFN has committed funding until March 2000. Funds shown as 
contributed in 97/98 are intended to cover all IMFN costs until March 2000. Hence, the annual 
expenditure budget has decreased significantly. The sources of funding, in millions of dollars, are as 
follows: IDRC $1.3M; CIDA; $2.OM; DFAIT $4.3M; Canadian Forest Service $0.9; and 
SEMARNAP $1.2M. 
Of the total amount expended to date, 50% has gone to the direct support of model forests in Russia, 
Malaysia, and Mexico. The other 50% is taken up by operational costs, publications and other core 
expenses. 
IMFN SOURCE OF FUNDS 
Donor 95/96 96/97 97/98/99/00 
(3 fiscal y ears 
Total % 
DFAIT 2,968,000 1,300,000 4,268,000 44% 
CIDA 250,000 48,979 1,745,500 2,044,479 21% 
IDRC 290,000 500,000 500,000 1,290,000 13% 
SEMARNAP 1,200,000 1,200,000 12% 
CFS 317,500 600,000 917,500 9% 
Total 3,825,500 1,848,979 4,045,500 9,719,979 100% 
% Year 39% 19% 42% 100% 
6. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP 
Interviews with IDRC and IMFN staff and Advisory Committee members confirmed that much of the 
Secretariat's success emanates from solid strategic leadership. While it is clear who is in charge, the 
staff, donors, and IDRC officials are consulted widely on practices, administrative matters, and 
decisions to be taken. A great deal of effort is expended building and maintaining external relationships 
within the host organization, experts in the field, donors, and interested countries. There is a high level 
of respect for the leadership, a clear understanding of the mission, a concern about getting significant 
activities done well, and an openness to new ideas from all sources. This is particularly evident in the 
way in which staff are involved in work planning and strategy setting. For example, the annual budget 
and work planning processes include all Secretariat staff. The result is that all staff have an intimate 
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knowledge of objectives, processes and direction. A strong participatory philosophy - driven by the 
belief that, if people are to be fully engaged and perform to their maximum level, they need to 
understand how what they do fits with the whole operation - is at work in IMFN. 
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
Housed at IDRC, IMFN is subject to the rules and regulations governing Secretariats. IMFN is headed 
by an Executive Director who is supported by four staff members. It receives policy direction from a 
Steering Committee of donors and IDRC representatives, the Chair and the President's Designate. 
Formally, the Steering Committee meets twice a year, but it is in frequent contact with the Executive 
Director between meeting. The President's Designate is a member of IDRC's Senior Management 
Committee (SMC). He provides close liaison between the Secretariat and SMC. In addition, an IDRC 
Vice President chairs the Steering Committee and provides ongoing support and advice to the 
Executive Director. 
The Executive Director and his staff provide day-to-day coordination for the Network. IMFN is 
continuously engaged in fostering the interchange of information and experience within the Network. It 
serves as a channel for the introduction of new ideas and technologies, the use of the results of 
scientific research in improving the performance and output of Model Forests, and the planning and 
organization of workshops, seminars and discussions. The Secretariat's tasks include promotion, 
coordination, administration, fund-raising, technical advice and guidance, and public relations. The 
IMFN Secretariat is involved in a variety of activities designed to strengthen and expand the Network 
and its impact on improving the management of the world's forests on a sustainable and 
environmentally-friendly basis. These activities include: network development, communications, 
services to Model Forests, assistance for new Model Forests, contacts, and public relations. 
7. ACTIVITIES AND PERFORMANCE 
IMFN's performance can be measured in four ways: 
Number of Model Forests 
Internal and external reputation 
Amount of activity generated and its impact 
Financial viability. 
NUMBER OF MODEL FORESTS 
Since the IMFN moved to IDRC, four new Model Forests have been established, namely: one 
additional one in Mexico, one in Chili, and two new ones in Japan. Further, because of IMFN's work, 
Japan has taken the initiative to earmark FAO funds for a model forest in Asia. 
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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REPUTATION 
Like EEPSEA, IMFN enjoys a very positive reputation, both inside IDRC and outside. When ranking 
the degree to which Secretariats have met their expectations on a five point scale (from 1 - not at all, 
to S - completely), interviewees frequently used IMFN as an example of a five. HVIFN is often used as 
an example of excellent Secretariat-IDRC relations. Further, it is almost always used as one of three 
examples of well-functioning Secretariats, the other two being EEPSEA and Bellanet. Relations 
between IDRC and IMFN are strong. Secretariat staff observe that they receive from IDRC all the 
support that they ask for. Much of this positive relationship is due to the attitude of the Executive 
Director who believes that good relationships are essential for getting things done quickly and 
smoothly. 
Externally, IMFN enjoys a high level of recognition, both in Canada and abroad. Model forests are an 
important part of a national strategic interest for Canada to demonstrate its commitment to sustainable 
forest management. Some believe that Canada's interest in Model Forests is an important way to 
respond to criticisms about clear cutting in Canada emanating from Greenpeace and some European 
countries. 
Nevertheless, IMFN is seen to have strong links to Canadian foreign policy. One interviewee identified 
IMFN's major accomplishment as having show-cased Canada as a leader in forest management and 
indicated that it is largely responsible for any credibility Canada currently has in forestry management. 
He added that Canada is solely responsible for keeping the idea of model forests alive internationally. 
The model forest idea is very attractive - people need very little convincing about why it is important. 
Donors commented that IMFN has led to positive perceptions of IDRC. One sponsor commented that: 
IDRC can be congratulated for its dedication and commitment. [They] were very attentive in giving 
IMFN the profile that it needs. IDRC is doing the necessary and then some. Another noted: I have a 
better sense now than before of how IDRC operates. They have been light on their feet. [The 
Executive Director] seems to have the autonomy and the support that he needs and I can't think of 
anywhere else in Ottawa where that particular balance could be achieved as well. 
Internationally, there is little doubt that IMFN is respected, but efforts to internationalize the 
Secretariate by attracting sponsors from other countries have not been very successful so far. Frequent 
references are made internationally to IMFN and its work, including in FAO reports and in the work of 
the World Commission of Sustainable Forestry and others. 
ACTIVITY GENERATED 
Since moving to IDRC, IMFN has, in addition to making numerous presentations at international 
conferences, successfully undertaken a number of major activities: 
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February 1996 - IMFN led two missions to South America to explore expanding the 
Network to Chile and Ecuador. Following the mission, Chile signed an agreement with 
IMFN to proceed with the development of a Model Forest 
April 1996 - A discussion paper on the way ahead, entitled Structures and Strategies, 
was prepared and tabled with Network members (approximately 600) 
May 1996 - A workshop was held in Cordoba (Argentina), providing an overview of the 
diverse conditions and problems relating to forestry in Argentina. Argentina committed, in 
an agreement with IMFN, to proceed with developing Model Forests, and an Argentinian 
selection committee was created to set up a process to review proposals 
May 1996 - A mission to Vietnam and Japan offered the opportunity to explore Model 
Forest possibilities in these countries 
May 1996 - An agreement was signed by IMFN and the IDRC Latin America and 
Caribbean Regional Office to join efforts to expand the Network in Latin America 
June 1996 - Discussions with German and British officials were held in Germany on 
Network activities 
July 1996 - Discussions on expanding Model Forests in Mexico resulted in a third 
Mexican Model Forest encompassing Monarch butterfly reserves 
September 1996 - Information sessions and tours to Vietnam, Japan, USA, South Africa, 
and Indonesia were organized to explore Model Forest partnerships 
September 1996 North American Regional Public Hearing of the World Commission of 
Forests and Sustainable Development were held in Winnipeg and featured the Model 
Forest concept. Mexico, USA and Canada reported on their experiences. A tour of the 
Manitoba Model Forest was offered 
October 1996 - Missions from Chile, Argentina, and Japan were hosted by IMFN and 
Canadian Model Forests 
October 1996 - The first IMFN Forum was held in Mexico and attracted more than 250 
participants 
November 1996 - An international workshop highlighting Model Forests was held in 
Kochi Japan, following which discussion were held about two proposed Model Forests in 
Japan 
January 1997 - The Canadian government approved financing for a three-year transition 
period (March 1997-March 2000) to support the establishment of the JMFN as a truly 
international institution through, among other things, forming alliances and 
internationalizing the Network's financing and governance 
March 1997 - A Model Forest workshop was held in Malawi 
May 1997 - The People Growing with Forests conference showcased Canada's Model 
Forest program in Manitoba 
May 1997 - A Commonwealth Forestry Conference was held in Zimbabwe 
September 1997 - An International Conference on Sustainable Forest Management was 
held in Prince George, B.C. 
October 1997 - The Xlt World Forestry Congress was held in Antalya (Turkey), 
following which a consultation process to determine the future of the IMFN was agreed 
upon. Member countries reported on their positive experiences with IMFN and described 
plans to increase the number of Model Forests within their countries. Benefits of 
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membership in the Network were positively assessed. China, Australia, United Kingdom, 
and South Africa discussed the possibility of joining IMFN. All countries present agreed to 
engage in a collective dialogue and to participate in meetings over the next 18 months to 
provide perspectives on their needs and expectations from the Network. The consultation 
process in brief would allow members to: 
Refine the definition of a Model Forest 
Determine the interests and needs of individual countries 
Determine networking needs at national and international levels 
Define organizational structures, governance, and coordination for the International 
Network 
Define obligations in support of the International Network. 
March 1998 - Consultations were held in Japan and Chile 
March 1998 - An Assembly of Model Forests was held in Portland, Oregon 
April 1998 - Consultations were held in Russia, following a Model Forest Workshop. 
IMPACT 
At this point in time, although often found attractive in theory, the model forest idea remains unproven 
in practice. It is simply too early to determine if model forests do make a real difference in the way 
forests are managed. Started in Canada as an experiment six years ago, Model Forests are a national 
program. After first five years of operation, an extension was granted for another five because more 
time was considered necessary for them to demonstrate positive impact. Therefore, it has not yet been 
determined whether Model Forests have been successful in the sense of demonstrating positive impact. 
A comprehensive evaluation will be made towards the end of the second five year period. 
Similarly, international networking about model forests remains a theoretically sound idea and has 
already shown some value added effects. However, the idea has not been assessed in practice and the 
impacts have not been determined yet. Consequently, countries considering supporting the network 
financially are reluctant to institutionalize the idea. IMFN is clearly in the middle of a developmental 
phase with little knowledge of where the experiment will lead. Since most of the experience with model 
forests resides in Canada, the international networking experiment will likely be evaluated in parallel 
with the evaluation of the national program. 
As we have seen, however, IMFN has already had considerable impact. It has facilitated the creation of 
new model forests, provided a focal point for multi-disciplinary interest in the topic, and offered a new 
approach to dealing with a global environmental and sustainable development issue. Moreover, there is 
considerable evidence that the activity of the Secretariat is recognized, nationally and internationally, as 
significant work. For example, the 1997 Annual Report of Japan's Forestry Agency describes the first 
two Japanese model forests as part of Japan's contribution to international sustainable forest 
management. Attention is drawn in this report to the cooperation links with model forests in other 
countries and to the support provided through the network. Similarly, the Report of the Working 
Group on Community Involvement in Forest Management to the UN Intergovernmental Panel on 
Forestry, entitled Communities and Forest Management in Canada and the United States, highlights 
Canada's exceptional international leadership in this area. In yet another example, IMFN is referenced 
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on page 4, as an important part of Canada's National Forest Strategy and contribution internationally. 
Under the framework for action: 
[Canada] will maintain, enhance and demonstrate the contribution that forest ecosystems 
make to the health of the planet... By cooperating with countries and with regional and 
international organizations on research and forest policy development through initiatives 
such as the International Model Forest Network.... 
8. LESSONS 
Key lessons gleaned from the IMFN experience encompass lessons on environments conducive to the 
good performance of Secretariats, the importance of building strong and supportive relationships, the 
ability to experiment with innovative approaches to deal with an uncertain future, and the importance 
of having national backing, and the fit with national policy. 
CoNnucm ENVIRONMENT 
IDRC has proved to be an excellent host for IMFN. It was able to receive existing functions from 
other Canadian departments and quickly establish a credible Secretariat. The transition was extremely 
smooth and the arrangement proved to be productive. Contributing departments and donors are very 
satisfied with the transition and oversight provided by IDRC. Contributors all noted that their view of 
IDRC improved significantly after IMFN was transferred. This positive perception is echoed by the 
Executive Director who has experience in several other Canadian government departments: 
Having worked in lots of dterent organizations and organizational cultures, IDRC is a treat - it is very conducive to accomplishing some real achievements. It is a very positive 
environment with a high level of professionalism. 
These positive observations are a strong indicator that IDRC is able to host highly innovative 
organizations in a way that fosters creativity. In this sense, IDRC has reached what so many other 
organizations find extremely difficult to find - a balance between accountability and autonomy. 
Attesting to this fact is the consistency of the views of interviewees and the ability of IMFN to operate 
relatively autonomously and very effectively at an international level. Also attesting to this finding is the 
1998 Internal Audit of IMFN which found nothing of substance to criticize about its operation, 
compliance with rules, procedures, probity, and so forth. This ability to be flexible and relatively 
autonomous is particularly critical to IMFN's sphere of influence because model forests cut across 
many jurisdictions, (levels of government and sectors) and disciplines (water, agriculture, forestry, 
indigenous people, environmental protection, etc.). 
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BUILDING STRONG AND SUPPORTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 
Very much interrelated to the first lesson is the finding that time spent building strong and mutually 
supportive relationships is a high-return investment in terms of the smoothness of operations and the 
ability to focus on outputs and on the mission at hand. The Executive Director's approach is to solve 
issues before they become problems. This approach is particularly important in the IDRC Secretariat, 
mainly because there is no single point of entry between Secretariats and the rest of IDRC - that is, 
no single responsibility centre to steward, or speak for Secretariats. This fact alone demands that, to be 
successful, Secretariats must carefully nurture a variety of relationships within IDRC at all levels. 
Although the Executive Director was recruited from outside IDRC, he took the time to learn the 
culture and to develop a clear understanding of what his role, responsibilities, and functions and those 
of IDRC were. Further, he has not treated the relationship as a static one, understanding that IDRC is 
an organization constantly evolving to address issues in a changing Canadian climate and in a dynamic 
global environment. 
These strong relationships have been established on four levels: between IMFN and IDRC, between 
the Executive Director and staff, between IMFN and Steering Committee members, and between 
IMFN and its network members. About 30% of the Executive Director's time is spent on nurturing 
relationships between IDRC and IMFN. The result is that IDRC staff view IMFN very positively and 
are happy to assist them in any way they can. About another 30% is spent with his staff, who, 
according to interviews, are highly motivated and positively engaged in their work. They are also 
highly supportive of the host organization. Relationships with the Steering Committee are very strong. 
Frequent informal communications occur between meetings. Communication with the Chair of the 
Steering Committee occurs on a monthly basis. Based on Workshop reports, members of the 
international network view the work of IMFN as valuable and very professional. 
EXPERIlVIENTATION, PLANNING, AND UNCERTAINTY 
IMFN is unique in that it is actively taking charge of its own future. One of its key objective is to 
internationalize and is prepared to radically restructure, metamorphose into an international institution 
if necessary, and even close if this objective is not met. Other Secretariats have not shown this level of 
organizational maturity, in that they seem unable to visualize in any meaningful way the fact that the job 
they set out to do may be either over, finished, or not worth pursuing. The trajectory set by IMFN is 
bold and involves a great deal of organizational risk. 
However, there is a more important and more subtle lesson to be learned from the IMFN experiment 
which highlights one of the hitherto unmentioned advantages of Secretariats. They constitute a 
relatively low cost way of experimenting with new and innovative approaches in an environment where 
risks are relatively controlled. By spreading funding, it is possible to somewhat reduce the risk. In 
addition, Secretariats can be started and just as quickly stopped. Relatively bold experiments can occur 
without precluding what the results might be. Here we are reminded of Dror's belief that many of our 
traditional approaches to public management are ineffective in dealing with new and most often unique 
problems created by globalization. Governments, he argues, should be spending even small amounts of 
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their resources on bold new ways of addressing emerging issues that transcend all boarders. Indeed, 
one of the key advantages of Secretariats is that they make it possible to do just that - IMFN is a 
perfect example. 
NATIONAL BACKING AND POLICY FIT 
It is clear that the IMFN idea would not have been started, nor proceeded very far, without national 
backing. As it is advancing the government's public policy objectives, it has the active support of most 
of the relevant government departments. It seems that Secretariats that are in harmony with other 
related policy initiatives can generate the kind of support enjoyed by IMFN. By contrast, Secretariats 
not enjoying this support have a great deal more difficulty achieving any degree of success. SIFR, for 
example, offers an equally compelling idea but lacks the official backing of Canada's Department of 
Fisheries. 
This observation may be troublesome to some who believe that IDRC, with its pure research role, is 
independent of the policies of the government of the day but others would argue that IDRC is 
becoming more responsive to public policy. Examples include involvement in Eastern Europe and 
advice to the South African government on organization and governance issues. An important 
observation is that IDRC is not static. It is an evolving organization responding to a rapidly changing 
environment. 
Needless to say, it is beyond the scope of this Review to address this issue. However, even though 
there is some tension between IDRC's policy framework and some of the activities it is involved with 
outside this framework, two observations should be made. First, the general trend in public 
administration-highlighted in Canada by the recent budget review methodology - is toward 
abandoning activities that have no direct public policy purpose. Second, it is to IDRC's credit that it 
has a mechanism like Secretariats that can quickly and holistically respond to emerging international 
issues and circumstances that other departments cannot respond to because of jurisdictional and 
national boundaries. Rather than being problematic, this may be a key advantage of Secretariats that 




IMFN Annual Reports 
IMFN Internal Audit, June 1998 
IMFN Structures and Strategies Draft Discussion Paper, April 1996 
IMFN Publications (Model Forest Program in Russia, Mexico, etc.) 
IMFN Proposals (Chihuahua, Calakmul, etc.) 
IMFN Web-site 
IMFN, International Model Forest Network Oregon Workshop, 1998 
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IMFN International Workshop: Record of Workshop Discussions, 1998 
Annual Report on Trends of Forestry, Forestry Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, Japan, 1997 
Communities and Forest Management in Canada and the United States, Working 
Group on Community Involvement in Forest Management, 1998 
National Forest Strategy - 1998-2003 
Interviews with Executive Director, Steering Committee, IDRC Governors, senior 
management and staff and Secretariat staff. 
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INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO IMTIATIVE 
(IT!) 
(NOW RITC: RESEARCH FOR INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO CONTROL) 
CASE STUDY 
1. GENESIS 
Globally, tobacco-related diseases are the most important preventable health problem with a 
cumulative mortality exceeding rates for AIDS, tuberculosis, and complications of childbirth 
combined. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that tobacco use kills three million 
people each year, and that deaths related to tobacco will rise to ten million each year by 2020 - 70% 
of the deaths will be in developing countries. In developing countries, with little or no regulation of the 
industry, consumption is growing rapidly, stimulated by the few multinationals that control most of the 
world's tobacco industry. 
In low-income countries, tobacco production threatens sustainable environments while tobacco 
consumption threatens sustainable and equitable development. Until recently, this threat has not been 
seen as a development issue. However, due to success in the North, led by Canada, in arresting and 
reversing the smoking epidemic, the focus of the tobacco industry is increasingly centered on 
populations in developing economies. The experience of Canada and other industrialized countries 
demonstrates that successful measures to reduce tobacco consumption depend upon comprehensive 
and consistent public policy, underpinned by substantial multi-disciplinary research. Canada and other 
industrialized countries have valuable tobacco control experience to share with developing countries. 
Over a one-year period, an IDRC working group compiled a catalogue of the resources and issues 
surrounding tobacco and international development. They concluded that there is an inter-disciplinary 
leadership vacuum and an urgent need for a coordinated and enhanced effort to support policy-relevant 
research directed at minimizing the negative developmental effects of tobacco production and 
consumption. Consequently, in 1994, IDRC initiated a project called the International Tobacco 
Initiative (ITI), to deal with this issue which was reviewed by SMC in August 1994 and approved by 
the Board of IDRC on October 20, 1994. 
LEARNING PARTNERSHIPS: A REVIEW OFIDRC SECRETARIATS 161 CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
2. CONTEXT 
The economic, social and environmental implications of tobacco are extensive. For example, directly 
related medical expenses and loss of productivity due to tobacco use total more than $100 billion US 
per year. The World Bank estimates the cost to be $208 billion US. However, despite these high costs, 
tobacco is an alluring business. In addition to being a cash crop growing in soils which will support 
few other crops, it offers huge export opportunities, and a ready source of tax revenue. 
A number of serious environmental problems are also associated with tobacco including: deforestation 
to grow crops, wood burning curing systems, and the fact that, in tropical soils, tobacco depletes soil 
nutrients faster than any other crop. Social problems abound. Overall health care costs of tobacco- 
related diseases, effects on the health of infants of smoking mothers, and the fact that in many poor 
countries families spend up to 5% of their income on tobacco products are examples. These factors 
create complex development issues. It is critical that efforts to decrease demand for tobacco are 
complemented by the development of lucrative alternative crops and enterprises for those individuals 
and governments which have grown to rely upon tobacco's profits. 
Combating tobacco's negative effects is one thing, dealing objectively with the economic realities and 
practical public policy constraints is another. Bringing them together provided what seemed to be an 
ideal niche for IDRC. Before ITI, there was no comprehensive approach or substantial multi- 
disciplinary research to deal with this development problem. 
3. MISSION, OBJECTIVES AND GOALS 
ITI's mission is to provide a strong funding, research, analysis, and knowledge base for the 
development of policies that would minimize the threat posed by tobacco production and consumption 
to sustainable and equitable development in the developing world. The initiative has as its overall goals 
to support the strategic research and partnerships required for the development of effective tobacco 
control policies and programs and to support an investment in southern capacity to sustain such 
programs. There were four sub-goals: strategizing, capacity building, research, and information 
dissemination. These were spelled out in considerable detail in the Formation Memorandum to IDRC 
Senior Management Committee and are repeated here because one of the central lessons to be learned 
from ITI is the need to have a very sharp focus, narrow enough to apply limited resources and achieve 
noticeable results. Each of these sub-goals had specific objectives and identified outputs or 
performance standards that are summarized below. 
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STRATEGY 1: ESTABLISHMENT OF ITI 
Objective 1: to promote multi-donor participation in the development of ITI's program 
Announcement by IDRC and other committed donors at the 1st World Conference on Tobacco and Health 
in Paris, 1994 
Donor meeting on the agenda of the IXth World Conference to be hosted by IDRC 
Through working on the planning committee, the placement of tobacco's implications for women on the 
agenda of The United Nations Ivth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 1995 
Launch of an electronic donor network discussion. 
Performance Standard 
IDRC's leadership established in a coordinated multi-agency effort 
Assured funding base provided by national and international donors 
Elevated profile of tobacco production and consumption as a threat to sustainable and equitable 
development. 
Objective 2: To establish the Steering Committee, Staff ITI and build relationships 
Gather a group of financially committed donors, participants from southern organizations, and subject area 
experts for the Steering Committee 
Appoint a high profile individual with a successful track record as program coordinator. 
Performance Standard 
Effective and mutually supportive relationships between Centre Programs, SMC, the Centre as a 
sponsoring agent, the Steering Committee and the organizations they represent, ITI, and the benefactors. 
Objective 3: To prepare ITI's goals, objectives and work plan 
Building upon work already completed at IDRC, prepare an assessment of needs in basic and applied 
research to support tobacco policy development in the developing world. 
Performance Standards 
Focused and attainable goals and objectives 
Multi-disciplinary research strategy 
Harmonized relationship between ITI and others already active in the field. 
STRATEGY 2: CAPACITY BUILDING 
Objective 1: to promote and support contact between experienced tobacco control advocates and researchers from the 
developin world 
Conduct guided research activities to capitalize upon the existing expertise in tobacco control and to 
facilitate linkages between experts 
Prepare a roster of international human and organizational resources in tobacco control 
Support participation in conferences and workshops. 
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Performance Standard 
A resource network in the South with expertise in research and action for developing effective tobacco 
control legislation. 
Objective 2: To develop education/training systems and tools to promote the expertise required to develop tobacco control 
no lacy 
Support specialized expertise programs for training in the fields of information sciences and systems, 
epidemiology, health promotion, health economics, agriculture and environmental science, social policy, 
and legislation making, as related to tobacco control. 
Performance Standard 
The creation of a pool of knowledgeable people throughout the South with the capacity to gather, analyze 
and act upon data concerning the consequences of tobacco production, use and control. 
Objective 3: To mobilize both beneficiaries and potential losers of tobacco control efforts 
As a part of each activity, the impact upon stakeholders will be analyzed. All activities must occur with an 
awareness of who the potential beneficiaries and losers of tobacco control activities. 
Performance Standard 
Minimized harmful impact upon those gaining their livelihood from tobacco production, manufacturing or 
marketing. 
STRATEGY 3: STRATEGIC RESEARCH 
Objective 1: to provide technical, material and financial support for tobacco research in the realms of economics, health, 
informatics, the environment, agriculture and social sciences 
Research agenda responding to the demands of the South and reflecting priorities of social development, 
economic management, and a sustainable use of the environment. 
Performance Standards 
Applied research which is credible, action oriented, and country specific upon which to base 
comprehensive and appropriate policies to control tobacco 
Intensive and effective local tobacco control activities with potential spin-offs for other countries. 
STRATEGY 4: INFORMATION DISSEMINATION-INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION, EDUCATION 
SYSTEMS THROUGHOUT THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
Objective 1: To promote attention to tobacco issues amongst donor organizations 
An electronic donor network discussion has already been launched, bringing the issues of tobacco to the 
attention of donor groups. 
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Performance Standard 
The promotion of inter-agency links in tobacco-related activities and the development of innovative 
activities. 
Objective 2: To maximize impact upon policy makers regarding the priority of concerns of tobacco consumption an d 
production 
Prepare a review of best practices in tobacco control in health promotion, taxation and legislation, advocacy, 
and regulation of the tobacco industry 
Support systematic surveillance information systems to survey, analyze and report data on tobacco-related 
disease incidence, knowledge, attitudes and behaviors surrounding tobacco use, effects of tobacco production 
on agricultural systems and the environment, and effects of tobacco production, use and manufacturing on 
the economy of specific nations 
Develop an electronic atlas of tobacco control for developing countries in which data, research findings, and 
successful strategies relevant to policy formulation could be accumulated and accessed for legislation 
development. 
Performance Standards 
Increased knowledge of successes and failures in tobacco control 
Increased access to country-specific data on research findings to support policy development. 
Objective 3: To disseminate awareness of the implications of tobacco use to the public 
Provide support for activities on the implications of tobacco use, through formal medical, public health and 
educational venues, and through informal venues reaching a wide audience. 
Performance Standard 
Increased public awareness of the implications of smoking. 
4. FUNDING AND FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
All funding for ITI came from Canadian sources. For the first three years of operation, IDRC 
promised $1.25M, Health Canada $850,000 and CIDA $2M. At the outset, ITI envisioned that it 
would leverage funds by receiving donations from many other agencies including: WHO, 
International Union Against Cancer, Canadian Society for International Health, International Agency 
for Research on Cancer, Canadian Cancer Society, American Cancer Society, International Union of 
Health Education, International Union Against Tuberculosis, World Bank, USAID, The Carter Center, 
The Rockefeller Foundation, the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, SAREC, DANIDA, and 
NORAD. However, the initial expectations that the Initiative would mobilize funding from additional 
donors and partners over and above the $4.15M pledged was never realized. 
As it turned out, IDRC and Health Canada were to be the only contributors until very recently. As of 
January 1998, only Health Canada has contributed $.85M of the $2.9M anticipated from outside 
sources. The lack of follow through on CIDA's part is attributable to a combination of reasons. First, 
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when ITI was proposed, and CIDA was enthusiastically supportive, IDRC had an active Health 
Sciences division that was eliminated during reorganization. Many people outside IDRC were upset 
about this move, viewing it as the end of health research at IDRC. Second, as we will see further on, 
IDRC was very slow in adequately staffing ITI, a second signal raising questions for prospective 
partners. 
However, in M's March 1998 Financial Statement, it is indicated that a contribution agreement of 
$465,000 from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency is in the final stages of 
negotiation. This has since materialized. In addition, CIDA's interest has been rekindled - a point to 
which we will return. 
ITI SOURCES OF FUNDS 
Donor 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 Total % 
IDRC 1,250,000 1,000,000 2,250,000 73% 
Health Canada 250,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 850,000 27% 
Total 1,500,000 200,000 200,000 1,200,000 3,100,000 100% 
% Year 48% 6% 6% 39% 100% 
Of the $3,100,000 actual contributions to date, ITI has expended $1,161,585 during its three and a half 
years of operation. At March 1998 fiscal year end, ITI showed a current fund balance of $2,377,896 
made up of the $1,200,000 contribution for the current year and an unexpended balance of $1,177,896. 
For the fiscal year ending March 31, 1997, ITI expended $204,001 on program activities and 
$235,481 on management and administration, spending $439,482 of the planned expenditure of 
$1,177,896 for the year. The picture for year ending March 1998 was almost identical: $248,098 of a 
budgeted $1,056,097 were expended on program activities; $218,432 of $311,838 were expended on 
management and administration. With the appointment of the new Executive Director and two new 
full time professional staff members in 1998, these ratios have dramatically improved. As of 30 
September 1998, program expenditures have reached 60% of total expenditures. 
According to ITI, this lower than planned level of activity in 1997/98 is attributable to the fact that it 
was a transitional year. The transition entailed augmenting the staff from one project coordination 
position to two and appointing a part time Executive Director to devote 30% of his time to ITI. No 
explanation for this variance was given in the 1997 year-end report. 
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5. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
In August 1994, ITI was approved by the Board of Governors as a Project and not as a Secretariat. In 
doing so, the Board agreed the IDRC could administer $2.9 million provided by CIDA and Health 
Canada. However, the CIDA money was never forthcoming. 
ITI has a Steering Committee that meets annually. It also has a President's Designate and Program 
Contact with IDRC. Unlike most other Secretariats, ITI does not have a full time Executive Director. 
Perhaps because of the funding difficulties with CIDA, financial problems prevented this essential step 
from happening. 
Two years after the establishment of ITI, internal correspondence indicates that IDRC managers were 
still very uncertain about what to do. In March 1996, the ITI Coordinator (on a one day a week 
contract filling in for someone on maternity leave) raised concerns about ITI's status and reporting 
relationships. She wondered whether ITI could be designated a Secretariat, and questioned the 
appointment of a new coordinator, who had little background in tobacco issues, and to whom she 
would report. The Acting Coordinator raised other concerns about an internal advisory committee that 
met sporadically and rotated the chair to various people including the Acting Coordinator. 
In management's response, ITI was described as still finding its feet and consideration was said to be 
given to linking ITI to the Healthy Public Policies Program Initiative. This was seen as advantageous in 
that it strengthened linkages between programs. It was concluded that if ITI evolves into something 
more visible, perhaps seeking additional funding and perhaps being led by an international figure, 
the reporting relationship to a Program Officer might be reviewed. In conclusion, it was suggested that 
the link with another Program Initiative was most attractive and, as such, ITI could report to two 
people for administrative purposes. 
If the lack of follow through on funding commitments by CIDA can perhaps be blamed for the lack of 
initiative in appointing an Executive Director, it was clear to everyone that little progress was being 
made. Sadly, this situation was to continue for another two years. The next management decision was 
to supply ITI with an external Executive Director who was hired as a consultant on a 1-2 day a week 
basis and rarely spent time in the ITI office. Several interviewees pointed out that the two people 
involved during the first four year period lacked the core competencies to do the job. They were 
characterized as lacking substantive expertise, not having international experience, not understanding 
research, and having no development expertise or experience. Further, interviewers were told that 
office politics caused ongoing problems during this period and the individuals assigned either part or 
full time struggled for control of the fledgling organization. For most of its life, then, ITI has, in effect, 
gone without an Executive Director. 
In December 1997, as the term of the part-time external Executive Director ended, the Chair of the 
Steering Committee wrote to the President of IDRC saying that ITI had developed a new program and 
funding strategy and believed that it could expand its donor group. The new program depended on a 
dramatic increase in staff positions: a full time Executive Director, two program officers and 
administrative assistance. It also needed more financial support from IDRC. A further $1 million was 
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requested for a two year period beginning in January 1998. If IDRC was unwilling to provide the 
necessary resources, the Steering Committee proposed that the Secretariat be closed. There was an 
idea that it could be transferred outside IDRC to another host institution. 
IDRC's response was to provide the additional $1 million and to assign a senior qualified IDRC 
program officer as Executive Director on a part-time basis (30%). It remains to be seen if this will be 
enough of his time. ITI has recruited two qualified Program Officers within the last few months. With 
support staff, they now seem to have a critical mass with which to move forward. The new team has 
already begun to make a difference having refocused their objectives, secured funding from Sweden, 
and have rekindled CIDA's interest. IDRC is beginning to look more committed to the International 
Tobacco Initiative. 
6. ACTIVITIES AND PERFORMANCE 
The 1994 Project Summary Memorandum establishing ITI was approved by IDRC Senior 
Management Committee, but was not forwarded to the Board of Governors. This document contains 
an extensive list of suggested activities and performance standards related to each of the four goals. 
These activities are summarized in Section 3 above. 
Needless to say, the expectations raised by these strategies, objectives, and activities are colossal. The 
resources required to meet most of the performance standards would be enormous. Within the 
parameters of this Review, it is difficult to ascertain with any precision the degree to which some of the 
objectives have been met. Until very recently, annual expenditures on programs - including research, 
capacity building, country activities, and information dissemination - have been relatively low. Annual 
expenditure for these programs has been around $180,000 for the past three years. 





Program for Appropriate Technology Health (PATH Canada) - $31,000. 
Smoking Behaviour and Attitudes (Turkey) - $51,410 
Comprehensive Tobacco Control Research Program for South Africa - ($300,000) 
Economics of Shifting from Tobacco: a micro-level study and action project (India) - 
$242,560 
Six other small grants averaging $20,000 to various research organizations and conference 
organizers. 
Under these grants, the following projects have been completed: Political Mapping for Tobacco 
Control (Vietnam), Smoking Behaviour and Attitudes (Turkey), and two components of the 
Comprehensive Tobacco Control Research Program for South Africa. Active projects include: 
Economics of Shifting from Tobacco: A Micro-Level Study and Action Project (India), Tobacco 
Control Strategies Phase II (Turkey), and Cigarette Consumption, Production and Taxation Policy 
(China). 
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ITI has also been working with other organizations to help develop national strategies for tobacco 
control within regional settings. Regional meetings are organized for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(August 1998), Asia (November 1998), and Africa (January 1999). There is also a collaborative 
project between ITI and the Ecosystem Health Program Initiative on Tobacco Growing and Ecosystem 
Effects being funded by the Special Program Funds of Programs Branch. 
ITI has had some important early successes. The first was at the meeting in Bellagio, Italy, which was 
organized by ITI in June 1995. It brought tobacco control experts and activists together with agencies 
which had already a stake in the international tobacco control scene and those who were not yet 
convinced that it was a serious development issue. ITI successfully brought all groups to share a 
common framework which resulted in the influential Bellagio Statement on Tobacco Control and 
Sustainable Development. This statement has been reprinted many times and affirms the importance of 
tobacco consumption as a development priority which cuts across the fields of health but also social 
and economic development and environmental sustainability. IDRC was asked to lead a round-table 
process among agencies to develop a global partnership for tobacco control. This meeting put ITI and 
IDRC on the international tobacco control map. More recently, the very stringent tobacco control 
legislation in South Africa certainly owes something to the ITI funded project and to the related ITI- 
supported conference on Towards an Optimal Policy Mix for Tobacco Control in South Africa, held 
early in 1998, which the Minister for Health attended. 
Unfortunately, through the early years, there was ineffective follow-up by ITI, which is only now being 
turned around. The first three and a half years of ITI's existence were marked by weak and sporadic 
leadership and a commitment by IDRC that appeared questionable to existing and potential partners. 
When asked the reasons for this seeming lack of action or attention on the part of IDRC, one 
respondent answered that there were really a multitude of problems: the changes and reductions at 
IDRC that occupied much attention and energy; IDRC's change in mandate that jeopardized funding; 
internal administrative problems; office politics; lack of an empowered, capable Executive Director; 
lack of capacity to deliver on program objectives; lack of intellectual or knowledge capacity in the 
subject area to a point where existing staff, as sparse as they were, could not implement programs they 
knew little about. The respondent continued: 
And besides, most people at IDRC are overworked. We've lost lots of competent staff. This 
caused turmoil and a tendency to be overly inward looking. In the end, nothing gets attended 
to until a crisis occurs. It is a reactive rather than a pro-active organization. 
The inattention to the monitoring and evaluation of this initiative appears all too obvious. In the 
Inception Memorandum, a commitment was made to ensure ongoing evaluation of the progress and 
impact of the Secretariat. An evaluation strategy and performance indicators were to be incorporated 
into the design of the projects in order to provide information to: 
Monitor and report on ITI's progress towards its objectives 
Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ITI's activities 
Document ITI's impact. 
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The Review team was unable to find any evidence of this commitment having been met. Further, key 
informants reported that they have little or no information about ITI's activities, that the sporadic 
annual reports offer little help, and that it is sometimes hard to get information because no one is at the 
other end of the phone. 
7. LESSONS LEARNED 
ITI offers three very clear lessons about capacity, focus, and leadership. 
CAPACITY The capacity within IDRC to deliver on objectives set out by new Secretariats is an 
issue that emerged on several occasions during interviews conducted for the Review. Relatively little 
attention was given to what exactly was to be delivered, whether it could be delivered, or whether 
IDRC had the knowledge, expertise, and experience to deliver. 
It is in this regard that ITI faltered. ITI was not ill considered, the ideas behind it are sound. However, 
the project was embarked upon with considerable naivety reflecting a lack of knowledge, expertise and 
experience in the area. IDRC misjudged the power of the tobacco lobby - on both sides of the issue. 
Upon entering the unfamiliar arena, a hornets' nest of problems was found. Not only was the pro- 
tobacco lobby strong and effective, but the anti-tobacco institutions were just as determined to protect 
their own interests, influence, and leadership roles and were quite prepared to thwart the efforts of 
upstarts. 
After its rocky and slow start, some key informants believe that ITI has gone through the necessary 
learning curve and is now poised to implement its strategy. However, it seems clear that more attention 
must be paid to capacity issues before embarking on a new enterprise. In the case of ITI, little, if any, 
attention was given to the amount of work entailed in the objectives and activities described. The level 
of human and financial resources, the knowledge, influence, and leadership required to deliver on the 
proposed programs were woefully underestimated. 
Focus The central idea of ITI is appealing and lends itself to building support. However, it seldom 
seems to be expressed in concise and relatively simple terms. Certainly this is not to say that the 
problem is a simple one. It is far from that. However, when we look at the plethora of strategies, 
objectives, activities, and desired outcomes presented, we are awestruck at the level of resources 
required to achieve them. This again reflects a level of naivety about this undertaking. The chances of 
success of a Secretariat are enhanced by having very sharply focused delimited goals and objectives. 
Many interviewees pointed out the importance of having precise and concise missions, goals, and 
objectives as a foundation for Secretariat success. 
LEADERSHIP As Peter Drucker so often observes: If a job is worth doing, it is worth 
dedicating resources to. For all of its life, ITI has been assigned a part-time Executive Director, and for 
the first three and a half years, the concentration of effort was a mere one day a week. This was hardly 
enough to get the initiative off the ground or to signal that IDRC was serious about it. The challenges 
faced by ITI require the full-time effort and dedication of an effective leader. To think that any more 
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than marginal progress is likely to be made with part-time leadership, with 70% of their time dedicated 
to other demanding tasks, is fanciful. 
However, it is instructional and encouraging to note that the dedicated effort of the new and highly 
qualified part-time Executive Director has resulted in considerable progress. In just a few months from 
his appointment, additional funding has been secured from SIDA (Sweden), CIDA is back at the table, 
qualified full time staff have been selected and appointed, and the mission and objectives are being 
better focused. The future now looks more promising for RITC. 
For some key informants, the initial period of relative inactivity reflects badly on IDRC. They report 
that, while the initiative is salable, IDRC has shown little interest in fully supporting ITI. What is being 
asked of existing and potential donors is that they make a continuing leap of faith and believe that, 
someday, IDRC will back the project. This of course is the catch-22 ITI and IDRC find themselves in. 
Naturally, more donor funding would enable more aggressive staffing levels. 
Similarly, the strength of Secretariats is seen by many to be based on their relative autonomy from 
IDRC - the arm's length distance. This has two advantages. First, it helps them focus all efforts on 
the single issue with which they are tasked. Second, it enables donors to become more actively 
involved in the collaborative effort. As we have seen throughout the course of this Review, donors are 
happy with IDRC's stewardship, but also insist on exercising fully their partnership role. 
Finally, it is one thing to recognize a leadership vacuum, as IDRC did with the tobacco issue. It is 
quite another thing to be able to fill the vacuum. This requires building a constituency of committed 
collaborators, which, as we have seen from other cases such as SIFR, is not always easy - particularly 
in areas that impinge on the influence of other institutions and interest groups. 
8. SOURCES 
Interviews 
ITI Annual Reports 
ITI Financial Statements 
Project Summary, (founding Memorandum), 1994 
Program of Work and Budget 
Internal correspondence 
ITI Website. 
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In September 1990, the World Summit for Children endorsed goals for the elimination or significant 
reduction of micronutrient deficiencies by the year 2000. These goals were further endorsed in 1992 at 
the International Conference on Nutrition. By this time, it was recognized that micronutrient 
deficiencies are a major obstacle to the health of a significant proportion of the world's population and 
that the deficiencies can be eliminated by existing cost-effective solutions. What was needed was a 
significant multi-sectoral effort involving policy makers, communities, the food industry, scientists and 
technicians, and donor agencies. The Micronutrient Initiative (MI) was established in 1992 in response 
to this call with a mandate to catalyze the international and multi-sectoral process through advocacy, 
and broker technical and financial support. 
Originally, the proposal to have a small international Secretariat that could stimulate and coordinate 
the effort was made in December 1990 by the World Bank, with the idea that it would be affiliated with 
the UN Administrative Coordinating Committee's Sub-Committee on Nutrition (SCN). The 
Secretariat would be guided by an Executive Board consisting of UNICEF, WHO, FAO, UNDP, and 
the World Bank, together with four bilateral donors, three scientific experts, and the chair of the SCN. 
At the same time, the Canadian government was taking a lead in fighting micronutrient deficiency and 
hosted a meeting of Health Ministers called Ending Hidden Hunger in Montreal in 1991. During the 
process of a series of meetings and discussions on the Secretariat, IDRC offered to host it. The IDRC 
proposal, made by the President, was that the Secretariat would have a lifetime of 10 years, after which 
its functions would be transferred to an international organization. It would have its own governing 
structure with an Executive Board on which would sit CIDA, the World Bank, UNDP, and IDRC. 
The rationale offered by IDRC for why it should host the MI Secretariat was that: 
IDRC had an active nutrition program which focused on operational research, community 
assessment, social marketing, and linking policy and action 
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IDRC was interdisciplinary, with health and agricultural sciences expertise 
IDRC had helped to create donor consortia and international organizations like ICRAF and 
INIBAP 
IDRC was a neutral venue outside the UN system. 
The IDRC proposal was accepted by the other donors and was then presented to the IDRC Governors 
at their Executive Committee meeting in January 1992. The IDRC Board resolution authorized the 
Centre to house the MI Secretariat in IDRC in Ottawa, on the understanding that the Secretariat's 
operations would be subject to the Centre's administrative policies and practices. All administrative 
costs, including office space, would be reimbursed to IDRC. 
The MI began operations on April 1, 1992 as IDRC's first international Secretariat. 
2. MISSION, Focus, AND STRATEGY 
MISSION 
The mission of the Micronutrient Initiative is to catalyze the sustainable control of micronutrient 
malnutrition by the year 2000, in keeping with the goals of the World Summit for Children: 
Virtual elimination of iodine deficiency disorders 
Virtual elimination of vitamin A deficiency and its consequences, including blindness 
Reduction of iron deficiency anemia in women by one third of the 1990 levels and 
sustaining it thereafter. 
At the latest meeting of the Steering Committee, there was a decision on extending the mandate of MI 
beyond 2000 and to review the mission with the possibility to include a wider range of nutrition issues 
for consideration and approval by the Steering Committee. 
Focus AREAS 
The MI's program of work is designed to address five strategic issues that are common to all 
micronutrient deficiencies and are considered critical for their elimination. These are: 
Advocacy and alliance building 
Development and application of technologies 
National and regional initiatives 
Capacity building 
Resolution of key operational issues. 
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STRATEGIC APPROACH 
The cornerstones of MI's strategy are: 
Responding rapidly to shying priorities and needs 
Supporting sustainable interventions 
Making limited, timely investments strategically targeted at critical gaps and niches 
Working with other partners and through existing institutions and mechanisms 
Assisting in national strategy development where the problem is most urgent 
Supporting target countries and regions where micronutrient deficiencies are greatest and 
affect the largest numbers of people 
Increasing the coverage of supplementation programs 
Focusing on food fortification to alleviate micronutrient deficiencies 
Leveraging additional financial support and donor involvement. 
3. ENVIRONMENT 
The MI grew out of an increasing awareness of the problem of micronutrient malnutrition globally and 
the relatively easy ways in which it could be solved, if national governments, international donors, and 
the food industry worked together with communities and with scientists to eradicate it. The target of 
virtual eradication by the year 2000 was a huge challenge but was possible to achieve. 
The visibility brought by the two international conferences in 1990 and 1992 had placed micronutrient 
deficiency, the hidden hunger, on high-level policy action agendas around the world. Since 1990, most 
national governments have committed themselves to eliminating micronutrient deficiencies and have 
adopted specific plans of action to do so. The food industry, especially the producers of staple foods 
such as salt, sugar, flour, dairy products and oils, as well as the processed food industry producing 
noodles, condiments, and snack foods have begun to recognize their role in reducing hidden hunger by 
adding micronutrients in the food refining and production process. The policy environment was 
therefore ready for a greater commitment, additional investment, and leadership in international and 
multisectoral coordination. 
The three micronutrients that account for a major part of hidden hunger are iodine, iron, and vitamin 
A. Thirty percent of the world's population is affected by one or more of these deficiencies. They suffer 
learning disabilities, impaired work capacity, and increased risks of illness and death. Children are 
especially at risk. 
There is already demonstrated success in reducing and eliminating micronutrient deficiencies. 
Iodization of salt has reached coverages of 80% and higher in many countries. Iron intakes can be 
improved by providing both tablets and syrups to target groups such as women and children and by 
fortifying staple foods such as flour which reach the general population. Vitamin A supplements can 
quickly reduce the deficiency to be followed up by food fortification programs adding vitamin A to 
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sugar, oils and milk. All of these approaches can be complemented with better nutrition education and 
programs to improve diets generally. These solutions are cost-effective. It is estimated that 5% of the 
gross domestic product of some countries is lost to micronutrient deficiencies. Solving the problem 
would cost less than 0.3% of GDP in those same countries. 
It is now generally recognized that the elimination of micronutrient deficiencies presents the best 
opportunity to improve the lives of the world's population at a low cost and in a short time. The 
advantages of reducing micronutrient deficiencies are so obvious and well known that the question is 
why has more not already been done to eliminate hidden hunger from the world. The MI operates in a 
supportive environment in which national governments, international agencies and the Canadian 
government through CIDA are dedicated to achieve the goals of the World Summit for Children. Its 
main challenge is not to develop a receptive environment but to position itself strategically within it. 
4. CAPACITY 
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP 
The early leadership for the MI came from the President of IDRC. He was very involved in the 
negotiations to bring the Secretariat to IDRC and chaired the founding meeting of the MI Board in 
April 1992. At that meeting, he was appointed as Chair of the Board for the next two years and was 
also appointed as interim Executive Director. The search for an Executive Director came from the 
President's Office and the job description indicated that the Executive Director would report to the MI 
Steering Committee and would be offered a salary that was considerably higher than IDRC salary 
scales. The tone was set that MI was different from IDRC. 
Before an Executive Director was appointed, in April 1993, IDRC had downsized and eliminated its 
own nutrition program. The IDRC President, acting as interim Executive Director, had transferred two 
IDRC program staff into the two professional positions in the new Secretariat without consulting the 
MI Board members or waiting for the ED to be appointed. This decision caused concern among the 
other donors and led to discussions about governance between them and IDRC. 
The first Executive Director was a former employee of both IDRC and CIDA and was therefore 
familiar with the institutional setting in which he was operating. However, he stayed in the position for 
only one year. After an international search, the second, and current, Executive Director was appointed 
in April 1994 for a three-year term as a consultant to IDRC. In 1996, his contract was renewed for a 
further three years to September 1999. The present Executive Director was new to IDRC and came 
from a food industry background with extensive experience in Canada and overseas. It is largely to his 
leadership that MI owes its present achievements and international recognition. 
GovERNANCE 
At the first meeting of the MI Steering Committee (then called an Executive Board) on April 27, 1992, 
it was agreed that the Executive Director would report to the MI Steering Committee and that they 
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would be responsible for setting policies and programs for MI. At their second meeting, on May 18-19, 
1993, the MI Steering Committee approved a signing authority of up to $50,000 for the Executive 
Director (who, as a consultant, could not authorize expenditures without an authorized IDRC co- 
signatory). The MI donors were told that the MI staff would not be bound by the IDRC salary scales. 
There was agreement that it would be worthwhile to eventually incorporate the MI, and IDRC agreed 
to seek legal counsel on the matter. The MI Steering Committee thus began with a very different 
understanding of the relationship between MI, IDRC and the other donors, from that held by the IDRC 
Board of Governors. It also understood that MI was not bound by IDRC administrative policies, 
including signing authority and salaries, and that exceptions would be made as appropriate. This set the 
stage for some genuine misunderstandings in the nature of the governance of MI. 
STEERING COMMITTEE 
The Steering Committee of MI consists of representatives of CIDA, the World Bank, UNDP, 
UNICEF, USAID, and IDRC. The Steering Committee meets at least once a year and discusses the 
work plan and budget. Members of the Steering Committee have expertise in micronutrients and can 
give technical advice to the Executive Director. 
The early misunderstandings that developed between the Steering Committee and IDRC continued to 
create some friction in the relationship between them for several years, and probably affected the 
working relationships between the staff of MI and support functions in IDRC. In 1997, the Steering 
Committee commissioned a study to review governance options for the MI Secretariat and to examine 
the relationship with IDRC. This study identified a number of misunderstandings between the Steering 
Committee and IDRC, and suggested that MI re-negotiate its working relationships with IDRC, while 
retaining the same governance arrangement and overall policy regime, at least in the short term. The 
Steering Committee adopted this approach, while keeping open the possibility that MI would become 
independent in a few years. Since late 1997, the liaison between MI and IDRC has significantly 
improved and there have been few exceptions to IDRC policies. All parties agreed to the need for the 
MI to work within IDRC policies and for exceptions to be considered on a case by case basis. This 
includes the salaries paid to MI staff, almost all of which now fall within IDRC salary scales. 
MANAGEMENT 
The MI is managed by an Executive Director within the overall administrative structure and support of 
IDRC. Between 1992 and the end of 1996, the MI core staffing structure did not change significantly. 
The Executive Director was supported by two program officers, an administrative coordinator, and an 
administrative assistant. In the first quarter of 1997, three new full-time staff were appointed: a senior 
program officer, an information officer, and a Director, South Asia Programs. Except for this Director, 
who is stationed at IDRC's Regional Office in Delhi, all the other MI staff are based in Ottawa at 
IDRC headquarters. 
A study conducted by a management consultant in January 1998 found that the present staff are 
knowledgeable about MI's mission and the international development and policy context in which they 
work. They showed a high level of enthusiasm and commitment to their work and were able to 
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communicate with one another. A major concern was that the Executive Director had too large a span 
of control and could not provide the direction and supervision required to all of the staff who reported 
to him. Another problem in the management of such a small and flat organization as Ml was, at the 
time, that the opportunities for career progression and development were limited and unclear. 
A major increase in financial resources and in the work to be accomplished in 1997-98 meant that the 
staff of the MI Secretariat had to be increased quickly and significantly. The management consultants 
identified a number of specific problems in the existing management structure of MI. These included: 
Inadequate total staff resources to implement the existing work plan 
A need for more support to the Executive Director, especially from a senior management 
team 
Some key skills were missing in the staff complement 
Too much reliance on external consultants 
Staff concerns on clarity of their own job descriptions. 
Recommendations included that the total staff complement, including three new senior managers, be 
appointed and that new appointments have key missing skills such as food science, communications, 
information resource management, program management, database management and financial 
management. It was proposed that the existing 12 full-time equivalents be increased to 20.5 in 1998-99 
to reach 26-30 full-time equivalents by 2000. 
The expansion and restructuring of human resources in accordance with this plan are well underway. 
While it is likely to cause some upheaval and growing pains in the MI Secretariat, it is urgently needed 
to ensure that the work plan can be carried out effectively. Earlier problems, such as frequent last 
minute requests to IDRC administrative support units and its inability to maintain communications with 
its stakeholders (both a result of inadequate staff resources) have already been overcome. 
The restructured management of MI includes four Directorates under the Executive Director: 
FINANCEANDADMINISTRATION Responsible for planning, coordination, and delivery of all 
internal finance and administrative support functions; and liaison with IDRC including financial and 
administrative accounting, reporting and accountability 
INFORMATIONAND COMMUNICATIONS Responsible for planning, coordination, and delivery of 
internal information, communications and related research support services, database management, the 
design and delivery of dissemination programs, and the design and delivery of communications 
materials and activities; 
PROGRAMS Responsible for overall planning, implementation, coordination, and delivery of 
programs and projects, including strategic planning, business development, and partner development 
TECHNOLOGYDEVELOPMENTAND RESEARCH Responsible for planning, implementation, 
coordination, and sharing of applied research and technology development for application in MI's 
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programs and projects, including the identification of research and technology development needs and 
synthesis of results. 
The Directors to lead these functions are under recruitment: three have recently been appointed and 
one (Programs) is currently searched for. Other positions are also being filled and new office space is 
being made available by IDRC. Thus MI will soon have a full complement of staff and will represent a 
major focus of expertise within IDRC. It will also be well positioned to transform itself into a more 
independent organization as it increases its internal human resources to carry out the full array of 
administrative, communication, financial, and program functions required. 
FUNDING 
Unlike many Secretariats in IDRC, MI's programs have not been limited by overall funding difficulties 
for most of its history. At its first meeting in April 1992, the Steering Committee (Executive Board) of 
MI agreed that one role of the Secretariat would be to act as a channel for funds to pass through to 
other organizations and also agreed that the earmarking of funds to MI by donors would be accepted. 
These two decisions have helped to shape the MI to what it is today. They have also contributed to 
some strain in the relationship and fit with IDRC because major funding has, in fact, passed through the 
MI, particularly from CIDA to UNICEF. This has caused some concern to IDRC management, as it 
has some implications for IDRC's own compliance with Treasury Board regulations. It has also meant 
that most of the funds to MI have been restricted and earmarked for specific activities. The operations 
and salaries of the Secretariat itself are being met out of core contributions from CIDA, the World 
Bank, IDRC, and UNICEF. 
From April 1992 until March 1998, the MI has received $69.5 million, of which 86% has come from 
CIDA. IDRC's contribution of just over $3 million for the same period represents only 4% of the total 
MI budget and other donors contributed significantly to operational costs, both directly and through 
the overhead levied by IDRC. The Centre's contribution was, however, critical to the operational 
survival of MI since, when commitments had to be made beyond the operational funds on hand, IDRC 
had to, in effect, guarantee projected deficits in the Secretariat operations until other funds were 
received. 
One of the specific problems raised by the Steering Committee in relation to funding was that MI 
should have its own bank account and interest on the balance should accrue to MI rather than to 
IDRC. This was a long-standing irritant for other donors which was responded to only recently by 
IDRC management, although the Independent Investigator to WETV had recommended in 1995 that 
separate bank accounts be established for Secretariats with sufficient funding and financial transactions 
to warrant it. At the January 20, 1998 meeting of the MI Steering Committee, it was agreed that 
interest earned on MI's funds would be credited to their projects and that this could be implemented 
without a separate bank account being established. 
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FUNDING CONTRIBUTED TO THE MJCRONUTRIENT INITIATIVE APRIL 1992 - MARCH 1998 
Donor 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 Total % 
CIDA 4000000 12000000 14280000 11,350,0 00 18350000 59980000 86 
WB 301483 647475 805000 1084000 1285169 1394350 5517377 8 
IDRC 1527566 500000 500000 500000 3027566 4 
UNICEF 128250 68750 203250 245200 645450 1 
Other 70413 291110 361523 1 
Total 5957299 12647475 805000 16003163 13338419 20780560 69531916 100 
5. PERFORMANCE 
RELEVANCE 
As will be clear from the discussion of the development context and international policy environment in 
which MI is operating, the mission and strategy of the Secretariat is seen as extremely relevant. The 
goal is to reach certain targets for the elimination of micronutrient deficiencies by 2000 and the 
Canadian government has taken a lead in the international effort. The location of the MI Secretariat in a 
Canadian venue is acceptable to the UN donors and the timing of its programs leading to the year 2000 
thus fit in with this context. 
What is less clear is how the MI fits in the current IDRC context. It includes research activities but is 
largely involved in operations - both operational planning and implementation. Now that nutrition has 
all but disappeared from IDRC's own programs, there are questions raised internally in IDRC about 
how relevant MI is to the mission and program niche of IDRC, although it is evident that the MI 
mission fits well with IDRC's corporate mission in international development. Underlying these 
questions is the issue of size; the projected financial and human resources for MI begin to rival that of 
IDRC's Program Branch, and the need for a large and visible MI to be seen to be relevant to IDRC's 
corporate program strategy becomes more explicit. 
ACTIVITIES 
The MI Secretariat works in an operational mode geared to implementation and outputs. Its activities 
are structured into five areas, which together make for a coherent and strategic work plan designed to 
well position MI as a catalytic player, which can coordinate inputs and provide technical solutions to 
the major implementing agencies like UNICEF: 
Advocacy and alliance building 
Development and application of technologies 
Regional and national initiatives 
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Capacity building 
Key operational issues. 
ADVOCACY ANDALLIANCEBUILDING The focus here is to play a key role in the international and 
regional fora in which micronutrient deficiencies are discussed, to ensure that micronutrient deficiencies 
are kept on the political agendas and in the priorities of donors, to build partnerships with the food 
industry, and to provide the information needed by all these stakeholders. 
DEVELOPMENTAND APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGIES Some of the technologies needed to 
achieve the goals of the World Summit for Children are not yet developed and in others, others are 
available but are not applied. The main focus is in the area of food fortification technology, at both 
large and small scales, of food production. For example, one major activity is the refinement of the 
process to doubly fortify salt with both iodine and iron. Another is demonstrating the feasibility of 
fortifying rice with vitamin A. 
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL INITIATIVES MI is developing special programs for countries where 
the severity of the deficiencies is greatest, where large populations are affected, or where special 
opportunities for intervention exist. These include fortification of soybean sauce with iron in China and 
flour fortification in Latin America. 
INFORMATIONMANAGEMENTAND CAPACITY BUILDING MI acts as a Resource Centre and 
clearinghouse for information about micronutrient malnutrition and produces and disseminates 
information through publications and the Internet, including electronic databases on micronutrients (MI 
and MN-NET). It also holds courses for food fortification consultants who can provide technical 
assistance to food producers, develops capacity for quality assurance programs, and develops 
education kits for primary schools. 
OPERATIONAL ISSUES The MI is uniquely positioned to be able to identify where controversies or 
bottlenecks are blocking progress towards eliminating micronutrient deficiencies at national, regional or 
international levels. Key operational issues being addressed include the resolution of controversies on 
anemia interventions and the correct dosages in a range of fortified foods. 
OUTPUTS AND IMPACTS 
The MI has considerable accomplishments for its first four years of operation. It is recognized 
internationally as a key player in the war against micronutrient deficiencies and has helped to raise 
awareness of the importance of the problem, and the availability of cost-effective solutions. This 
combination has attracted major funding into the MI, and into programs generally, to combat hidden 
hunger. 
MI has been active on the policy front and recently provided input for a resolution to eliminate 
micronutrient deficiencies approved by the Heads of State of the MERCOSUR countries. It also 
helped to organise a large international dialogue meeting, the Ottawa Forum, to promote interagency 
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partnerships. MI also co-sponsored a series of regional and national meetings bringing together 
government and food industry representatives. 
The MI was selected as the focal point to collect all available information resources on micronutrient 
malnutrition and has developed the MN-NET website to provide a database available to all. It has also 
published technical documents and videos as well as awareness building posters and pamphlets. Among 
its most important publications are: Monitoring of Universal Salt Iodization Programs (1995); and 
Micronutrient Fortification of Foods: Current Practices, Research and Opportunities (1996). 
In terms of technical innovations, the MI has successfully supported the development of a salt fortified 
with both iron and iodine which is stable for at least one year under conditions of high humidity and 
temperature, and which allows good absorption of both elements on consumption. The MI also 
supported important investigations on iodine stability in salt from developing countries to evaluate 
different packaging and environmental conditions. These studies resulted in the development of 
recommendations by WHO/UNICEF/ICCIDD for improving iodization programs. MI has 
demonstrated success in field testing a technology to fortify rice with vitamin A in Indonesia and shown 
that the product is acceptable to consumers. 
MI is providing support for national Vitamin A programs in more than 30 countries through UNICEF 
field offices and is supporting 15 NGOs in 12 countries to implement programs to increase coverage 
and to improve monitoring of interventions. Linked to these field programs, MI has increased national 
capacities to monitor Vitamin A delivery systems and increase coverage and community involvement. 
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL REPUTATION 
MI has achieved a high visibility and a very good reputation among international agencies and 
countries involved in micronutrient deficiencies. Indeed, several external sources attested that after 
UNICEF, the MI was one of the best known and most well regarded initiatives in the field. It appears 
to have positioned itself well and has a clear focus, mission and achievements. 
Within IDRC, MI's reputation is more mixed. The concern is not with the mission or technical 
competence of the staff, both of which are well regarded. The issue is more that MI does not fit with 
IDRC's own mandate to support research for development, and is now growing so large that it is no 
longer a small operation on the side, but a major activity, neither in nor out of IDRC. As has been 
discussed, contributory factors in this unease as expressed within the Centre are that MI is partly a flow 
through operation; that it is mainly funded by one donor - CIDA; that MI does not always conform 
to IDRC standard operating procedures; and that it doesn't give IDRC adequate recognition. What is 
not always recognized is that, even where funds are passed to UNICEF for implementation, MI must 
exercise technical quality control and financial oversight for CIDA funds. 
The very success of MI in having evolved in four years from its initial small start-up phase to its 
current position as an internationally recognized Secretariat which can bring partners together and 
attract funding, seems to have contributed to some of the strains that are felt today within IDRC. 
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FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
Given the continuing support of major donors such as CIDA and the World Bank, the future financial 
viability of the MI looks secure, at least until 2000. The issue of restricted versus unrestricted funding 
may continue to be a problem, together with the challenges brought by year to year funding rather than 
multi-year commitments. In response to this problem, CIDA has agreed to increase its share of core 
funding towards the operations of the MI and is looking to ways of providing multi-year funding. With 
the grant agreements for both 1998-99 and for 1999-2000, CIDA has provided and committed more 
funds for operations. This is important as the major increase in the cost of running the Secretariat 
means that more of the future funding must be able to be allocated to Secretariat operations. Another 
funding difficulty faced by MI in the past has been the rapid response required to accept funds at the 
end of the fiscal year which need to be expended within short time horizons. 
6. LESSONS 
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN IDRC AND OTHER DONORS 
The early history of MI saw a number of important misconceptions arise between the donors on the MI 
Steering Committee and IDRC staff and management. The Board of IDRC, in approving the 
establishment of the MI Secretariat, had specified that it would be subject to IDRC's normal policies 
and practices, and IDRC staff and management generally followed this in dealing with MI. However, in 
its discussions with IDRC, the Steering Committee of MI understood that it had authority to set 
policies and make decisions on appointments and salaries for MI staff. Their understanding was that, 
where MI needed an adjustment to IDRC's normal administrative procedures, this would be 
forthcoming. The result was some tension between IDRC staff and the MI Executive Director and 
staff, as well as with the donors on the Steering Committee over a number of administrative issues, 
some of which could have been avoided if there had been better communication at the outset and more 
direct regular contact between IDRC and the donors on the MI Steering Committee. This situation has 
improved during 1998 following the consultant's report pointing out the problems. 
The Board of IDRC did not have direct information from the Steering Committee of MI and only 
heard about some of the administrative concerns about MI when Internal Audit reported to them in 
June 1997. At this time the Board wondered if other Secretariats were having similar problems. It was 
noted that the new Guidelines for Secretariats should clarify some of the issues. In interviews with 
Governors, direct discussions between Governors and donors funding IDRC Secretariats was 
suggested by some as a way to improve both understanding of their point of view and the quality of the 
information received by the Board. 
SYNERGY WITH IDRC PROGRAMS 
The experience of MI raises the issue of how far Secretariats should, or need to have close links and 
synergy with IDRC Programs. One of the characteristics specified for Secretariats in IDRC and which 
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is used by Internal Audit to assess them is that they are active in a field relevant to IDRC's competence 
and programming. In interviews with IDRC staff and MI staff, the issue of poor links to IDRC 
programs was often mentioned. It was also raised by external donors who felt that one of the reasons 
why IDRC was seen as a suitable host institution for the new Secretariat was that it had an ongoing 
nutrition program. When the MI was established, the IDRC nutrition program closed and the program 
link with IDRC effectively withered from that time. 
In addition to the intellectual interaction and stimulus that an active group of nutrition specialists in 
IDRC could have brought to MI, one of the disadvantages that MI has suffered in not having close 
program links, is that it has lacked a champion within the Program Branch of IDRC. Similarly, MI has 
worked essentially separately from IDRC Programs, and its professional expertise has not been 
effectively linked to Programs Branch. The MI team has demonstrated success in forging partnerships 
with national governments and the food industry, and in supporting innovations in technology and 
health interventions. There would appear to be more potential for synergy than is perhaps recognized 
by either side. 
The lesson may be that a Secretariat does not need to have close program links with IDRC to be 
successful and to bring visibility and credit to IDRC, and to Canada. For MI, it is not IDRC's 
programs that make it an attractive host institution today. Rather, it is IDRC's overall reputation as a 
good, flexible, relatively neutral development agency with a strong presence in developing regions 
through its regional offices. The issue of how MI is linked to Programs Branch would appear to be 
more a matter of concern for IDRC Programs than for the MI Secretariat or its donors. 
A NATURAL PROGRESSION... ? The arrangement between MI and IDRC has been a supportive one for 
MI and has allowed it to grow more rapidly than probably any other IDRC Secretariat in reputation, 
resources, staff and activities. In the last year, MI donors have been giving serious consideration to 
changing the status of MI from a Secretariat within IDRC to an independent organization. Thus MI 
may represent a lesson in achieving what was always foreseen as a natural progression for IDRC 
Secretariats; that IDRC would act as an innovator, a catalyst and an incubator for new initiatives which 
would one day-when they had reached a level of maturity and financial sustainability-become 
independent organizations. Whether MI remains a Secretariat within IDRC or eventually becomes 
established with its own legal identity, the future outlook is extremely positive. 
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The Strategy for International Fisheries Research (SIFR) originated from donor demand and was 
based on extensive, well-founded research. The management of oceans and freshwater resources had 
become a recognized global problem and the lack of research was identified as one of the key 
problems contributing to the limited success of many development projects in this sector. The Fisheries 
Development Donors Consortium (FDDC), a group of 30-40 people representing many of the key 
public and private donors, first met to explore these issues in Paris in 1986. There was consensus that 
the lack of coordination of research, information, and the provision of aid to fisheries represented major 
constraints to development in this area. 
The first initiative of FDDC was to commission the Study of International Fisheries Research. 
Involving over 100 scientists, fisheries administrators, and experts, the study was considered to be the 
most comprehensive ever attempted on fisheries research. It took two years to complete and costed 
over $860,000 US. 
The major conclusion of the study was that the strengthening of national research institutions, with 
focused development and management-oriented research programs, could contribute significantly to 
the development of national economies. The establishment of appropriate means to facilitate donor 
coordination was strongly recommended. 
Based on the study, completed in 1991, the donors agreed to establish and fund SIFR. Originally, it 
seemed as though the most suitable candidate to house the Secretariat was FAO. Other Steering 
Committee members, however, were adamantly opposed to this idea. The second attempt to house 
SIFR, this time at the World Bank, also failed because the activity and arrangement were outside the 
Bank's mandate and policy framework. It was then that the Committee turned to IDRC to house it at 
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the Centre. Approved by IDRC's Board of Governors in October 1992, the Strategy for International 
Fisheries Research, (SIFR) was one of IDRC's first three Secretariats. 
2. CONTEXT 
Fisheries provide the main source of animal protein for more than one billion people and employ 100 
million, mostly poor people. Fisheries exploitation has major social, economic, and environmental 
repercussions. The need for an integrated resource-management approach based on socio-economic 
and sustainability principles is critical to the preservation of living aquatic resources. 
By helping countries in their efforts to strengthen their national fishery research capacity, donors will 
help them create new development opportunities, redress current development problems, and remove 
many of the constraints to effective development research. Among these constraints are: 
The lack of sufficient operating funds 
Inadequate access to scientific information 
Inadequate national sector policies 
Few research programs that concentrate on broad development and management issues 
The lack of integration between research disciplines and national institutes. 
SIFR was established to develop mechanisms for matching the research priorities of developing 
countries with the interests of donors. It is guided by a Steering Committee which reports to the FDDC 
and is composed of representatives of the World Bank, UNDP, FAO, Commission of European 
Communities, IDRC, and NORAD. 
3. GOALS, MISSION, AND OBJECTIVES 
SIFR seeks to encourage the coordination of fisheries research for the sustainable development of 
living aquatic resources. High priority is given to strengthening the capacity of research institutions in 
developing countries to conduct applied research at the local and regional level. In addition SIFR seeks 
to encourage support for strategic research through the CGIAR (Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research) centers involved in living aquatic resource management. 
SIFR presented an ideal fit with IDRC's objectives and strategy. As indicated in the IDRC strategy 
document, Empowerment Through Knowledge, research coordination and network building were high 
priorities for the Centre. Conceptually, IDRC was instrumental in creating SIFR along with 
representatives of other donors and national programs. In keeping with IDRC's philosophy, the 
strategy was global in concept with most of the dissemination taking place through regional and 
national workshops with southern countries. Early on, it was recognized that the success of SIFR was 
largely dependent upon the involvement of national governments. These need to give a higher priority 
to the sector by involving their planners and allocating greater support to fisheries research. 
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The SIFR Plan for Action focused on the provision of support to fisheries research and on helping 
countries develop their fisheries policies and programs. It called for donors to support: 
National institutions linked to regional or wider networks according to specific selection 
criteria 
Exchange of scientific information supporting regional initiatives 
Transfer and adaptation of technology resulting from research 
Research conducted by universities and advanced scientific institutes 
Exchange of information about fisheries research activities. 
These initiatives required direct staff work to promote donor coordination. In addition, technical and 
scientific work was required, including: 
Preparing national research strategies and plans 
Monitoring progress and consultation with donors and recipients 
Supporting regional research networks 
Providing an active interface between research results and development programs through 
the rapid transfer of technology 
Bringing the results of strategic research to developing countries. 
The five main objectives of SIFR are: 
To improve the effectiveness of donor assistance to fisheries research for the benefit of 
developing countries 
To disseminate the SIFR report and stimulate developing country reaction to it 
To increase donors and recipients' awareness of needs and priorities with relation to the 
Indicative Plan, and to increase effective coordination 
To improve coordination among implementing agencies 
To provide support to the Steering Committee in updating the Indicative Plan for 
submission to the Third Fisheries Donor Consultation in 1993. 
Given the strategic fit with IDRC, the involvement of a large number of donors in the diagnosis and 
recommendation stages, the broad base of donor commitment, and the sound basis upon which the 
rationale was built (a large number of missions, workshops, and the major World Bank study 
previously mentioned), SIFR is perhaps the best example of a conceptually well grounded Secretariat. 
4. FUNDING AND FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
Originally, SIFR envisioned obtaining funding from a wide array of donors. IDRC funds were 
requested to cover some of the local costs of the Secretariat and for the dissemination aspect of the 
strategy. IDRC was confident that other donors would provide further support and that much of the 
specific project support would by directed to developing countries. 
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The financial plan or the approved budget for SIFR for the first two years of operation was $861,000, 
of which, originally, 33% were to come from IDRC and 66% from other donors. 46% ended up 
coming from IDRC and 54% from other donors, primarily UNDP and the World Bank. 
Of the $1.7 million used by SIFR during the six years since its inception, approximately $1.4 million, or 
80%, was provided by IDRC. Of this amount, $320,500 were earmarked for Sustainable Oceans 
Development, a specifically IDRC/Canadian initiative. The UNDP, the next largest contributor, 
provided approximately 15% of the funding. Five other donors provided around 1 % each. Given the 
initial expressions of interest by other donors, contributions to SIFR had fallen far below expectations. 
SIFR SOURCE OF FUNDS (THROUGH IDRC*) 
Donor 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 Total % 
IDRC 49,511 372,610 320,500 639,989 1,382,610 80% 
UNDP 225,500 28,856 254,356 15% 
Other 25,000 19,301 49,485 1,256 95,042 5% 
Total 74,511 372,610 0 546,000 659,290 78,341 1,256 1,732,008 
% Year 4% 22% 0% 32% 38% 5% 0% 100% 100% 
* Note that some other money not identified here was held by the UNDP (including 
funds for evaluation and for the salary of the first Executive Director). In addition, 
project funding controlled by other donors is not shown. 
Of the approximately $1.7 million expended by SIFR during the period from its inception to August 
1998, 31% went to program activities. These activities included workshops, studies, and publications. 
The remaining 69% were expended on salaries (39%) and overhead costs (30%). At first sight, these 
ratios appear to compare unfavorably with other Secretariats. However, the principal role of SIFR 
demanded a very labor-intensive set of activities associated with collaboration and coordination, and 
participating donors insisted that project funds pass through existing bilateral and multilateral channels, 
not through the SIFR Secretariat office. 
While SIFR had a potentially broad base of donors - more than 40 representatives participated in the 
FDDC - actual contributions were small (between $1,256 and $38,286). In the end, IDRC and 
UNDP/World Bank provided 95% of the funding. Surprisingly, other than the $463,000 pledged by 
the UNDP and $25,000 from ICOD, no other donor support either pledged or anticipated is mentioned 
in the 1992 Memorandum to IDRC Board of Governors. 
In the end, IDRC was to receive only $254,264 of the UNDP planned contribution. Interviewees 
expressed return-on-investment concerns. 
5. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
One of the first steps in starting SIFR was to develop a job description for the Executive Director 
(originally called Executive Secretary) and to carry out an international search. Of the 70 applications 
that were screened for the job, Steering Committee members could agree on only one. However, this 
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process was not without controversy. Heated debate took place among donors as to the need for such 
a person, the institutional affiliation, and the role vis-a-vis FAO. There was never a full consensus on 
these issues. In 1991, for example, it was first decided to locate the Executive Director in the World 
Bank. About a year later, this office was moved from the WB to IDRC in Ottawa. 
Once appointed in October 1992, the new Executive Director was faced with establishing the 
Secretariat at IDRC, preparing a work plan, disseminating the SIFR Report, establishing liaison with 
donor agencies and countries, organizing the Bulletin, and identifying a demand-led fisheries research 
plan in coordination with FAO. This last activity led to many difficulties and accounted for most of the 
Executive Director's time and energy. At the Steering Committee meeting in October 1993, the 
Executive Director recommended the preparation of a refined strategy for SIFR, with a clear statement 
of rationale and objectives, and a framework of activities setting down practical approaches to strategic 
objectives. 
Steering Committee members did not agree with the new plan, feeling that the strategy, as set down in 
the original study, was clear and adequate. 
This disagreement was one of the factors that led to the Executive Director's decision not to continue 
past the first year of his contract which ended in March 1994. Another factor leading to his departure 
was the fact that the job, by definition, was temporary and the Executive Director sought permanent 
employment. Yet other difficulties included the fact that IDRC, unlike other international institutions, 
cannot grant international, tax free status to employees. The most compelling reason, however, was 
the divisive issue of FAO wanting to house the Secretariat in Rome, an issue that was stressful for both 
the Executive Director and the Steering Committee. 
Following the Executive Director's early departure, there was a six month period during which a 
member of the Steering Committee provided interim and part time support to the Secretariat while 
continuing his normal duties at IDRC. Hence, the year between October 1993-September 1994, was 
characterized as a period of reduced activity for SIFR. The work plan was adjusted and refocused in 
September 1994 and included an evaluation of the SIFR. In 1994, the acting Executive Director 
became the full time Director of SIFR. Coincidentally, in 1994, the Executive Director became 
increasingly involved with the IDRC-funded Sustainable Oceans Development project aimed at 
creating a mechanism for collaborative partnerships among Canadian institutions with oceans expertise. 
This situation may have caused some Steering Committee members to feel that the Executive Director 
was inordinately linked to IDRC. 
6. PERFORMANCE 
During its six years of operation, SIFR published six Bulletins designed to disseminate information 
among recipients and interested parties on the following topics: 
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Identification of Demand-Led Fishery Priorities and Needs: Workshop of Fishery 
Information & Statistics in Asia 
Identification of Demand-Led Fishery Priorities and Needs: Fish Productivity 
(Aquaculture) - Development and Research Needs in sub-Saharan Africa 
Regional Workshop on Fisheries Commodity Conservation and Utilization - Demand- 
Led Research Needs & Priorities in Asia 
Inter-Regional Research on Fish Genetics 
The International Network on Genetics in Aquaculture Update 
Information for Aquatic Resources Management in Asia 
In addition, SIFR sponsored and published a number of research reports, including: 
Fisheries Information in Asia: Needs and Opportunities 
Aquatic Biodiversity Conservation: A Review of Current Issues and Efforts 
A Strategy for Post-harvest Fisheries in Asia. 
Naturally, many other activities took place, among which attendance at over 40 meetings; publication 
of 11 articles, reviews, and announcements; and provision of information to over 20 international 
gatherings in a two year period between 1992 and 1994. During the same time frame, a large number 
of visits to donors and potential donors took place. 
In spite of this activity, however, it seems clear that SIFR was, for a number of reasons, unable to 
deliver fully its slated program of planned activities. Based on the March 1994 Report of the SIFR 
Executive Secretary to the Donor Advisory Committee, it appears that the Secretariat was involved in 
attempting to coordinate and influence an enormous amount or research activity. The tables below 
highlight some of these activities. 
FISHERIES RESEARCH IN WHICH SIFR COLLABORATED 
Research Theme Lead Implementing Institution(s) Supporting Donor(s) 
Fish Productivity (aquaculture) 
1. Sub-Saharan Africa Fisheries Dept., FAO FAO, Economic Commission for 
Africa, FAO-executed ALCOM 
Project, CEC (DG XII) 
2. Latin America & Caribbean Fisheries Dept. FAO FAO, FAO - executed AQUILA II 
Project (Italian TF) 
3. Asia 
(a) Pathology / Epidemiology Fish Health Section (FHS), Asian AFS 
Fisheries Society (AFS) with the 
participation of University of Stirling / 
ODA 
(b) All aquaculture themes Fisheries Dept., FAO, in collaboration Proposal to donors under preparation 
with institutions in the region by FAO 
Commodity Conversion & 
Utilization 
1. Asia Natural Resources Institute (NRI) ODA (UK) 
2. Latin America & Caribbean NRI Proposal submitted to CIDA 
3. Africa NRI Proposal submitted to CIDA 
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Fisheries Information Needs 
1. Asia 
(a) Study SIFR IDRC, World Bank 
(b) Workshop FAO-RAPA / SEAFDEC FAO-RAPA; SEAFDEC; FAO, Rome. 
2. Africa To be identified To be identified 
3. Latin America & Caribbean To be identified To be identified 
Human Linkages, Socio-Economics 
& Policy 
All regions North Sea Centre (NSC), Denmark Joint SIFR-NSC proposal submitted to 
DANIDA 
Resource Conservation & 
Management 
1. Asia To be identified To be identified 
2. Africa To be identified To be identified 
3. Latin America & Caribbean To be identified To be identified 
All Themes 
1. South Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) FFA, CIDA, IDRC 
2. Mediterranean Region Fisheries Department, FAO; CEC (?), MEDRAP II, IFREMER, 
FAO/UNDP Regional Mediterranean Fisheries Dept., FAO 
Aquaculture Project (MEDRAP II) 
OTHER RESEARCH IN VARIOUS STAGES OF SCREENING BY SIFR 
Title Source 
1. Cooperative Assessment of the Shrimp Fisheries in the Fisheries Department, FAO 
ASEAN and Adjacent Seas 
2. The Management of Ocean Fisheries: A Fresh Approach Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Mass., 
to a Failed System USA 
3. Creation of a PTA Centre for Fisheries Research & Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern & Southern 
Management (CFRM) African States, Lusaka, Zambia 
4. UNDP/FAO Integrated Coastal Fisheries Management - Mr. Phil Reynolds UNDP/DGIP, New York 
(INT/91/007) - S1FR Secretary 
5. Lake Malawi Project Mr. Eduardo Loayza, AGRTN, World Bank, Washington 
6. The Nansen Programme Ms. Kirsten Bjoru, Natural Resources Management Div., 
NORAD, Oslo, Norway 
7. ICLARM's International Network on Genetics in - SIFR Secretary 
Aquaculture (INGA) - Mr. Phil Reynolds, UNDP/DGIP, New York 
8. World Bank/Ecuador Project on Control of Shrimp Mr. E. Loayza, AGRTN, World Bank, Washington 
Diseases 
9. IUBS/Reproductive Biology in Aquaculture (RBA) Dr. Pieter van Oordt, Utrecht Univ., Netherlands 
Programme 
10. ICLARM's National Research Support Programme - SIFR Secretary 
- Mr. S. Sverdup Jensen, ICLARM 
It is equally clear from reading the same report that the role of SIFR (to develop mechanisms for 
matching the research priorities of developing countries with the interests of donors) was more 
difficult in practice than in theory. SIFR's role is described as catalytic and/or collaborative ... with 
direct involvement concentrated in the preparatory and follow up phases. SIFR's roles as endorser, 
screener, and promoter of research proposals were also mentioned in the report. These roles excluded 
reviewing or commenting on proposals for technical context - that would be left up to FAO and 
ICLARM. The one exception was the study of information needs in ASIA that was planned and 
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executed by SIFR with support from IDRC. In many cases, the implementing agency was FAO or 
other organizations that actually took the lead in managing the research. The report goes on to state 
that only modest progress had been made in matching research needs of developing countries with the 
aid policies and strategies of the donors. Reflecting the lack of agreement on the Steering Committee, 
the Executive Director concluded that procedural options for both identification and matching have to 
be explored with the donors to arrive at workable approaches. A little later in the report, frustration is 
expressed at the lack of interest from donors to become involved in consultations to follow-up on 
workshops. 
SIFR's role as promoter, endorser, screener, collaborator, and coordinator was fine in theory, but it 
seems that it could not be carried out without impinging on the autonomy of the various players 
involved. Another factor adding to the difficulty was the fact that all of the players, including IDRC, 
were going through changes in resource levels, organization, and strategic direction. The various, and 
sometimes conflicting, interests of Steering Committee members and their organizations increased the 
difficulty of carrying out SIFR's mission and objectives. 
In 1995, following the initial two-year experimental operation of SIFR, an evaluation of its 
achievements in meeting its objectives was carried out. The evaluation was managed by the UNDP. 
Interest in the evaluation was low. Only 19 of 85 persons on the SIFR Donor List responded to the 
questionnaire designed to measure SIFR's achievement. However, 35 of these 85 persons attended a 
subsequent Evaluation Workshop in Rome. 
Part of the reason for this lack of interest was the rush in which the evaluation was undertaken. 
However, it was seen as an opportunity to break what was perceived by the Steering Committee as a 
logjam caused by divisiveness within the Committee and a perceived lack of progress on the part of 
SIFR. It should be noted again that this was a period of rapid change and adjustment for all donor 
agencies. Typifying this flux, IDRC was in the midst of downsizing and restructuring, including the 
abolishment of its agricultural division that included fisheries research. The appearance was that IDRC 
lacked serious commitment to SIFR. At the same time, the World Bank, who had considerable 
influence on the Steering Committee, had decided to mend its relationships with FAO, making it 
appear as if the decision to move SIFR to Rome had been taken early on. 
Results of the evaluation were less than encouraging: 
11 of 19 respondents were of the opinion that SIFR had not contributed in any significant 
way to the overall objective of improving the effectiveness of donor assistance to fisheries 
research for the benefit of developing countries 
SIFR in its existing form suffered from the lack of a mandate and official recognition by 
donors. The target of SIFR initiatives was deemed to be unclear- the donors, recipient 
countries, or both? This concern highlighted a continuing issue with FAO who maintained 
that the intent of SIFR was to target the donors while FAO was to target the recipient 
countries, as per its mandate 
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Almost all respondents (17) agreed that there was still a need to draw attention of 
developing countries to the SIFR Study. The conclusion was that the relevant private 
sector players and policy makers in developing countries were oblivious to the Study 
The evaluation noted that the objective to increase awareness of donors and recipients of 
needs and priorities and to increase effective coordination had not been met. Seventeen 
respondents identified a need for more effective coordination of fisheries research at both 
the strategic international and applied regional and national levels. It was recommended 
that, rather than focusing on general awareness-creating activities, SIFR focus on policy 
issues at the regional and national levels, working more directly with government agencies 
in a few carefully selected countries 
Improving coordination among implementing agencies had not been done well enough. 
Again, it was suggested that SIFR play a more active role at the level of national and 
regional research institutions, while it was at the same time noted that there may be 
regionally-based institutions better placed for this function 
Only nine, fewer than half of the respondents, believed that there was a need for SIFR to 
continue providing support to the Fisheries Development Donor Consultation. Indeed, it 
was noted that only IDRC had made a commitment to continue support to SIFR, provided 
that other donors also participate. It was pointed out that funding might be easier if SIFR 
were to be affiliated with another international organization 
The evaluation concluded: The donor response to the questionnaire and the statements 
made in the follow-up discussion have made it clear that substantial changes in the scope, 
activities, and possibly the organizational set-up and location of the SIFR as well, would 
be needed for the initiative to become fully recognized, utilized and financially supported 
by the international donor community. 
People interviewed for this Review and case study observed that there were no real impacts and few 
outcomes flowing from SIFR. Reasons offered included lack of staff and funds, Steering Committee 
divisiveness and lack of collaboration, focus, and communication with donors. 
7. CURRENT STATUS 
Finally acting on the recommendations arising from the 1995 Evaluation Report, on September 1, 
1998, SIFR was transferred, without staff, to FAO in Rome. 
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8. LESSONS 
The two-sentence Risk Analysis in the Memorandum to the Board of Governors founding SIFR 
proved to be prophetic. It stated: 
This project will only be successful if donors and recipients are willing to participate actively 
in it. The fact that 18 donors co funded SIFR [the study] and that SIFR was approved by a 
Consultation of Fisheries Donors in October 1991 are positive factors. Nevertheless the 
Executive Secretary's major challenge will be to engage donors and recipients through 
communication, enthusiasm and results. 
Given the careful attention to diagnosis and planning during the formation of SIFR, it is indeed 
surprising that it was not perceived to be more successful by the very people who founded it and 
agreed to fund it. The formal evaluation can be seen as rushed, somewhat negative, and drawing 
conclusions based on too few questions answered by too few respondents. Further, only answers 
related to the perceptions of achievement of each of five objectives were reported in the Evaluation 
Report. The evaluator failed to mention the results of the other half of the questionnaire dealing with 
SIFR outputs - including some 15 questions on areas such as publications, reports on research needs 
and priorities, and other initiatives-choosing instead to copy the lists of accomplishments provided by 
SIFR as appendices. 
Surprisingly, the report moved directly from an assessment of achievements in meeting objectives to 
future organizational options. Perhaps the most obvious problem with the evaluation was that its 
conclusion did not go much beyond the job isn't done yet. It failed to observe that, in such a short time 
frame and without the full and enthusiastic cooperation of donors and Steering Committee members, 
the notion that the job should or could have been done was absurd. 
Nevertheless, the SIFR experience provides some important, interrelated lessons about focus, 
appropriate levels of resources, constituency, and mission. 
Focus One of the clearest advantages of Secretariats is their ability to focus sharply on a specific area. 
As the evaluator of SIFR concluded, no matter where and how SIFR is constituted in the future, it 
should, under no circumstances, be designed to pursue more than a limited number (maximum of three) 
of objectives at a time. It is clear that this was not the case as SIFR was mandated to pursue several 
complex objectives at various levels of policy, research, donor interest and to do so nationally, 
regionally, and internationally. 
In addition, it could be maintained that the institutional interests of IDRC inhibited the chances of 
maximizing SIFR success. Pursuing IDRC goals such as the Sustainable Oceans Development 
initiatives may have detracted from the required single-minded focus. It certainly did dilute the already 
very scarce amount of time and energy of the one-man operation. As the SIFR Steering Committee 
members interviewed for this Review observed, it was not always possible to see where SIFR's agenda 
started and IDRC's agenda ended... and this made people very nervous. 
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Further, much of the time of the two Executive Directors was taken-up by attempting to get donors 
and founding partners to follow-through on their financial and other commitments. This, combined 
with the counterproductive interests of the partners themselves, sapped much time and energy. 
Singularity of purpose and focus are the primary advantages of Secretariats, an advantage SIFR never 
experienced. 
APPROPRIATELEVEL OFRESOURCES The human resources supplied were not adequate for the job. 
This was particularly evident during the period in which the Executive Director was part-time, a factor 
compounding the perceived problem of the lack of independence from IDRC. Further, while there is a 
great deal of evidence of work planning and activity listing, very little attention seems to have been 
given to assessing the time it takes to carry out the complex tasks so carefully identified. The human 
resources supplied was not appropriate for the work identified to be undertaken. 
Financial resource levels were also a problem. SIFR may have expended too much energy on securing 
adequate funding (including the considerable effort involved in attempting to get some of the donors to 
live up to their commitments) and not enough on results. Further, it seems that IDRC invested more 
funding than originally intended. Even if the money earmarked for the Sustainable Oceans 
Development ($320,500) is subtracted, IDRC was never intended to fund more than 50% - certainly 
not the 84% that it did contribute. This raises the possibility of IDRC being in the position of being the 
donor of last resort, not something bargained for at the outset. As one donor observed: 
If you're offered $100, 000, it's hard to say no but that is exactly what you should do if there is 
not the funding assured to support an activity for the long term at an adequate level. That's 
what happened with SIFR; it was built on promises of funds that never came. SIFR has been 
on a shoestring for a long time. Unfortunately, we are still in the same situation and we are 
still doing what I said we should not: taking the $100, 000 in the hope that other funding will 
come along. But with the current donor situation and competing initiatives, it will be difficult. 
CONSTITUENCY The first two steps in establishing a Secretariat are: to develop a strong 
conceptual base for the idea; and, to build a strong alliance and constituency. While the SIFR Study 
provided the strong conceptual base, it could be argued that far too much time was taken up by the 
research, conceptual stage. SIFR began in 1986 with the decision to conduct the research. 
Approximately six years was spent on this phase. SIFR the Secretariat began in 1992 and spent 
approximately half of its 6 year life on research and planning. Therefore, lots of time was spent on 
diagnosis. As one interviewee pointed out, SIFR had good diagnosis but poor implementation, in that 
it lacked mechanisms to achieve coordination on the ground. Implementation, the other half, proved 
to be more difficult in many ways. The most obvious is that, once the research was completed, and 
SIFR established, donor energy and funds had waned and discussions dissipated into internal squabbles. 
While SIFR has strong international support, it lacked a strong donor constituency, as demonstrated 
vividly by the failure to contribute promised funds. These harmony, constituency, and funding issues 
emanating from the Steering Committee put demands on the Executive Directors' energy and time and 
detracted from getting the job done. In other words, there was inadequate recognition of the difficulty 
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of this undertaking which need other organizations to open their operations, decision making 
processes, etc., for others to inspect and compare. 
MISSION The subject matter was consistent with IDRC's research agenda and policy direction at 
the time. SIFR's mission was to develop mechanisms for matching the research priorities of 
developing countries with the interests of donors. It was to be focused on the coordination of other 
international implementing and research organizations. In application, this mission can be threatening in 
that, through the development and application of rules and guidelines, SIFR has the potential to 
become a gatekeeper. Nevertheless, the very people who recognized and substantiated the need for 
screening, coordination, and cooperation in theory found it discomforting in practice. 
This points to a foundational issues dealing with collaborative partnerships. It is easy to talk about and 
support conceptually, but few are able to put it in practice. Often, it is time consuming, and it 
frequently takes a low priority relative to other daily pressures. Further, there is seldom any incentive 
systems or other mechanisms put in place to encourage behaviours supportive of collaboration. The 
lesson we witness again and again, but seldom learn, in organizations is that establishing a structure is 
never enough. Systems need to be put in place to support the new structures. Socio-organizational 
patterns, values, and culture must also change to ensure environments in which these new approaches 
can survive and thrive. 
9. SOURCES 
SIFR Project Summary (Memorandum to the IDRC Board), 1992 
SIFR Financial Reports, 1992-1998 
SIFR Strategy for International Fisheries Research Evaluation Report, November 1995 
Annual Reports of the SIFR Executive Secretary to the Steering Committee, 1994- 
1998 
Interviews with former Executive Director, Steering Committee members, IDRC 
Governors, senior management and staff 
SIFR Bulletins. 
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SECRETARIAT FOR INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 




SISERA is an IDRC initiative to strengthen economic research in Africa through institutional support 
to key research centres. The initiative was designed to complement existing activities aimed at 
strengthening economic research, such as AERC (African Economic Research Consortium), the ACBF 
(African Capacity Building Foundation), and the RPI (Reseau sur les politiques industrielles). One of 
the key obstacles to improved economic research in Africa has been identified as weak institutions with 
mandates to undertake research and training across the continent. 
The proposal was developed first through a process of internal discussions within IDRC and 
consultations with African researchers, donor agencies, and the AERC. A background paper was 
prepared and circulated to these groups and then presented to an expert group meeting of economic 
researchers held in Dakar in June 1996. It was further developed as a proposal and presented to a 
donors meeting in Nairobi in November 1996. The proposal was then discussed in December 1996 in 
Abidjan by African research centre leaders. These included the heads and senior managers of CREA 
(Centre de recherches economiques appliquees) , CEDRES (Centre d'etudes, de documentation, de 
recherche economique et sociale), CIRES (Centre ivoirien de recherche economique et sociale), 
CODESRIA (Council for the development of Social Science Research in Africa), AAU (Association of 
African Universities), and several Deans of university faculties of economics. Some of these institutions 
are likely to be beneficiaries, and some of them have already received institutional support from IDRC. 
However, within IDRC, the proposal was not without controversy. It came at a time of some 
uncertainty for the staff in the IDRC Regional Office in Dakar and was seen by some outside Dakar as 
self-serving. Its original name (Secretariat for Economic Capacity Building in Africa) was abandoned 
over concerns that it would appear to overlap with AERC's mandate, and there were some strong 
views within the Centre that a new Secretariat for economic capacity building in Africa was not 
needed. 
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SISERA was designed to build on IDRC's previous institutional strengthening grants in West Africa to 
CIRES in Cote d'Ivoire, CEDRES in Burkina Faso, and CREA in Senegal. It has absorbed two major 
projects currently located in IDRC's Regional Office in Dakar (BRACO) and funded by CIDA, 
USAID, and IDRC which IDRC is responsible for coordinating. These two projects are: 
The Programme de troisieme cycle inter-universitaire (PTCI). This project is funded 
by CIDA, USAID, IDRC, ACBF, the Cooperation francaise, and the Dutch. IDRC is 
currently playing a coordinating role for CIDA and USAID which SISERA will take over 
until the current phase ends in 1999 
The Reseau sur les politiques industrielles has received funding from CIDA, USAID, 
and IDRC. SISERA will take over IDRC's role in managing the project under a 
contractual arrangement. The current funding ends in 1998 and there is a proposal for a 
new phase. 
The intent is that, as a Secretariat in IDRCBRACO with the capability to manage donor funds and 
coordinate donor initiatives, SISERA will attract other donor funds and be able to facilitate the 
consolidation and rationalization of donor support to economic research institutions in Africa. 
SISERA was approved by the IDRC Board in March 1997 and provided with $1 million over two 
years. It was anticipated that additional funding in the order of $2 million would be provided by other 
donors, some of which was already rolled over from the projects already funded by IDRC, CIDA, and 
USAID. 
2. CONTEXT 
In the past decade, Sub-Saharan Africa has undertaken a number of stabilization and structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs). The debates that have raged around these policies have been influenced 
by the international financial institutions, national governments, and certain influential groups and 
individuals, but African economic research institutions have been largely absent. Yet they should 
normally play a key role in their countries and in the region as providers of policy advice and research 
results, and be capable of intervening in both national and international policy bodies. 
Donors have some responsibility for this present situation. They have tended to support individual 
researchers to undertake specific research projects rather than supporting their institutions. This 
approach has done little to reinforce the research centres in which individuals operate, and may have 
weakened them in some instances. In particular, it has done little to reinforce poor infrastructure and 
management systems in those research centres; has promoted insufficient synergy between research and 
training; and has failed to stimulate networking among research institutions. 
SISERA aims to fill a gap in donor support by taking a holistic approach to institutional capacity 
building. This would include core institutional support, support for collaborative research and 
networking among institutions, and interventions designed to strengthen the management and human 
resources of those institutions. 
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Such interventions require careful monitoring and management; two activities which demand more 
oversight than most donors can provide. SISERA can provide this oversight role for donor funds and 
thus expects to increase donor confidence in supporting economic research institutions. IDRC/BRACO 
is well placed to provide the technical and administrative services that SISERA offers. It has developed 
and managed institutional support grants in the past and coordinated the projects that were rolled into 
the Secretariat. In addition, it has a bilingual staff familiar with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
3. MISSION AND OBJECTIVES 
SISERA's mission is to help strengthen African economic research centres through coordinated donor 
action, and thus enable them to perform better and become full-fledged partners in the international 
research community. SISERA's mission is pursued through the following objectives: 
Improve working conditions and incentive systems in research centres 
Improve managerial capacity and governance structures 
Facilitate networking among research centres and research users 
Facilitate funding of commissioned research work 
Support training activities for researchers through their research centres 
Improve the dissemination of research results. 
4. FUNDING AND FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
SISERA has an operating budget of $3.27 million for the first two years. This includes $1 million from 
IDRC to SISERA and approximately $2 million which have been rolled over from the earlier two 
projects. This will enable it to carry out its planned activities for the first two years, but will not be 
sufficient to sustain operations without new resources. One of the major tasks of the Executive 
Director is therefore to secure additional resources before April 1999. Some of these resources may 
come from IDRC projects but funds will also be required from outside sources such as the World 
Bank, the European Union, the African Development Bank, and some bilateral donor agencies. 
In addition to the money provided for project implementation by the two rolled-over projects, USAID 
is contributing salaries for the project officer, project assistant, and secretary, as well as office rent and 
office expenses, travel and communications. IDRC is providing the salary for the part-time Executive 
Director in kind, in addition to the $1 million grant. If additional funds are provided by donors during 
the first two years, these will be used to increase the grants made to African economic research 
institutions. 
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5. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
SISERA has established a Steering Committee, a Technical Advisory Committee, and a Secretariat. 
STEERING COMMITTEE The Steering Committee establishes the program of work for the 
Secretariat, approves the budget, and commissions regular evaluations. It is composed of 
representatives of SISERA's three donors (USAID, CIDA, and IDRC) and representatives from the 
Association of African Universities (AAU), the AERC, and the UN Economic Commission for Africa. 
TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE The Technical Advisory Committee assists the Secretariat in 
developing its strategy and work plan and participates in the selection of research centres for 
institutional support, as well as providing general technical support and advice. It consists of leading 
experts in the field as well as representatives of African economic research institutions. 
SECRETARIAT The staff of the Secretariat includes an Executive Director, a Project Officer, a 
Project Assistant, and a Secretary. The Secretariat is housed in IDRCBRACO. 
6. ACTIVITIES 
SISERA works through six modalities to achieve its objectives. These are: 
Core institutional grants 
Collaborative thematic research 
Managerial capacity building 
Support for sabbaticals and internships 
Electronic connectivity 
Dissemination, publication and outreach. 
CORE INSTITUTIONAL GRANTS Core institutional grants are the main modality for SISERA support. 
Their purpose is to enable research centres to develop and implement research programs that have 
strong local input and are thus more likely to be relevant to local end-users. The institutional grants will 
include small grants schemes to be administered by the institutions themselves. Such grants usually 
cover the purchase of research support facilities (books, academic journals, databases, computers and 
software), staff training, seminars, participation in research meetings, and costs of publishing research 
output. It is proposed to limit these grants to $250,000 each and to provide approximately two per 
year. 
COLLABORATIVE THEMATICRESEARCH Grants for collaborative thematic research allow a 
research centre to engage in a major research program, often at a regional level, in which it wishes to 
collaborate with researchers in other institutions. Two possible themes for collaborative research 
networks are agricultural policy and participation of women in African economies. Funding for such 
regional research initiatives is particularly hard to find in Africa, but it should be noted that the 
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agricultural policy theme overlaps with one of the projects being planned with multidonor funding 
under the Trade, Employment and Competitiveness Program Initiative for West and Central Africa. 
MANAGERIAL CAPACITY BUILDING SISERA assists research centres to strengthen their managerial 
capacity by disseminating best practices electronically and through meetings and providing fora where 
managers can discuss their problems and potential solutions. SISERA will consider providing or 
supporting training to staff of research institutions. 
SUPPORT FOR SABBATICALS AND INTERNSHIPS These grants will allow civil servants, through 
financial support, to visit research centres and research scholars and conduct research in policy-making 
agencies. Support will also be given to help African researchers visit research institutions in other 
countries. 
ELECTRONIC CONNECTIVITY One of the important goals of SISERA is to facilitate African 
researchers' access to the Internet and to email in order to reduce their current isolation. SISERA 
plans to assess the connectivity of all partner institutions and collaborate in its effort with the IDRC 
Unganisha project. 
DISSEMINATION, PUBLICATION AND OUTREACH The lack of appropriate publication outlets is 
seen as a major obstacle to African researchers gaining visibility and credibility for their work. 
SISERA will support a newsletter entitled Economic Research in Africa and provide support for the 
main academic journals in Africa such as the West African Economic Journal and the East African 
Economic Review. Support will be provided to enable African researchers to participate in scientific 
meetings and present their results at dissemination events for parliamentarians, journalists, business 
people, and trade unions. 
7. LESSONS 
SISERA has been established for just over one year. The general consensus of all those interviewed 
who are familiar with SISERA is that it is too early to say what lessons SISERA holds for IDRC in 
understanding its international Secretariat mechanism. However, some concerns about SISERA echo 
the lessons learned earlier in other Secretariats. These include the difficulty that SISERA is facing in 
attracting additional funds to ensure the Secretariat's long term viability and the lack of a full time 
Executive Director. The two are not unrelated: the task to bring new funding partners on board within 
the next two years, in addition to implementing the programs, is very difficult for a part-time Executive 
Director. There is also some ambiguity about priorities and loyalties when an Executive Director works 
for both IDRC Programs and for a Secretariat, particularly when they feel pulled in several directions 
and burdened by a heavy workload. 
On the positive side, SISERA has demonstrated that there is a need for institutional support for 
African economic research institutions and that good proposals are coming into SISERA. At present, 
the demand side is alive and well: it is the supply side that needs attention. 




IDRC Project Proposal (PNM) SISERA (96-8153-01), Approved by the IDRC Board 
in March 1997 
SISERA Proposed Work Program and Budget 1997-98, December 1997 
SISERA: Proposal for Monitoring, December 1997 
SISERA Minutes of Dakar Partner Institutions Meeting, April 9-10, 1998 
An analysis of francophone economic research centres in Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, 
and Senegal, Seck, Diery, January 1998 
Interviews with members of SISERA Steering Committee, and Secretariat and IDRC 
staff and management. 
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WETV began with a series of consultations on the problems of producing and accessing programs 
produced in the South. These consultations that took place between 1987 and 1992 involved 
broadcast and other experts in developing countries. These consultations led to the bold idea that a 
global access television broadcast service providing opportunities for local independent producers 
could be achieved through innovative public-private sector partnerships. It was led by the founder and 
first CEO of Vision TV, a successful satellite to cable speciality service, which saw the possibilities at a 
global level. 
At the outset, WETV was seen as an IDRC Agenda 21 initiative responding to the challenge of the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development to create global outreach and a closing of the North- 
South gap in information and broadcasting. The restructuring of IDRC in March 1992 eliminated the 
Communications Program Division, although some of its functions were transferred elsewhere, and 
freed the former Director to work full-time as Executive Director of Broadcasting on the Ventures in 
Development Partnerships initiative which was to become WETV. 
The initiative began in April 1992 as a one year in-house feasibility study in which the demand for a 
global service was assessed, partners were identified for both producing the programming in the South 
and for purchasing or sponsoring it in the North, and models of how WETV would work both 
technically, financially, and programmatically were explored. At the end of the one year feasibility 
study, the Executive Director prepared a proposal for IDRC to fund a major $1 million project over 
two years to undertake the research and development needed to establish an independent WETV 
company. It was agreed that he would formally leave IDRC to lead this project. The project was 
presented by the President to the IDRC Board of Governors which approved it in March 1993. WETV 
was established as an IDRC Secretariat and located in IDRC headquarters in Ottawa. 
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2. CONTEXT 
Several elements of the context made WETV possible. First, there were compelling development 
reasons to think about an alternative global access television service that could help to free developing 
countries from northern electronic and broadcast domination. Everyone recognized that broadcast 
media are a pervasive and profound influence in the North and increasingly in the South. 
Democratization of information was seen as a development priority, and support for developing 
country producers and broadcasters as one important means to that democratization. The globalization 
of the world economy was seen as paralleled by the emergence of a world culture sweeping the values 
of western industrialized societies across all cultures and regions. In this initiative, IDRC saw itself as 
positioned at the leading edge of development donors. 
Another contextual factor was Canadian public policy. Canada saw itself as an innovator in broadcast 
technologies, telecommunications, and multi-cultural programming. CIDA already had a track record 
in supporting telecommunications and broadcast infrastructures in developing countries and in 
supporting R&D in communications. The third relevant contextual factor was IDRC's internal policy. 
IDRC was looking for innovative ideas on which partnerships could be built and that would extend 
IDRC's visibility in Canada and overseas beyond its traditional research partners. WETV was expected 
to put IDRC on the map within Canada and globally. 
3. GOAL, MISSION, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGY 
GOAL Through the use of television on a global scale, WETV's goal was to support cultural 
and social self-expression in developing countries for their development, and for the exchange of 
information and knowledge in a South-North and South-South fashion, particularly in environment and 
sustainable development matters. 
MISSION The Secretariat's mission was to promote sustainable development and the expression 
of cultural diversity through the creative use of new and existing communications media. 
OBJECTIVES WETV had four main objectives: 
To support and undertake research and development for the creation of an alternative 
global access television service with southern and northern country public and private 
sector partners 
To create an international Secretariat to undertake the convening of an international 
partnership consortium for this purpose, and to manage the day-to-day activities related to 
this effort 
To establish a Steering Committee to advise and guide the Secretariat in its function, 
including representatives of partners in the venture 
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To create, within a three-year period, an independent organization that would carry out 
long term financing and operation of a global access television service, and to hand off the 
activities of the Secretariat to this organization. 
STRATEGY Four main areas were to be explored in the R&D phase: 
Determine the appropriate technological options 
Determine and shape appropriate national, regional, and international policy options for 
sending and receiving programming and use of technologies 
Determine audience demand and needs 
Determine alternative structures for the financing and operation of a global access 
television service, including scale of start-up, country participants, revenue generating 
devices and the use of parallel broadcasting. 
4. FUNDING AND FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
IDRC provided $90,000 and the full time services of the Executive Director for a year to undertake a 
feasibility study for WETV during 1992-93. This was successfully completed by March 1993. The 
Centre then made a two-year grant of $1 million in March 1993. From the outset, the IDRC 
Secretariat phase of WETV was seen as two years only. The plan then became to establish it as an 
independent organization which would leave IDRC. WETV said that it would try to match the $1 
million provided by IDRC by raising funds from other donors within the two year period. In fact, it 
exceeded this target, raising just over $1.2 million. 
WETV's financial difficulties occurred in the period April-October 1995 after the successful 
conclusion to the R&D Phase and at a time when WETV was planning to change from an IDRC 
Secretariat to an independent organization. There was an important opportunity to launch the service 
at the International Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995. During the period April-June 
1995, discussions took place whether to go ahead or not with the planned launch. It appeared that it 
would require major expenditures before promised financial contributions were likely to be received. 
This financial exposure and risk is not uncommon in launching business ventures but it was not a 
familiar scenario for IDRC. Although the WETV Executive Director had always been very open about 
the status of promised contributions, both with IDRC management and with the IDRC Board, there 
was a systems breakdown in communications over a period of several critical months in 1995, when 
the financial situation of WETV and the financial exposure of IDRC were not communicated to the 
Board. 
Between April and October 1995, it became evident that IDRC would have to advance funds in order 
to complete the planned activities through the launch of the service. The amount of expenditures over 
and above the IDRC approved allocation amounted to about $600,000. In October 1995, the IDRC 
Board approved a supplemental allocation of $300,000 which was specified for production activities 
not related to the WETV launch, and authorized advances of $915,000 to defray on-going operational 
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expenses to keep WETV solvent until March 31, 1996. At this time, the WETV Secretariat formally 
closed and the assets were transferred to a new legal entity: WETV Development. 
The funds provided to the WETV Secretariat therefore included the $1 million original grant, 
$615,000 to cover the over-run, $300,00 as an advance for future expenses and $300,000 as a grant 
for 1995-96. As the table below shows, IDRC provided 57% of the nearly $4.5 million budget during 
the time it was a Secretariat in IDRC. 
FUNDS PROVIDED TO WETV DURING ITS PERIOD AS AN IDRC SECRETARIAT 1993-1996 
Donor 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 Total $ Percent 
IDRC 1,000,000 1,565,000 2,565,000 57% 
CIDA 50,000 50,000 300,000 400,000 9% 
Min/Comm 350,000 350,000 8% 
Min/Indus 40,000 40,000 1% 
IISD 50,000 14,000 64,000 1% 
Teleglobe Can 200,000 200,000 4% 
MFA 134,328 134,328 3% 
COL 50,000 25,000 75,000 2% 
TVE 56,535 56,535 1% 
WB 48,784 118,975 167,759 4% 
PANICARO 250,000 250,000 6% 
Other 13,287 46,058 130186 189,531 4% 
Total 1,569,822 634,842 2,287,489 4,492,153 100% 
From the beginning, WETV was planned to be an innovative experiment in public-private sector 
partnership for broadcasting, with a complex and ambitious funding structure. After the feasibility 
study which was entirely funded by IDRC, four phases were envisaged, each with its own funding 
structure. 
Feasibility study April 1992-March 1993 $90,000 plus 1 PY 
R&D Phase April 1993-March 1995 $2,204,664 
Pre-launch Phase April-September 1995 $1,340,000 
Start-up Phase Sept. 1995- August 1996 $10 million (projected) 
Operational Phase September 1996 - 
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R&D PHASE During the R&D Phase, the funding formula was a membership fee structure with 
international agencies and national broadcasters paying an annual fee which would entitle them to 
shape the network through their participation in the WETV Steering Committee and, in the case of 
broadcasters, to use the membership as an investment for preferential access to WETV services in the 
first three years of its operation.. 
PRE LAUNCHPHASE The Pre-Launch Phase was a six month period leading up to the Fourth 
United Nations Conference on Women, in September 1995, where the WETV service was launched 
providing about 2 hours of programming a day from Beijing for 17 days to 10 broadcasting services 
(Canada, Mexico, Caribbean region, Ukraine, Chile, India, Thailand, South Africa, Namibia, and 
China). The cost was estimated to be $1,340,000 for programming, operations, securing satellite time, 
and up-link facilities. The funding structure was foreseen as $300,000 from bilateral and multilateral 
agencies, $340,000 from existing WETV partners, and $700,000 from the private sector. The funding 
from other sources did not meet these expectations and IDRC had to act as the fonder of last resort. 
START-UPPHASE The estimated cost of the start-up which would take a year from the launch 
(September 1995- August 1996) was approximately $10 million. 
WETV ceased to be an IDRC Secretariat in March 1996 during the Start-Up Phase and by that time 
had developed its own legal structure. 
5. MANAGEMENT 
WETV operated as a Secretariat in IDRC for three years from April 1993 until March 1996. It was 
one of the first Secretariats and its operations began before the IDRC Policy on Secretariats was 
elaborated. In practice, WETV's contracts were reviewed and signed by authorized IDRC officers, it 
used IDRC to hire its staff, and its financial officer was recruited within the Centre. 
The Secretariat also reported to an International Steering Group which was composed of 
representatives of organizations purchasing memberships, and of a few key international figures. The 
terms of reference for the Steering Group included reviewing the strategic plan, overseeing the 
planning and operation of the Secretariat, and meeting twice a year during the R&D phase. Once 
WETV was established as an independent legal entity, the Steering Group's role would be taken over 
by a Board of Directors. The Steering Group met twice and their opinions were also sought 
electronically, but they were a large group and, in any case, could not perform any effective oversight 
role with respect to Secretariat operations. 
THE OVERSIGHT ROLE OF THE IDRC BOARD WETV was an unusual venture for IDRC, as it fell 
outside of its normal granting procedures and programs, and involved a large commitment of funds. In 
approving the grant, the Board specifically requested the President to provide the Board and the 
Executive Committee with regular progress reports, starting in October 1993. 
LEARNING PARTNERSHIPS: A REVIEW OF IDRC SECRETARIATS 209 CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
The Executive Director provided regular reports until March 1995. He supplied information on 
projected funding, the meetings of the WETV Steering Committee, and, in response to a request from 
the Board, in January 1995, he presented a detailed business plan for raising start-up funds and 
financing the network The Governors were generally supportive of the initiative but there were 
concerns about WETV's financial viability and the financial implications for IDRC. They were also 
faced with a number of governance issues about how IDRC would relate to WETV once it was 
established as an independent organization. 
The Governors were asked to consider how IDRC wished to be involved in WETV once it was 
successfully launched. In March 1995, the Board agreed that an Ad Hoc Committee of the Board be 
established to oversee IDRC's on-going involvement with WETV but the Committee did not meet 
until October, just prior to the Board meeting. At that time, in October 1995, a report was provided to 
the Board with an update on the launch of WETV in Beijing in September and the new legal structure 
for WETV. This included: 
WETV Program Corporation (a not-for-profit entity) being incorporated in Canada to 
provide the overall content and quality assurance needed to keep WETV to its 
development mandate and to represent the interest of the donor community and southern 
NGOs in WETV International. IDRC was to be a member of the nominating committee for 
the Trustees of WETV Program and would sit on the Standards and Practices Advisory 
Council which was an executive body of WETV Program Corporation responsible for 
monitoring and making decisions on the standards and practices relating to Mosaic partners 
in the network 
WETV International Corporation (a for-profit entity) which was in the process of being 
incorporated in the Caribbean. This would be the business centre of WETV. It would 
receive investments and be responsible for managing and investing funds in relation to the 
operation of the service. It was proposed that IDRC's grant be rolled into WETV Program 
Corporation in the form of non-participating shares in WETV International 
WETV Development Corporation which was already incorporated to assume WETV's 
assets and liabilities from IDRC and was intended to exist for one year only and be located 
in Ottawa. 
It was at the October 1995 meeting that the Board also learned that the grants from the other donors 
had not been received as expected and that IDRC had advanced approximately $615,000 to WETV 
since April 1, 1995 to cover operational costs, contingent on reimbursement from other sources. The 
Board was asked to approve this advance and to provide further advance funds to cover the 
operational costs of the new WETV Development Corporation, up to a maximum of a further 
$500,000. Governors were also told that there was strong investor interest in WETV from the private 
sector amounting to more than $9.3 million. 
The Board spent several hours in camera discussing WETV at the October 1995 Board meeting. 
Their specific response to the question of the over-run on the budget was to approve it but to appoint 
an Ad Hoc Committee of the Board and an independent outside investigator to look into what went 
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wrong and to recommend actions to avoid a re-occurrence of any similar situation within IDRC in the 
future. The investigator, a former IDRC Governor with outstanding financial and managerial expertise, 
reported in November 1995 to the Ad Hoc Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee endorsed each of the 
nine recommendations in the report and forwarded their own report to all Governors in December 
1995. 
In January 1996, another meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee learnt that no private sector investment 
had been forthcoming to date and that WETV had immediate short-term funding requirements. The Ad 
Hoc Committee reported to the Executive Committee of the IDRC Board on February 1, 1996 and it 
was agreed that: 
IDRC should immediately move to finalize the incorporation of WETV Program and help 
to set up the Board of WETV Development Corporation 
IDRC should enter into an agreement with WETV Development in order to transfer to it 
all IDRC assets and liabilities regarding WETV 
The $915,000 already advanced to WETV should be converted into WETV Mosaic air 
time in favour of the Centre 
IDRC should provide WETV with accommodation until March 31, 1996 and a further 
modest grant. 
In presenting the report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the Board in March 1996, the Chair of the 
Committee also reported that the Minister and the Auditor General had been informed of the situation. 
6. PERFORMANCE AND CURRENT STATUS 
WETV was a venture in both innovative programming and in public-private sector partnership in 
broadcasting. In its third year at IDRC, it faced a shortfall of funding for its launch and IDRC became 
the donor of last resort. But in terms of achieving its program goals and having a successful launch of 
the service in Beijing in September 1995, it did achieve its targets. It broadcast from the UN 
Conference on Women via satellite to 34 broadcasting networks or stations covering 50 countries. 
WETV also achieved its goals with respect to incorporation and private-public sector partnership. The 
WETV network is made up of for-profit and not-for-profit entities working in partnership. It was 
selected to be the official carrier of the UN Habitat Conference in Istanbul in June 1996 and launched 
regular programming of a few hours daily on October 15, 1996. 
Today, the WETV broadcast signal is transmitted to 38 broadcast affiliates in 30 countries using the 
latest in satellite technologies. In two more years, it is anticipated that more than 60 affiliates and 
broadcasters will join the WETV network. WETV is using independent producers from around the 
world, including many developing countries, as initially envisaged. The continuing challenge in raising 
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funds means that the hours of programming are still limited to a few hours a week. Broadcasters also 
need time to develop confidence in WETV and to open a WETV time slot in their program schedule. 
Each affiliate has a tailor-made contract which ensures that an inability to pay fees for programming 
does not stand in the way of participation in the network. Affiliates can participate by purchasing 
programming, providing programming in-kind, sharing programming fees, or providing a small fee for 
the service. 
Revenues to support WETV now come from Mosaic Partners. They provide core funding grants 
which also enable their own public information and documentaries to be aired; corporate sponsors; 
advertising; affiliate contributions to programming; and program sales to other networks. Programs are 
in three series: Living Together, Voices and Visions and Tapestry and provide a genuine international 
outlet for independent producers. 
For the Habitat II Conference, WETV teamed up with Apple Computer to produce a webcast from 
Istanbul, combining Internet and television technology. To facilitate the participation by people in 
developing countries who did not have access to the Internet, Apple Computer provided two 
experimental access points in Montevideo and Mexico City. The webcast provided electronic 
discussion groups and on-line facilities for people to vote on the issues being negotiated by 
government delegates to the Conference. The site was so successful that Microsoft Network 
nominated the webcast as Pick of the Week. People from at least 79 countries participated interactively 
in the webcast. 
Five years after it was started by IDRC, WETV is still on the air and is still one of the most innovative 
ideas around in broadcasting. The Executive Director acknowledges that WETV's first three years as 
an IDRC Secretariat were critical to its success today. 
7. LESSONS 
INITIAL LACK OF CLEAR POLICY GUIDELINES FOR SECRETARIATS WETV is seen as a key 
learning experience for IDRC and led directly to the process which created the Policy Guidelines for 
IDRC Secretariats. The Secretariats were created with the intention of giving them considerable 
independence and freedom in operating. This was a problem from the beginning for IDRC management 
as the Executive Directors of the first Secretariats operated on the assumption that they were 
independent of IDRC and reported directly to their Steering Committees or Boards as well as to the 
President of IDRC. When WETV was first established, there were few policies in place and no explicit 
recognition that the authority granted to the Secretariat Steering Committee in its terms of reference 
was, in fact, retained by the IDRC Board. 
One month after the WETV Secretariat was established, questions began to arise about the authority of 
Executive Directors of Secretariats who were consultants to IDRC and fell outside the normal 
structure for delegated authority from the Board. The liaison function with IDRC for the three existing 
Secretariats (MI, SIFR, and WETV) was placed in the office of the Director General for Resources 
and was to deal with start-up issues, policy development, and problem solving. Executive Directors 
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were able to authorize office expenses and other minor expenditures but major expenses such as travel 
and staff salaries had to be authorized by the Director General for Resources. 
THEINDEPENDENTINVESTIGATOR 'S REPORT The Independent Investigator's report identified a 
number of lessons with respect to the financial management of Secretariats, their relationship to IDRC, 
and the information provided to the Board. He noted that the Secretariats' independence and the 
promotion of an arm's length relationship with IDRC reduced the amount of scrutiny that IDRC senior 
management exercised over them. 
He also noted that the Board approved the $1 million initial grant on the basis of a concept paper 
rather than any formal project documentation. The Board accepted the best case scenario rather then 
even considering a worst case scenario for an initiative that was ambitious, path-breaking and outside 
IDRC's traditional competence and experience. 
There were obvious lessons about financial accounting practices in IDRC, and the need to ensure that 
anticipated contributions were not assumed to be actual cash contributions. The financial accounting 
system used for the WETV Secretariat had a number of problems, some of which appear to be related 
to IDRC's financial reporting system, and some others more specifically related to WETV's financial 
records. 
One major problem was that expressions of support for WETV were included as committed 
contributions before they were received, which led to an over-optimistic picture of the income side of 
the ledger. In addition, a number of commitments and liabilities were not recorded and when these had 
to be paid, it became apparent that expenditures would be exceeding revenues. Another problem was 
that there was inadequate financial reporting, particularly with respect to cash flow statements. 
Projected best case scenarios were used as the basis for operating the Secretariat rather than actual 
revenue. Thus the May 1995 statement of accounts showed a positive balance of over $300,000 when 
the actual cash position was a negative one of over $1 million. 
The Independent Investigator also recommended that future financial reports from Secretariats going 
to the Board, Executive and Finance and Audit Committees be prepared by IDRC Financial Services 
and signed off by them. This was to ensure that, in the future, a high standard of financial information 
on Secretariats is presented to the Board to allow it to make informed decisions. He reported that the 
IDRC Board did not receive accurate financial information on WETV for several months during 1995 
as the over-run built up. Even when there was a cash deficit in March 1995, it was assumed that other 
funding would cover the shortfall and the situation was not reported to the Board. 
Other recommendations of the Independent Investigator's report were that all Secretariats be subject to 
the same policies and processes as the rest of the Centre unless there was a specific reason for doing 
otherwise, that the Steering Committees review the annual budget and financial activities of 
Secretariats, that the President's Designate on the Steering Committee be accountable for ensuring that 
the Centre's responsibilities are fulfilled, and that separate bank accounts be opened for Secretariats 
where the volume of activity warrants it. 
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THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE IDRC BOARD With the benefit of hindsight, another lesson 
can be learned from the WETV experience. From the outset in 1993, the Board discussions on WETV 
reflected a number of concerns about the very ambitious nature of the project, the quality of 
information being presented to the Board, and the fact that the initiative was beyond the competence of 
IDRC. The Board was also worried that IDRC was getting in too deeply as WETV moved towards its 
operational phase and was, in practice, the funder of last resort for an activity that required millions of 
dollars. 
Governors openly expressed their individual misgivings about WETV at the Board meetings. But the 
operational style of the Board seemed to mitigate against it being proactive as a body in requiring that 
information be provided to it or in taking action. The WETV experience was seen by Governors 
themselves as a lesson in gaining a better sense of their responsibility for governance of the Centre and 
of the potential liabilities that IDRC might incur when it got involved with complex private-public 
sector investment ventures. This reinforced their determination to transfer IDRC's assets and liabilities 
to the independent WETV Development Corporation as rapidly as possible 
The WETV experience also appears to be a major turning point in the confidence the Governors had in 
the reliability, quality, and the timeliness of the information presented to them by IDRC and therefore in 
the Board's ability to be an effective oversight body. These concerns still reverberate with some 
Governors today as they consider how the Board can be more effective and improve its knowledge and 
information sources on IDRC Secretariats and programs. 
LINKAGEBETWEENSECRETARIATSAND IDRC One of the difficulties encountered by WETV, 
and also reported by other Secretariats, was the inadequate mechanisms linking the Secretariat to 
program and management structures in IDRC. Secretariats, even in the same building in Ottawa, were 
physically isolated from program divisions (now Programs Branch) and the nurturing environment in 
terms of intellectual exchange between Secretariat staff and IDRC program staff did not take place as 
much as the WETV Executive Director had hoped. The need to be heard and critiqued by experts 
within the Centre was not met. Instead, there was a feeling of abandonment and an uncomfortable 
sense of free-floating. 
Furthermore, there did not seem to be any effective mechanisms to make the formal accountability 
framework to senior management or the Board really work. WETV felt that no one in IDRC was 
listening or was sympathetic to what they had to say. This created problems when they had to operate 
more in a business mode to raise capitalization by hiring well known outside legal and financial 
advisors, or spent money on promotional material. This was not a style of doing business that IDRC 
was comfortable with. 
Another lesson was that the financial reporting system used by IDRC did not provide the information 
needed by an enterprise like WETV - which was making frequent cash expenditures - to track its 
finances, especially to know its immediate cash flow situation. This problem has been pointed to by 
other Executive Directors who have essentially put in place parallel financial tracking systems, but such 
a system was not developed in WETV while it was a Secretariat. 
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IDRCASANEFFECTIvEINCUBATOR Despite cash flow problems around the time of the launch, and 
the crisis concerning IDRC's communications with the Board about the financial situation, a major 
lesson to be learned from the WETV experience is that IDRC made WETV happen. Without the early 
support, both financial and institutional, WETV would not have been able to demonstrate that its 
innovative approach to public-private sector broadcasting could work. Neither would the more than 
400 hours of previously unseen broadcasting from development agencies have been aired to date. 
While the WETV experience had its uncomfortable moments for people in both WETV and IDRC, it 
showed that the Secretariat mechanism worked well as a time-limited incubator of a creative new 
organization. 
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